Switch to: Citations

References in:

The rise of moral cognition

Cognition 135 (C):39-42 (2015)

Add references

You must login to add references.
  1. Transfer effects between moral dilemmas: A causal model theory.Alex Wiegmann & Michael R. Waldmann - 2014 - Cognition 131 (1):28-43.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   26 citations  
  • On the Morality of Harm: A response to Sousa, Holbrook and Piazza.Stephen Stich, Daniel M. T. Fessler & Daniel Kelly - 2009 - Cognition 113 (1):93-97.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   14 citations  
  • Pushing moral buttons: The interaction between personal force and intention in moral judgment.Joshua D. Greene, Fiery A. Cushman, Lisa E. Stewart, Kelly Lowenberg, Leigh E. Nystrom & Jonathan D. Cohen - 2009 - Cognition 111 (3):364-371.
    In some cases people judge it morally acceptable to sacrifice one person’s life in order to save several other lives, while in other similar cases they make the opposite judgment. Researchers have identified two general factors that may explain this phenomenon at the stimulus level: (1) the agent’s intention (i.e. whether the harmful event is intended as a means or merely foreseen as a side-effect) and (2) whether the agent harms the victim in a manner that is relatively “direct” or (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   164 citations  
  • The psychology of meta-ethics: Exploring objectivism.Geoffrey Goodwin & John Darley - 2008 - Cognition 106 (3):1339-1366.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   142 citations  
  • A cognitive developmental approach to morality: investigating the psychopath.R. Blair - 1995 - Cognition 57 (1):1-29.
    Various social animal species have been noted to inhibit aggressive attacks when a conspecific displays submission cues. Blair (1993) has suggested that humans possess a functionally similar mechanism which mediates the suppression of aggression in the context of distress cues. He has suggested that this mechanism is a prerequisite for the development of the moral/conventional distinction; the consistently observed distinction in subject's judgments between moral and conventional transgressions. Psychopaths may lack this violence inhibitor. A causal model is developed showing how (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   308 citations  
  • The development of intent-based moral judgment.Fiery Cushman, Rachel Sheketoff, Sophie Wharton & Susan Carey - 2013 - Cognition 127 (1):6-21.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   62 citations  
  • Principled moral sentiment and the flexibility of moral judgment and decision making.Daniel M. Bartels - 2008 - Cognition 108 (2):381-417.
    Three studies test eight hypotheses about (1) how judgment differs between people who ascribe greater vs. less moral relevance to choices, (2) how moral judgment is subject to task constraints that shift evaluative focus (to moral rules vs. to consequences), and (3) how differences in the propensity to rely on intuitive reactions affect judgment. In Study 1, judgments were affected by rated agreement with moral rules proscribing harm, whether the dilemma under consideration made moral rules versus consequences of choice salient, (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   74 citations  
  • Cold or calculating? Reduced activity in the subgenual cingulate cortex reflects decreased emotional aversion to harming in counterintuitive utilitarian judgment.Katja Wiech, Guy Kahane, Nicholas Shackel, Miguel Farias, Julian Savulescu & Irene Tracey - 2013 - Cognition 126 (3):364-372.
    Recent research on moral decision-making has suggested that many common moral judgments are based on immediate intuitions. However, some individuals arrive at highly counterintuitive utilitarian conclusions about when it is permissible to harm other individuals. Such utilitarian judgments have been attributed to effortful reasoning that has overcome our natural emotional aversion to harming others. Recent studies, however, suggest that such utilitarian judgments might also result from a decreased aversion to harming others, due to a deficit in empathic concern and social (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   22 citations  
  • Affect, Culture, and Morality, Or Is It Wrong to Eat Your Dog?Jonathan Haidt, Silvia Helena Koller & Maria G. Dias - 1993 - Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 65 (4):613-28.
    Are disgusting or disrespectful actions judged to be moral violations, even when they are harmless? Stories about victimless yet offensive actions (such as cleaning one's toilet with a flag) were presented to Brazilian and U.S. adults and children of high and low socioeconomic status (N = 360). Results show that college students at elite universities judged these stories to be matters of social convention or of personal preference. Most other Ss, especially in Brazil, took a moralizing stance toward these actions. (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   240 citations  
  • The Emotional Dog and Its Rational Tail: A Social Intuitionist Approach to Moral Judgment.Jonathan Haidt - 2001 - Psychological Review 108 (4):814-834.
    Research on moral judgment has been dominated by rationalist models, in which moral judgment is thought to be caused by moral reasoning. The author gives 4 reasons for considering the hypothesis that moral reasoning does not cause moral judgment; rather, moral reasoning is usually a post hoc construction, generated after a judgment has been reached. The social intuitionist model is presented as an alternative to rationalist models. The model is a social model in that it deemphasizes the private reasoning done (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1583 citations  
  • Reflection and Reasoning in Moral Judgment.Joshua D. Greene - 2012 - Cognitive Science 36 (1):163-177.
    While there is much evidence for the influence of automatic emotional responses on moral judgment, the roles of reflection and reasoning remain uncertain. In Experiment 1, we induced subjects to be more reflective by completing the Cognitive Reflection Test prior to responding to moral dilemmas. This manipulation increased utilitarian responding, as individuals who reflected more on the CRT made more utilitarian judgments. A follow-up study suggested that trait reflectiveness is also associated with increased utilitarian judgment. In Experiment 2, subjects considered (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   96 citations  
  • The Paradox of Moral Focus.Liane Young & Jonathan Phillips - 2011 - Cognition 119 (2):166-178.
    When we evaluate moral agents, we consider many factors, including whether the agent acted freely, or under duress or coercion. In turn, moral evaluations have been shown to influence our (non-moral) evaluations of these same factors. For example, when we judge an agent to have acted immorally, we are subsequently more likely to judge the agent to have acted freely, not under force. Here, we investigate the cognitive signatures of this effect in interpersonal situations, in which one agent (“forcer”) forces (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   27 citations  
  • (1 other version)Moral dilemmas and moral rules.Shaun Nichols & Ron Mallon - 2006 - Cognition 100 (3):530-542.
    Recent work shows an important asymmetry in lay intuitions about moral dilemmas. Most people think it is permissible to divert a train so that it will kill one innocent person instead of five, but most people think that it is not permissible to push a stranger in front of a train to save five innocents. We argue that recent emotion-based explanations of this asymmetry have neglected the contribution that rules make to reasoning about moral dilemmas. In two experiments, we find (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   78 citations  
  • Foundations of cooperation in young children.Kristina R. Olson & Elizabeth S. Spelke - 2008 - Cognition 108 (1):222-231.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   46 citations  
  • Mysteries of morality.Peter DeScioli & Robert Kurzban - 2009 - Cognition 112 (2):281-299.
    Evolutionary theories of morality, beginning with Darwin, have focused on explanations for altruism. More generally, these accounts have concentrated on conscience to the neglect of condemnation. As a result, few theoretical tools are available for understanding the rapidly accumulating data surrounding third-party judgment and punishment. Here we consider the strategic interactions among actors, victims, and third-parties to help illuminate condemnation. We argue that basic differences between the adaptive problems faced by actors and third-parties indicate that actor conscience and third-party condemnation (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   45 citations  
  • (1 other version)Moral appraisals affect doing/allowing judgments.Fiery Cushman, Joshua Knobe & Walter Sinnott-Armstrong - 2008 - Cognition 108 (2):353-380.
    An extensive body of research suggests that the distinction between doing and allowing plays a critical role in shaping moral appraisals. Here, we report evidence from a pair of experiments suggesting that the converse is also true: moral appraisals affect doing/allowing judgments. Specifically, morally bad behavior is more likely to be construed as actively ‘doing’ than as passively ‘allowing’. This finding adds to a growing list of folk concepts influenced by moral appraisal, including causation and intentional action. We therefore suggest (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   57 citations  
  • (1 other version)Crime and punishment: Distinguishing the roles of causal and intentional analyses in moral judgment.Fiery Cushman - 2008 - Cognition 108 (2):353-380.
    Recent research in moral psychology has attempted to characterize patterns of moral judgments of actions in terms of the causal and intentional properties of those actions. The present study directly compares the roles of consequence, causation, belief and desire in determining moral judgments. Judgments of the wrongness or permissibility of action were found to rely principally on the mental states of an agent, while judgments of blame and punishment are found to rely jointly on mental states and the causal connection (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   200 citations  
  • The neural basis of the interaction between theory of mind and moral judgment.Liane Young, Fiery Cushman, Marc Hauser & and Rebecca Saxe - 2007 - Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 104 (20):8235-8240.
    Is the basis of criminality an act that causes harm, or an act undertaken with the belief that one will cause harm? The present study takes a cognitive neuroscience approach to investigating how information about an agent’s beliefs and an action’s conse- quences contribute to moral judgment. We build on prior devel- opmental evidence showing that these factors contribute differ- entially to the young child’s moral judgments coupled with neurobiological evidence suggesting a role for the right tem- poroparietal junction (RTPJ) (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   47 citations  
  • Are children moral objectivists? Children's judgments about moral and response-dependent properties.Shaun Nichols & Trisha Folds-Bennett - 2003 - Cognition 90 (2):23-32.
    Researchers working on children's moral understanding maintain that the child's capacity to distinguish morality from convention shows that children regard moral violations as objectively wrong. Education in the moral domain. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). However, one traditional way to cast the issue of objectivism is to focus not on conventionality, but on whether moral properties depend on our responses, as with properties like icky and fun. This paper argues that the moral/conventional task is inadequate for assessing whether children regard moral (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   57 citations  
  • Moral appraisals affect doing/allowing judgments.Fiery Cushman, Joshua Knobe & Walter Sinnott-Armstrong - 2008 - Cognition 108 (1):281-289.
    An extensive body of research suggests that the distinction between doing and allowing plays a critical role in shaping moral appraisals. Here, we report evidence from a pair of experiments suggesting that the converse is also true: moral appraisals affect doing/allowing judgments. Specifically, morally bad behavior is more likely to be construed as actively ‘doing’ than as passively ‘allowing’. This finding adds to a growing list of folk concepts influenced by moral appraisal, including causation and intentional action. We therefore suggest (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   50 citations  
  • Outcomes and intentions in children’s, adolescents’, and adults’ second- and third-party punishment behavior.Michaela Gummerum & Maria T. Chu - 2014 - Cognition 133 (1):97-103.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  • (1 other version)Cognitive load selectively interferes with utilitarian moral judgment.Joshua D. Greene, Sylvia A. Morelli, Kelly Lowenberg, Leigh E. Nystrom & Jonathan D. Cohen - 2008 - Cognition 107 (3):1144-1154.
    Traditional theories of moral development emphasize the role of controlled cognition in mature moral judgment, while a more recent trend emphasizes intuitive and emotional processes. Here we test a dual-process theory synthesizing these perspectives. More specifically, our theory associates utilitarian moral judgment (approving of harmful actions that maximize good consequences) with controlled cognitive processes and associates non-utilitarian moral judgment with automatic emotional responses. Consistent with this theory, we find that a cognitive load manipulation selectively interferes with utilitarian judgment. This interference (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   198 citations  
  • Young children enforce social norms selectively depending on the violator’s group affiliation.Marco Fh Schmidt, Hannes Rakoczy & Michael Tomasello - 2012 - Cognition 124 (3):325-333.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   45 citations  
  • Aliens behaving badly: Children’s acquisition of novel purity-based morals.Joshua Rottman & Deborah Kelemen - 2012 - Cognition 124 (3):356-360.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   15 citations  
  • Selfless giving.Daniel M. Bartels, Trevor Kvaran & Shaun Nichols - 2013 - Cognition 129 (2):392-403.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   11 citations  
  • Analyzing the history of Cognition using Topic Models.Uriel Cohen Priva & Joseph L. Austerweil - 2015 - Cognition 135:4-9.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   10 citations  
  • Philosophers are doing something different now: Quantitative data.Joshua Knobe - 2015 - Cognition 135 (C):36-38.
    The philosophical study of mind in the twentieth century was dominated by a research program that used a priori methods to address foundational questions. Since that time, however, the philosophical study of mind has undergone a dramatic shift. To provide a more accurate picture of contemporary philosophical work, I compared a sample of highly cited philosophy papers from the past five years with a sample of highly cited philosophy papers from the twentieth century. In the twentieth century sample, the majority (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   20 citations  
  • It’s OK if ‘my brain made me do it’: People’s intuitions about free will and neuroscientific prediction.Eddy Nahmias, Jason Shepard & Shane Reuter - 2014 - Cognition 133 (2):502-516.
    In recent years, a number of prominent scientists have argued that free will is an illusion, appealing to evidence demonstrating that information about brain activity can be used to predict behavior before people are aware of having made a decision. These scientists claim that the possibility of perfect prediction based on neural information challenges the ordinary understanding of free will. In this paper we provide evidence suggesting that most people do not view the possibility of neuro-prediction as a threat to (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   32 citations  
  • Anti-equality: Social comparison in young children.Mark Sheskin, Paul Bloom & Karen Wynn - 2014 - Cognition 130 (2):152-156.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   23 citations  
  • The mismeasure of morals: Antisocial personality traits predict utilitarian responses to moral dilemmas.Daniel M. Bartels & David A. Pizarro - 2011 - Cognition 121 (1):154-161.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   108 citations  
  • When ignorance is no excuse: Different roles for intent across moral domains.Liane Young & Rebecca Saxe - 2011 - Cognition 120 (2):202-214.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   49 citations  
  • Time and moral judgment.Renata S. Suter & Ralph Hertwig - 2011 - Cognition 119 (3):454-458.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   52 citations  
  • Children’s developing notions of (im)partiality.Candice M. Mills & Frank C. Keil - 2008 - Cognition 107 (2):528-551.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   10 citations  
  • The essential moral self.Nina Strohminger & Shaun Nichols - 2014 - Cognition 131 (1):159-171.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   157 citations  
  • Tainting the soul: Purity concerns predict moral judgments of suicide.Joshua Rottman, Deborah Kelemen & Liane Young - 2014 - Cognition 130 (2):217-226.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   18 citations  
  • Young children’s understanding of violations of property rights.Federico Rossano, Hannes Rakoczy & Michael Tomasello - 2011 - Cognition 121 (2):219-227.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   38 citations  
  • Divergent effects of different positive emotions on moral judgment.Nina Strohminger, Richard L. Lewis & David E. Meyer - 2011 - Cognition 119 (2):295-300.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   36 citations  
  • Blind ethics: Closing one’s eyes polarizes moral judgments and discourages dishonest behavior.Eugene M. Caruso & Francesca Gino - 2011 - Cognition 118 (2):280-285.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   17 citations  
  • Norms Inform Mental State Ascriptions: A Rational Explanation for the Side-Effect Effect.Kevin Uttich & Tania Lombrozo - 2010 - Cognition 116 (1):87–100.
    Theory of mind, the capacity to understand and ascribe mental states, has traditionally been conceptualized as analogous to a scientific theory. However, recent work in philosophy and psychology has documented a "side-effect effect" suggesting that moral evaluations influence mental state ascriptions, and in particular whether a behavior is described as having been performed 'intentionally.' This evidence challenges the idea that theory of mind is analogous to scientific psychology in serving the function of predicting and explaining, rather than evaluating, behavior. In (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   79 citations  
  • The neural basis of the interaction between theory of mind and moral judgment.Liane Young, Fiery Cushman, Marc Hauser & Rebecca Saxe - 2007 - Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 104 (20):8235-8240.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   77 citations  
  • The drunk utilitarian: Blood alcohol concentration predicts utilitarian responses in moral dilemmas.Aaron A. Duke & Laurent Bègue - 2015 - Cognition 134 (C):121-127.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   27 citations  
  • “I had so much it didn’t seem fair”: Eight-year-olds reject two forms of inequity.Peter R. Blake & Katherine McAuliffe - 2011 - Cognition 120 (2):215-224.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   38 citations  
  • The morality of harm.Paulo Sousa, Colin Holbrook & Jared Piazza - 2009 - Cognition 113 (1):80-92.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   21 citations  
  • Determining who owns what: Do children infer ownership from first possession?Ori Friedman & Karen R. Neary - 2008 - Cognition 107 (3):829-849.
    A basic problem of daily life is determining who owns what. One way that people may solve this problem is by relying on a ‘first possession’ heuristic, according to which the first person who possesses an object is its owner, even if others subsequently possess the object. We investigated preschoolers’ use of this heuristic in five experiments. In Experiments 1 and 2, 3- and 4-year-olds inferred that an object was owned by the character who possessed it first, even though another (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   37 citations  
  • Young children proactively remedy unnoticed accidents.Felix Warneken - 2013 - Cognition 126 (1):101-108.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   15 citations  
  • Coalitional psychology on the playground: Reasoning about indirect social consequences in preschoolers and adults.David Pietraszewski & Tamsin C. German - 2013 - Cognition 126 (3):352-363.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  • Spreading the blame: The allocation of responsibility amongst multiple agents.Tobias Gerstenberg & David A. Lagnado - 2010 - Cognition 115 (1):166-171.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   25 citations  
  • Are irrational reactions to unfairness truly emotionally-driven? Dissociated behavioural and emotional responses in the Ultimatum Game task.Claudia Civai, Corrado Corradi-Dell’Acqua, Matthias Gamer & Raffaella I. Rumiati - 2010 - Cognition 114 (1):89-95.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   14 citations  
  • When it takes a bad person to do the right thing.Eric Luis Uhlmann, Luke Zhu & David Tannenbaum - 2013 - Cognition 126 (2):326-334.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   20 citations  
  • (1 other version)Cognitive Load Selectively Interferes with Utilitarian Moral Judgment.Jonathan D. Cohen Joshua D. Greene, Sylvia A. Morelli, Kelly Lowenberg, Leigh E. Nystrom - 2008 - Cognition 107 (3):1144.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   158 citations