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Consciousness and false HOTs.Jonah Wilberg - 2010 - Philosophical Psychology 23 (5):617-638.details
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Misrepresenting consciousness.Josh Weisberg - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 154 (3):409 - 433.details
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Same old, same old: The same-order representational theory of consciousness and the division of phenomenal labor.Josh Weisberg - 2008 - Synthese 160 (2):161-181.details
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Abusing the notion of what-it's-like-ness: A response to Block.J. Weisberg - 2011 - Analysis 71 (3):438-443.details
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Transparency, qualia realism and representationalism.Michael Tye - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 170 (1):39-57.details
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Consciousness and Persons: Unity and Identity, MICHAEL TYE. Cambridge, MA, and London, UK.Eric T. Olson - 2006 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73 (2):500-503.details
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Consciousness and Persons: Unity and Identity.Michael Tye - 2003 - MIT Press.details
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The silence of the senses.Charles Travis - 2004 - Mind 113 (449):57-94.details
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What are debates about qualia really about?Jeff Speaks - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 170 (1):59-84.details
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How to think about mental qualities.David Rosenthal - 2010 - Philosophical Issues 20 (1):368-393.details
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Exaggerated reports: reply to Block.David Rosenthal - 2011 - Analysis 71 (3):431-437.details
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Keeping it Real: Intentional Inexistents, Fineness‐of‐Grain, and the Dilemma for Extrinsic Higher‐Order Representational Theories.Vincent Picciuto - 2017 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98 (4):555-575.details
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The experience property frame work: a misleading paradigm.Martine Nida-Rümelin - 2018 - Synthese 195 (8):3361-3387.details
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The division of phenomenal labor: A problem for representationalist theories of consciousness.Karen Neander - 1998 - Philosophical Perspectives 12:411-34.details
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Two senses for 'givenness of consciousness'.Pessi Lyyra - 2009 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 8 (1):67-87.details
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Why the Rare Charles Bonnet Cases Are Not Evidence of Misrepresentation.Asger Kirkeby-Hinrup - 2014 - Journal of Philosophical Research 39:301-308.details
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Events: Their metaphysics and semantics.Jaegwon Kim - 1991 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 51 (3):641-646.details
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Higher-order intentionalism and higher-order acquaintance.Benj Hellie - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 134 (3):289--324.details
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Verbal Disputes in the Theory of Consciousness.Joseph Gottlieb - 2018 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 5.details
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Transitivity and Transparency.Joseph Gottlieb - 2016 - Analytic Philosophy 57 (4):353-379.details
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Higher-order theories of consciousness and what-it-is-like-ness.Jonathan Farrell - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (11):2743-2761.details
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Some Like It Hot: Consciousness and Higher-Order Thoughts.Alex Byrne - 1997 - Philosophical Studies 86 (2):103-129.details
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Some like it HOT: Consciousness and higher-order thoughts.Alex Byrne - 1997 - Philosophical Studies 86 (2):103-29.details
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Experience and content.Alex Byrne - 2009 - Philosophical Quarterly 59 (236):429-451.details
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The higher order approach to consciousness is defunct.Ned Block - 2011 - Analysis 71 (3):419 - 431.details
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Consciousness is not a property of states: A reply to Wilberg.Jacob Berger - 2014 - Philosophical Psychology 27 (6):829-842.details
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D. M. Armstrong, A Materialist Theory of the Mind. [REVIEW]Alvin I. Goldman - 1969 - Journal of Philosophy 66 (22):812-818.details
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The Phenomenal and the Representational.Jeffrey Speaks - 2015 - New York, NY: Oxford University Press UK.details
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Naming and Necessity.S. Kripke - 1972 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 45 (4):665-666.details
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The Consciousness Paradox: Consciousness, Concepts, and Higher-Order Thoughts.Rocco J. Gennaro - 2012 - MIT Press.details
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Consciousness and Mind.David M. Rosenthal - 2005 - New York: Oxford University Press UK.details
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Subjective Consciousness: A Self-Representational Theory.Uriah Kriegel - 2009 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press UK.details
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Consciousness and Experience.William G. Lycan - 1996 - Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.details
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Purple Haze: The Puzzle of Consciousness.Joseph Levine - 2001 - New York, US: Oxford University Press USA.details
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Phenomenal Consciousness: A Naturalistic Theory.Peter Carruthers - 2000 - New York: Cambridge University Press.details
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Naming and Necessity.Saul Kripke - 1980 - Philosophy 56 (217):431-433.details
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Review of 'The Consciousness Paradox: Consciousness, Concepts, and Higher-Order Thoughts' by Rocco J. Gennaro. [REVIEW]Richard Brown - 2012 - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews.details
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A theory of consciousness.David M. Rosenthal - 1997 - In Ned Block, Owen J. Flanagan & Guven Guzeldere (eds.), The Nature of Consciousness. MIT Press.details
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Sensory qualities, consciousness, and perception.David M. Rosenthal - 2005 - In Consciousness and Mind. Clarendon Press. pp. 175-226.details
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Consciousness and metacognition.David M. Rosenthal - 1998 - In Dan Sperber (ed.), Metarepresentations: A Multidisciplinary Perspective. Oxford University Press.details
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‘What it is Like’ Talk is not Technical Talk.Jonathan Farrell - 2016 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 23 (9-10):50-65.details
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Phenomenal Consciousness: A Naturalistic Theory.Peter Carruthers - 2002 - Philosophical Quarterly 52 (207):265-268.details
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Presentational Character and Higher Order Thoughts.Joseph Gottlieb - 2015 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 22 (7-8):103-123.details
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Consciousness and Experience.William G. Lycan - 1996 - Philosophy 72 (282):602-604.details
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Purple Haze: The Puzzle of Consciousness.Joseph Levine - 2001 - Philosophy 77 (299):130-135.details
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