- Actually-Rigidified Descriptivism Revisited.Jesper Kallestrup - 2012 - Dialectica 66 (1):5-21.details
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Belief as Question‐Sensitive.Seth Yalcin - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 97 (1):23-47.details
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Empty Singular Terms in the Mental-File Framework.François Recanati - 2014 - In Manuel García-Carpintero & Genoveva Martí (eds.), Empty Representations: Reference and Non-Existence. New York, NY: Oxford University Press. pp. 162-185.details
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Cognitive Significance.Aidan Gray - 2021 - In Heimir Geirsson & Stephen Biggs (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Linguistic Reference. New York: Routledge.details
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Belief, Truth, and Ways of Believing.Johannes Stern - 2021 - In Carlo Nicolai & Johannes Stern (eds.), Modes of Truth: The Unified Approach to Truth, Modality, and Paradox. New York, NY: Routledge.details
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Direct reference and the Goldbach puzzle.Stefan Rinner - 2024 - Theoria 90 (1):8-16.details
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Fregean senses, modes of presentation, and concepts.Edward N. Zalta - 2001 - Philosophical Perspectives 15:335-359.details
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Quantifying In from a Fregean Perspective.Seth Yalcin - 2015 - Philosophical Review 124 (2):207-253.details
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On Belief Content and That-Clauses.William W. Taschek - 1995 - Mind and Language 10 (3):274-298.details
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Is It Merely Loose Talk?⋆.Alberto Voltolini - 2000 - Dialectica 54 (1):51-72.details
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To think is to have something in one’s thought.Alberto Voltolini & Elisabetta Sacchi - 2012 - Quaestio 12:395-422.details
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How I Really Say What You Think.José Manuel Viejo - 2021 - Axiomathes 31 (3):251-277.details
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How I Really Say What You Think.José Manuel Viejo - 2021 - Axiomathes 31 (3):251-277.details
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Complex demonstratives, singular thought, and belief attributions.José Manuel Viejo - 2022 - Synthese 200 (1):1-27.details
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Le retour du psychologisme en théorie de la signification.Richard Vallée - 1995 - Dialogue 34 (4):777-.details
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A Puzzle about Communication.Matheus Valente & Andrea Onofri - 2023 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 14 (3):1035-1054.details
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De Re And De Dicto: Against The Conventional Wisdom.Ken Taylor - 2002 - Noûs 36 (s16):225-265.details
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Are concepts mental representations or abstracta?John Sutton - 2004 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (1):89-108.details
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Are Concepts Mental Representations or Abstracta?Jonathan Sutton - 2004 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (1):89 - 108.details
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What is Said, Linguistic Meaning, and Directly Referential Expressions.Isidora Stojanovic - 2006 - Philosophy Compass 1 (4):373-397.details
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Mental Files, Blown Up by Indexed Files.Isidora Stojanovic & Neftalí Villanueva Fernández - 2015 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 58 (4):393-407.details
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Profligate or abstemious Millianism.D. Sosa - 2013 - Analysis 73 (1):51-56.details
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On Mates's puzzle.Andrés Soria-Ruiz - 2023 - Mind and Language 38 (2):515-544.details
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Particularity of Content and Illusions of Identity.Błażej Skrzypulec - 2018 - Axiomathes 28 (5):491-506.details
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Three Problems for Richard’s Theory of Belief Ascription.Theodore Sider - 1995 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 25 (4):487 - 513.details
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Can Truth‐Conditional Theorists of Content Do Without ‘That’‐Clause Ascriptions?Lionel Shapiro - 2020 - Analytic Philosophy 61 (1):1-27.details
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The binding argument and pragmatic enrichment, or, why philosophers care even more than weathermen about 'raining'.Adam Sennet - 2007 - Philosophy Compass 3 (1):135-157.details
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The Binding Argument and Pragmatic Enrichment, or, Why Philosophers Care Even More Than Weathermen about ‘Raining’.Adam Sennet - 2008 - Philosophy Compass 3 (1):135-157.details
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Why be an anti-individualist?Laura Schroeter - 2008 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 77 (1):105-141.details
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A problem for a direct-reference theory of belief reports.Stephen Schiffer - 2006 - Noûs 40 (2):361-368.details
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The Best of Intentions: Ignorance, Idiosyncrasy, and Belief Reporting.Jennifer Saul - 1999 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 29 (1):29 - 47.details
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Still an attitude problem.Jennifer M. Saul - 1993 - Linguistics and Philosophy 16 (4):423 - 435.details
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Fictional Names and the Problem of Intersubjective Identification.Fiora Salis - 2013 - Dialectica 67 (3):283-301.details
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Being of Two Minds: Belief with Doubt.Nathan Salmon - 1995 - Noûs 29 (1):1-20.details
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Concept Cartesianism, Concept Pragmatism, and Frege Cases.Bradley Rives - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 144 (2):211-238.details
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The multiple relation theory and Schiffer’s puzzle.Stefan Rinner - 2020 - Synthese 198 (10):1-21.details
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Recanati on 'That'-clauses.Stafan Rinner - 2021 - Res Philosophica 98 (4):619-626.details
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Naive Russellians and Schiffer’s Puzzle.Stefan Rinner - 2020 - Erkenntnis 87 (2):787-806.details
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A Puzzle about Logical Analysis.Stefan Rinner - 2021 - Philosophia 50 (2):691-698.details
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Why and How to Fill an Unfilled Proposition.Samuel C. Rickless - 2011 - Theoria 78 (1):6-25.details
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Attitudes in context.Mark Richard - 1993 - Linguistics and Philosophy 16 (2):123 - 148.details
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Replies to the papers in the issue "Recanati on Mental Files".François Recanati - 2015 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 58 (4):408-437.details
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Replies.François Recanati - 2015 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 58 (4):408-437.details
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Quasi-Singular Propositions: The Semantics of Belief Reports.François Récanati & Mark Crimmins - 1995 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 69 (1):175 - 209.details
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Predication, fiction, and artificial intelligence.William J. Rapaport - 1991 - Topoi 10 (1):79-111.details
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Mental Graphs.James Pryor - 2016 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 7 (2):309-341.details
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The price of innocent millianism.Stefano Predelli - 2004 - Erkenntnis 60 (3):335-356.details
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Scare quotes and their relation to other semantic issues.Stefano Predelli - 2003 - Linguistics and Philosophy 26 (1):1-28.details
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Sub-sentential speech and the traditional view.Stefano Predelli - 2011 - Linguistics and Philosophy 34 (6):571-588.details
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How to refrain from answering Kripke’s puzzle.Lewis Powell - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 161 (2):287-308.details
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