Systematischer Gegenstand der klassischen Religionsphilosophie ist die Frage nach den Bedingungen der Moglichkeit, unter denen die Gottesvorstellung denkbar ist. Als so verstandene systematische Disziplin geht die Tradition der Religionsphilosophie schon auf die Theologie der antiken Naturphilosophie, vor allem aber auf die theologischen Entwurfe Platons und Aristoteles' zuruck, die fur die Wirkungsperspektive im Mittelalter und in der fruhen Neuzeit richtungweisend wurden. Als eigenstandige wissenschaftliche Disziplin entstand die Religionsphilosophie jedoch erst in der fruhen Neuzeit, und zwar mit dem Traktat des englischen Platonikers (...) Ralph Cudworth (1617-1688) The True Intellectual System of the Universe (London, 1678), der sich erstmals auch terminologisch als eine 'Philosophy of Religion' verstand. Die vorliegende historische und systematische Studie dokumentiert die Transformation der klassischen philosophischen Theologie in die neuzeitliche Religionsphilosophie unter den Bedingungen der reformatorischen Theologie, die eine Denkbarkeit der Gottesvorstellung auszuschliessen schien. (shrink)

The problem of the will has long been viewed as central to Heidegger's later thought. In the first book to focus on this problem, Bret W. Davis clarifies key issues from the philosopher's later period--particularly his critique of the culmination of the history of metaphysics in the technological "will to will" and the possibility of Gelassenheit or "releasement" from this willful way of being in the world--but also shows that the question of will is at the very heart of Heidegger's (...) thinking, a pivotal issue in his path from Being and Time (1926) to "Time and Being" (1962). Moreover, the book demonstrates why popular critical interpretations of Heidegger's relation to the will are untenable, how his so-called "turn" is not a simple "turnaround" from voluntarism to passivism. Davis explains why the later Heidegger's key notions of "non-willing" and " Gelassenheit " do not imply a mere abandonment of human action; rather, they are signposts in a search for an other way of being, a "higher activity" beyond the horizon of the will. While elucidating this search, his work also provides a critical look at the ambiguities, tensions, and inconsistencies of Heidegger's project, and does so in a way that allows us to follow the inner logic of the philosopher's struggles. As meticulous as it is bold, this comprehensive reinterpretation will change the way we think about Heidegger's politics and about the thrust of his philosophy as a whole. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Heidegger’s Craving Being-on-SchellingDavid L. Clark (bio)What we call spirit exists by virtue of itself, a flame that fuels itself. However, because as something existing, it is opposed by Being, the spirit is consequently nothing but an addiction to such Being, just as the flame is addicted to matter. The most base form of the spirit is therefore an addiction, a desire, a lust.—Friedrich Schelling, Stuttgart Private Lectures1. Just Say (...) NoHow not to speak of addiction? We know from Derrida that in talking this way we are always asking two overlapping questions, 1 both of which remind us that what is still confusedly called “addiction”—and with it, a host of related concepts ranging from “drugs” and “toxicity” to “dependence” and “simulation”—is perhaps best held open as a question or, rather, in the strange space between two questions, quite possibly more. First, an interrogative: a query that calls for a certain vigilance and responsibility when it comes to thinking about addiction, and that draws attention to the ways in which addiction is figured, the rhetorics or tropologies as well as the knowledges of addiction. Like mourning and longing, Schellingian philosophemes to which it is closely related and to which I will return in this essay, addiction is among other things a figure of understanding, to use Tilottama Rajan’s evocative phrase. 2 As a figure, so the first question goes, “addiction” deserves to be written and to be read slowly, not only for what might be called “political” reasons, which is to say, reasons having to do with the normalizing efficiency that comes of speaking the word too quickly, of claiming to know “who” the addict is as such and “what” it means to be addicted, but also because when it comes to addiction—again, like mourning and longing—we are dealing with a term that is irreducibly allegorical in nature, a term that inevitably says more than it says. One could almost say that “how not to speak of addiction” means “let us try to speak well or properly of addiction, even and especially if this means speaking properly of addiction’s multiple improprieties.” One could almost say this, if “addiction,” understood as a fundamental structure of desire that “holds valid for all possible contents of the world” [Slawney 42], were not precisely that which displaces and disorganizes firm oppositional limits between [End Page 8] propriety and impropriety, as it does between responsibility and irresponsibility, voluntarity and compulsion, delinquency and productivity, sickness and health, the very limits that the medical, juridical, and criminal discourses of addiction often seem most in the service of inscribing and enforcing. But of course the inability unequivocally to speak well (or, for that matter, unwell) of “addiction” in no way suggests that we have nothing to say about it—the collection of papers of which this one forms a small part is proof of that—and this goes to the heart of my second question, not interrogative but rhetorical in kind. “How not to speak of addiction?” also means that there is no way not to speak of it; insofar as addiction names a structure that precedes and exceeds the knowing subject (and is thus “older” than it), that subject is always “speaking” of it, as if answering and answerable to an imperious law, the law of addiction that amounts to an addiction to the law. Addiction there is: that is the strange, anonymous, and always anterior logic of craving, a craving no longer necessarily in thrall to the thought of self-possession and sobriety that Schelling scandalously evokes and explores, and that Heidegger directly pursues in his lectures on Schelling. More: where the human is, so too is “the deepest self-craving [der tiefsten Eigensucht]” [Heidegger, ST 140; 42, 244]. 3 Under these maximally habituated conditions, “how not to speak of addiction?” means that we are not unwilling but incapable of just saying no to a form of radical intoxication. Instead we find ourselves, as ourselves, whether speaking specifically about addiction or not, responding in a kind of passive affirmative to an originary craving, saying yes to addiction even when, in the name of an... (shrink)

Die Frage nach dem Ursprung hat die Menschen in allen Kulturen und Epochen beschäftigt. In besonderer Weise bestimmt sie das Denken der Philosophie, das nach klassischem Verständnis der Erforschung der ersten Ursachen und Prinzipien gilt. Es schließt darin an die Fragerichtung des Mythos an, der seinerseits von ersten Anfängen und Gründen berichtet. Auch außerhalb der Philosophie, in Wissenschaften, Weltbildern und Religionen, in Theorien der Natur und der Geschichte, bilden Vorstellungen vom Ursprung in vielfachen Abwandlungen Leitideen des Fragens und der Orientierung. (...) Die Frage nach dem Ursprung ist nicht auf eine Frage zu reduzieren und nicht durch eine Auskunft zu beantworten. Sie gehört in den Kreis jener offenen Fragen, die das Denken nach Kant nicht beantworten, aber ebenso wenig abweisen kann. Die vorliegenden Aufsätze bieten Diskussionsmaterial zur Heterogenität der Fragestellungen und reflektieren das Spannungsverhältnis, das dem Ursprungsbezug insgesamt innewohnt. (shrink)

_Explores Schelling’s Essay on Human Freedom, focusing on the themes of freedom, evil, and love, and the relationship between his ideas and those of Plato and Kant._.

A new English translation of Schelling’s unfinished magnum opus, complete with a contextualizing introduction by the translator.

In der 1970 gegründeten Reihe erscheinen Arbeiten, die philosophiehistorische Studien mit einem systematischen Ansatz oder systematische Studien mit philosophiehistorischen Rekonstruktionen verbinden. Neben deutschsprachigen werden auch englischsprachige Monographien veröffentlicht. Gründungsherausgeber sind: Erhard Scheibe (Herausgeber bis 1991), Günther Patzig (bis 1999) und Wolfgang Wieland (bis 2003). Von 1990 bis 2007 wurde die Reihe von Jürgen Mittelstraß mitherausgegeben.

Schelling’s masterpiece investigating evil and freedom.

A revised translation of Heidegger's most important work.

ANMERKUNGEN ZU KARL JASPERS »PSYCHOLOGIE DER WELTANSCHAUUNGEN« Das eingangs kundzugebende Zugeständnis, daß eine »angemessene« Richtung für eine positiv auf ...

This book explores how four of Heidegger's most influential Jewish students came to grips with his Nazi association and how it affected their thinking.

In mid 1930's, Heidegger recognized that thinking must relinquish its claim to self-guidance in its hermeneutical mode in order to regather its impetus through an encounter with what is presumably antithetical to it, namely, the “systematic philosophy” of a figure like Schelling. By entering into this tension, it becomes possible to dislodge more fertile ways of speaking ; the opportunity arises to juxtapose apparently incongruous forms of discourse. These are as divergent as that aimed at in addressing the etymology of (...) the word “being,” or that involved in the exposition of the character of evil which is found in Schelling's Of Human Freedom. The linkage of these two forms of discourse allows for a reformulation of the question of being, whose hallmark lies in redirecting thought through the issuance of an attunement rather than through the self-guidance of hermeneutics. Schelling's question as to the enigmatic character of evil and the question of being do not even remotely seem to share the same kind of lexicon. The purpose of this paper is to show how the rekindling of the concern for evil as it arises in Heidegger's 1936 lectures on Schelling poses a special challenge; for it involves inscribing within Heidegger's discourse a set of assymetrical meanings to express the basic motifs of his thought. Such assymetry resounds with a special attunement by calling forth the tragedy of human being's imperfect kinship with the Divine, of our enduring the tension of a greater conflict as the counterpole of darkness against which to illuminate the essence of human freedom in a new way. The prospect of finding an index to correlate disparate terms proves far more difficult in this case than with Heidegger's dialogue with other thinkers like Kant and Nietzsche where he links more symmetrical terms such as temporal finitude/sensibilized reason or resolve/will to power. (shrink)

In mid 1930's, Heidegger recognized that thinking must relinquish its claim to self-guidance in its hermeneutical mode in order to regather its impetus through an encounter with what is presumably antithetical to it, namely, the “systematic philosophy” of a figure like Schelling. By entering into this tension, it becomes possible to dislodge more fertile ways of speaking ; the opportunity arises to juxtapose apparently incongruous forms of discourse. These are as divergent as that aimed at in addressing the etymology of (...) the word “being,” or that involved in the exposition of the character of evil which is found in Schelling's Of Human Freedom. The linkage of these two forms of discourse allows for a reformulation of the question of being, whose hallmark lies in redirecting thought through the issuance of an attunement rather than through the self-guidance of hermeneutics. Schelling's question as to the enigmatic character of evil and the question of being do not even remotely seem to share the same kind of lexicon. The purpose of this paper is to show how the rekindling of the concern for evil as it arises in Heidegger's 1936 lectures on Schelling poses a special challenge; for it involves inscribing within Heidegger's discourse a set of assymetrical meanings to express the basic motifs of his thought. Such assymetry resounds with a special attunement by calling forth the tragedy of human being's imperfect kinship with the Divine, of our enduring the tension of a greater conflict as the counterpole of darkness against which to illuminate the essence of human freedom in a new way. The prospect of finding an index to correlate disparate terms proves far more difficult in this case than with Heidegger's dialogue with other thinkers like Kant and Nietzsche where he links more symmetrical terms such as temporal finitude/sensibilized reason or resolve/will to power. (shrink)

In der Wissenschaftstheorie des letzten halben Jahrhunderts stand in alter Tradition stets die Frage im Vordergrund, welche Anforderungen an Meinungen gestellt werden mussen, um sie als Wissen im Sinne der Wissenschaften zu qualifizieren. Nachdem gezeigt wurde, dass sich auch zu den anspruchsvollsten Kriterien des Wissens immer noch Gegenbeispiele anfuhren lassen, die wir im intuitiven Sinne nicht als Kandidaten fur Wissen bezeichnen wurden, konnte man sich dahingehend zufrieden geben, dass wir zwar nicht uber garantierende, wohl aber uber autorisierende Kriterien fur Wissen (...) verfugen. Damit war andererseits klar, dass Formen des Nichtwissens in der Philosophie notwendig prasent bleiben. Die vorliegende Arbeit tastet die Spielraume, in denen ein Nichtwissen geradezu konstitutiv ist - also Zonen geschichtlicher Vergewisserung im Gegenwartigen, auch Zonen heuristischer Bemuhungen im Alltag und im Vorfeld von Wissenschaften - ab und analysiert sie in cusanischer Tradition als Mischformen von Wissen und Nichtwissen.". (shrink)

In der den ersten Teil der Vorlesung umfassenden Vorbetrachtung uber die Unterscheidung zwischen Grund und Existenz fallt innerhalb der begriffsgeschichtlichen Erlauterung die Auseinandersetzung mit den Existenzbegriffen von Kierkegaard und Jaspers sowie die sich davon abhebende Erlauterung des Existenzbegriffes in Sein und Zeit ins Auge. Der 2. Teil der Vorlesung wendet sich dem Kernstuck der Schellingschen Freiheitsabhandlung zu, namlich der Erlauterung der Unterscheidung von Grund und Existenz als Drstellung des Seienden im Ganzen (Gott, Welt, Mensch).

Originally presented as the author's thesis (doctoral)--Freie Universiteat Berlin, 1992/93.

Der Band 16 der Martin Heidegger Gesamtausgabe vereinigt gemass einer Festlegung Heideggers fast alle von ihm gehaltenen Reden und Ansprachen sowie andere Zeugnisse aus 66jahriger Arbeitszeit: Ankundigungen, Aufrufe, Aufsatze, amtliche Ausserungen, einige Briefe, Buchbesprechungen, Gedenkworte, einige Gedichte und Gesprache, Gratulationen, Gruss- und Dankworte, Lebenslaufe, Stellungnahmen und Wurdigungen. Dazu kommen bisher unveroffentlichte Ausserungen, besonders aus seiner Rektoratszeit, die dazubeitragen konnen, Heideggers Personlichkeit und seinen politischen Irrtum von 1933 besser zu verstehen. Hauptsachliche Unterlagen dieses Bandes sind die da und dort mit Verbesserungen (...) versehenen Handexemplare der von Martin Heidegger selbst zum Druck gebrachten Einzelveroffentlichungen, in wenigen Fallen die vom Herausgeber durchgesehenen Neuauflagen. In seinem Nachwort gibt Hermann Heidegger einen kurzen Uberblick uber die bisherige Geschichte der Gesamtausgabe und berichtet aus der Sicht des Historikers und Zeitzeugen knapp uber einiges, was bisherige Biographieversuche ausser acht gelassen haben. (shrink)

»Selten hat in den neueren Jahrhunderten ein philosophischer Erstling so durchgeschlagen und einen so unverrückbaren Platz unter den >großenHans Georg Gadamer in DIE ZEIT Nr. 47 vom 19.11.1982.

"[Heidegger's] greatest work... essential for all collections." —Choice "... students of Heidegger will surely find this book indispensable." —Library Journal Contributions to Philosophy, written in 1936-38 and first published in 1989 as Beiträge zur Philosophie, is Heidegger’s most ground-breaking work after the publication of Being and Time in 1927. If Being and Time is perceived as undermining modern metaphysics, Contributions undertakes to reshape the very project of thinking.

This is the first time that a seminal collection of fourteen essays by Martin Heidegger (originally published in German under the title Wegmarken) has appeared in English in its complete form. It includes new or first-time translations of seven essays, and thoroughly revised, updated versions of the other seven. Amongst the new translations are such key essays as 'On the Essence of Ground', 'Hegel and the Greeks' and 'On the Question of Being'. Spanning a period from 1919-1961, these essays have (...) become established points of reference for all those with a serious interest in Heidegger. Now collected for the first time in translations by an experienced Heidegger translator and scholar, they will prove an essential resource for all students of Heidegger. (shrink)