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What Is Logical Validity.Hartry Field - 2015 - In Colin R. Caret & Ole T. Hjortland (eds.), Foundations of Logical Consequence. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.details
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Against Belief Normativity.Kathrin Glüer & Åsa Wikforss - 2013 - In Timothy Chan (ed.), The Aim of Belief. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.details
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How We Reason.Philip Nicholas Johnson-Laird - 2006 - Oxford University Press.details
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Rule following: A pedestrian approach.Masahiro Yamada - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 80 (2):283-311.details
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Assessment Sensitivity: Relative Truth and its Applications.John MacFarlane - 2014 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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Some more thoughts on semantic oughts: A reply to Daniel Whiting.Anandi Hattiangadi - 2009 - Analysis 69 (1):54-63.details
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The collected philosophical papers of G.E.M. Anscombe.Gertrude Elizabeth Margaret Anscombe - 1900 - Oxford [Oxfordshire]: Blackwell.details
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Against Content Normativity.Kathrin Glüer & Åsa Wikforss - 2009 - Mind 118 (469):31-70.details
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The normativity of meaning and content.Kathrin Glüer, Asa Wikforss & Marianna Bergamaschi Ganapini - 2022 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Making sense of relative truth.John MacFarlane - 2005 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 105 (3):321–339.details
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Meaning and normativity.Allan Gibbard - 1994 - Philosophical Issues 5:95-115.details
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Making It Explicit: Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment.Robert Brandom - 1994 - Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.details
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(2 other versions)Wittgenstein on following a rule.John McDowell - 1984 - Synthese 58 (March):325-364.details
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Wittgenstein on rules and private language: an elementary exposition.Saul A. Kripke - 1982 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.details
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Semantics and metasemantics in the context of generative grammar.Seth Yalcin - 2014 - In Alexis Burgess & Brett Sherman (eds.), Metasemantics: New Essays on the Foundations of Meaning. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 17-54.details
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Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language. An Elementary Exposition.Saul A. Kripke - 1983 - Philosophical Quarterly 33 (133):398-404.details
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Meaning and Normativity.Allan Gibbard - 2012 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press UK.details
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Understanding People: Normativity and Rationalizing Explanation.Alan Millar - 2004 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press UK.details
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Rules of Meaning and Practical Reasoning.Peter Pagin - 1998 - Synthese 117 (2):207 - 227.details
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Rules, rights, and promises.G. E. M. Anscombe - 1978 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 3 (1):318-323.details
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(1 other version)Reference and necessity.Robert Stalnaker - 1997 - In Bob Hale, Crispin Wright & Alexander Miller (eds.), A Companion to the Philosophy of Language. Chichester, West Sussex, UK: Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 902–919.details
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Oughts and thoughts: rule-following and the normativity of content.Anandi Hattiangadi - 2007 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Nonfactualism about epistemic modality.Seth Yalcin - 2011 - In Andy Egan & Brian Weatherson (eds.), Epistemic Modality. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.details
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Xiv *-making sense of relative truth.John MacFarlane - 2005 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 105 (1):305-323.details
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Does thought imply ought?Krister Bykvist & Anandi Hattiangadi - 2007 - Analysis 67 (4):277–285.details
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Wittgenstein on rules and private language.Saul A. Kripke - 1982 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 173 (4):496-499.details
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The normativity of meaning defended.Daniel Whiting - 2007 - Analysis 67 (2):133-140.details
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Is meaning normative?Anandi Hattiangadi - 2006 - Mind and Language 21 (2):220-240.details
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Some reflections on thoughts and things.Wilfrid Sellars - 1967 - Noûs 1 (2):97-121.details
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Sprache und Regeln: zur Normativität von Bedeutung.Kathrin Glüer - 1999 - Walter de Gruyter.details
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Is Meaning Fraught with Ought?Daniel Whiting - 2009 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 90 (4):535-555.details
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Bedeutung zwischen Norm und Naturgesetz.Kathrin Glüer - 2000 - Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 48 (3):449-468.details
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Rule-Following Skepticism, Properly So Called.Jason Bridges - 2014 - In James Conant & Andrea Kern (eds.), Varieties of Skepticism: Essays After Kant, Wittgenstein, and Cavell. Boston: De Gruyter. pp. 249-288.details
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