- Frankfurt and the folk: An experimental investigation of Frankfurt-style cases.Jason S. Miller & Adam Feltz - 2011 - Consciousness and Cognition 20 (2):401-414.details
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(1 other version)A Hard-line Reply to Pereboom’s Four-Case Manipulation Argument.Michael Mckenna - 2008 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 77 (1):142-159.details
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A very brief measure of the Big-Five personality domains.Samuel D. Gosling, Peter J. Rentfrow & William B. Swann Jr - 2003 - Journal of Research in Personality 37 (6):504-528.details
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The Significance of Free Will.Robert Kane - 1996 - New York, US: Oxford University Press USA.details
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(3 other versions)Freedom of the will and the concept of a person.Harry G. Frankfurt - 1971 - Journal of Philosophy 68 (1):5-20.details
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The Philosophical Personality Argument.Adam Feltz & Edward T. Cokely - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 161 (2):227-246.details
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Perspective in intentional action attribution.Adam Feltz, Maegan Harris & Ashley Perez - 2012 - Philosophical Psychology 25 (5):673-687.details
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Pereboom and premises: Asking the right questions in the experimental philosophy of free will.Adam Feltz - 2013 - Consciousness and Cognition 22 (1):53-63.details
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Natural compatibilism versus natural incompatibilism: Back to the drawing board.Adam Feltz, Edward T. Cokely & Thomas Nadelhoffer - 2009 - Mind and Language 24 (1):1-23.details
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Questioning the free will comprehension question.E. Cokely & A. Feltz - 2010 - In S. Ohlsson & R. Catrambone (eds.), Proceedings of the 32nd Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society. Cognitive Science Society. pp. 2440--2445.details
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The proper role of intuitions in epistemology.A. Feltz & M. Bishop - 2010 - In Marcin Młlkowski & Konrad Talmont-Kaminski (eds.), Beyond Description. Naturalism and Normativity. College Publications.details
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Knowing That P without Believing That P.Blake Myers-Schulz & Eric Schwitzgebel - 2013 - Noûs 47 (2):371-384.details
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(1 other version)Is Incompatibilism Intuitive?Jason Turner, Eddy Nahmias, Stephen Morris & Thomas Nadelhoffer - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73 (1):28-53.details
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Experimental philosophy and free will.Tamler Sommers - 2010 - Philosophy Compass 5 (2):199-212.details
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Responsibility and the brain sciences.Felipe De Brigard, Eric Mandelbaum & David Ripley - 2008 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 12 (5):511-524.details
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Is Belief in Free Will a Cultural Universal?Hagop Sarkissian, Amita Chatterjee, Felipe de Brigard, Joshua Knobe, Shaun Nichols & Smita Sirker - 2010 - Mind and Language 25 (3):346-358.details
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(1 other version)More work for hard incompatibilism.Tamler Sommers - 2009 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (3):511-521.details
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Free will: a very short introduction.Thomas Pink - 2004 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Free will, moral responsibility, and mechanism: Experiments on folk intuitions.Eddy Nahmias, D. Justin Coates & Trevor Kvaran - 2007 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 31 (1):214–242.details
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Individual differences in theory-of-mind judgments: Order effects and side effects.Adam Feltz & Edward T. Cokely - 2011 - Philosophical Psychology 24 (3):343 - 355.details
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Responsibility and the Moral Sentiments.R. Jay Wallace - 1994 - Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.details
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(1 other version)Moral responsibility and determinism: The cognitive science of folk intuitions.Shaun Nichols & Joshua Knobe - 2007 - Noûs 41 (4):663–685.details
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Surveying Freedom: Folk Intuitions about free will and moral responsibility.Eddy Nahmias, Stephen Morris, Thomas Nadelhoffer & Jason Turner - 2005 - Philosophical Psychology 18 (5):561-584.details
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Folk fears about freedom and responsibility: Determinism vs. reductionism.Eddy Nahmias - 2006 - Journal of Cognition and Culture 6 (1-2):215-237.details
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The phenomenology of free will.Eddy Nahmias, Stephen G. Morris, Thomas Nadelhoffer & Jason Turner - 2004 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 11 (7-8):162-179.details
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(2 other versions)Philosophical essays.Alfred Jules Ayer - 1954 - Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press.details
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Do judgments about freedom and responsibility depend on who you are? Personality differences in intuitions about compatibilism and incompatibilism.Adam Feltz & Edward T. Cokely - 2009 - Consciousness and Cognition 18 (1):342-350.details
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Persistent bias in expert judgments about free will and moral responsibility: A test of the Expertise Defense.Eric Schulz, Edward T. Cokely & Adam Feltz - 2011 - Consciousness and Cognition 20 (4):1722-1731.details
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Experimental Philosophy on Free Will: An Error Theory for Incompatibilist Intuitions.Eddy Nahmias & Dylan Murray - 2011 - In Jesús H. Aguilar, Andrei A. Buckareff & Keith Frankish (eds.), New waves in philosophy of action. New York: Palgrave-Macmillan. pp. 189--215.details
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Are the folk agent-causationists?Jason Turner & Eddy Nahmias - 2006 - Mind and Language 21 (5):597-609.details
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Libertarianism and Frankfurt-style cases.Laura W. Ekstrom - 2001 - In Robert Kane (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Free Will. New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Fatalism.M. Bernstein - 2001 - In Robert Kane (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Free Will. New York: Oxford University Press.details
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(1 other version)Folk intuitions, slippery slopes, and necessary fictions : an essay on Saul Smilansky's free will illusionism.Thomas Nadelhoffer - 2007 - In Peter A. French & Howard K. Wettstein (eds.), Philosophy and the Empirical. Blackwell. pp. 202–213.details
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Free will, causes, and decisions: Individual differences in written reports.Adam Feltz, A. Perez & M. Harris - 2012 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 19 (9-10):166-189.details
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Bringing moral responsibility down to earth.Adina L. Roskies & Shaun Nichols - 2008 - Journal of Philosophy 105 (7):371-388.details
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(2 other versions)A treatise of human nature.David Hume - 2007 - In Elizabeth Schmidt Radcliffe, Richard McCarty, Fritz Allhoff & Anand Vaidya (eds.), Late modern philosophy: essential readings with commentary. Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell.details
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(2 other versions)Free will, fundamental dualism,and the centrality of illusion.Saul Smilansky - 2001 - In Robert Kane (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Free Will. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 489-505.details
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Distance, anger, freedom: An account of the role of abstraction in compatibilist and incompatibilist intuitions.Chris Weigel - 2011 - Philosophical Psychology 24 (6):803 - 823.details
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(3 other versions)Identification, situational constraint, and social cognition: Studies in the attribution of moral responsibility.Robert L. Woolfolk, John M. Doris & John M. Darley - 2006 - Cognition 100 (2):283-301.details
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