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De re and De se.François Recanati - 2009 - Dialectica 63 (3):249-269.details
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De re and De se.François Recanati - 2009 - Dialectica 63 (3):249-269.details
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¿Soluciona el descriptivismo causal el problema de la referencia de los términos teóricos?Bruno Borge - 2017 - Ideas Y Valores 66 (163):125-151.details
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Does causal descriptivism solve the problem of reference of theoretical terms?Bruno Borge - 2017 - Ideas Y Valores 66 (163):125-151.details
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Communicating and Disagreeing with Distinct Concepts: A Defense of Semantic Internalism.Matheus Valente - 2019 - Theoria 85 (4):312-336.details
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Knowledge-yielding communication.Andrew Peet - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (12):3303-3327.details
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Thought by description.Michael Mckinsey - 2008 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 78 (1):83-102.details
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The supervenience of truth: freewill and omniscience.Storrs McCall - 2011 - Analysis 71 (3):501-506.details
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Proper Names.Josep Macià - 2004 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 34 (sup1):129-155.details
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Luck and the Value of Communication.Megan Hyska - 2023 - Synthese 201 (96):1-19.details
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The Presentational Use of Descriptions.Michael R. Hicks - 2019 - Analytic Philosophy 60 (4):361-384.details
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Speaker’s Reference, Semantic Reference, and Intuition.Richard G. Heck - 2018 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 9 (2):251-269.details
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The limits of selflessness: semantic relativism and the epistemology of de se thoughts.Marie Guillot - 2013 - Synthese 190 (10):1793-1816.details
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Sense, Reference and contemporary predicativism.Karen Green - 2022 - Semiotica 245 (245):99-123.details
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Name-bearing, reference, and circularity.Aidan Gray - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 171 (2):207-231.details
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Singular Reference in Fictional Discourse?Manuel García-Carpintero - 2019 - Disputatio 11 (54):143-177.details
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Naming and Nonexistence.Neil Feit - 2009 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 47 (3):239-262.details
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You can call me 'stupid', ... just don't call me stupid.Delia Graff Fara - 2011 - Analysis 71 (3):492-501.details
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