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(1 other version)Eliminative Materialism and the Propositional Attitudes.Paul Churchland - 2003 - In John Heil (ed.), Philosophy of Mind: A Guide and Anthology. New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Word and Object.Willard Van Orman Quine - 1960 - Les Etudes Philosophiques 17 (2):278-279.details
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Re-Engineering Philosophy for Limited Beings. Piecewise Approximations to Reality.William C. Wimsatt - 2010 - Critica 42 (124):108-117.details
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(1 other version)Eliminative Materialism and the Propositional Attitudes.Paul M. Churchland - 1981 - Journal of Philosophy 78 (2):67-90.details
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One mechanism, many models: a distributed theory of mechanistic explanation.Eric Hochstein - 2016 - Synthese 193 (5):1387-1407.details
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The cognitive neuroscience revolution.Worth Boone & Gualtiero Piccinini - 2016 - Synthese 193 (5):1509-1534.details
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Philosophy and Neuroscience: A Ruthlessly Reductive Account.J. Bickle - 2003 - Kluwer Academic Publishers.details
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Studying Human Behavior: How Scientists Investigate Aggression and Sexuality.Helen E. Longino - 2013 - University of Chicago Press.details
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(1 other version)Psychoneural Reduction: The New Wave.John Bickle - 1998 - Bradford.details
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Simulation and Similarity: Using Models to Understand the World.Michael Weisberg - 2013 - New York, US: Oxford University Press.details
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(1 other version)Special Sciences, or Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis.Jerry Fodor - 1974 - Synthese 28 (2):97--115.details
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Origins of Objectivity.Tyler Burge - 2010 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.details
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Integrating psychology and neuroscience: functional analyses as mechanism sketches.Gualtiero Piccinini & Carl Craver - 2011 - Synthese 183 (3):283-311.details
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The autonomy of psychology in the age of neuroscience.Ken Aizawa & Carl Gillet - 2011 - In Phyllis McKay Illari Federica Russo (ed.), Causality in the Sciences. Oxford University Press. pp. 202--223.details
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(1 other version)Word and Object.Willard Van Orman Quine - 1960 - Cambridge, MA, USA: MIT Press.details
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Re-engineering philosophy for limited beings: piecewise approximations to reality.William C. Wimsatt - 2007 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.details
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Intention, plans, and practical reason.Michael Bratman - 1987 - Cambridge: Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.details
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(1 other version)Explaining the brain: mechanisms and the mosaic unity of neuroscience.Carl F. Craver - 2007 - New York : Oxford University Press,: Oxford University Press, Clarendon Press.details
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(1 other version)The Causal Autonomy of the Special Sciences.Peter Menzies & Christian List - 2010 - In Graham Macdonald & Cynthia Macdonald (eds.), Emergence in mind. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 108-129.details
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Interfield theories.Lindley Darden & Nancy Maull - 1977 - Philosophy of Science 44 (1):43-64.details
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The Nature of Psychological Explanation.Robert Cummins - 1983 - MIT Press.details
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Neurophilosophy: Toward A Unified Science of the Mind-Brain.Patricia Smith Churchland - 1986 - MIT Press.details
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Reducing mind to molecular pathways: Explicating the reductionism implicit in current cellular and molecular neuroscience. [REVIEW]John Bickle - 2006 - Synthese 151 (3):411-434.details
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Thinking about mechanisms.Peter Machamer, Lindley Darden & Carl F. Craver - 2000 - Philosophy of Science 67 (1):1-25.details
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Elements of Mind: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind.Tim Crane - 2001 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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Emotions as natural and normative kinds.Paul E. Griffiths - 2004 - Philosophy of Science 71 (5):901-911.details
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The Mind Incarnate.Lawrence A. Shapiro - 2004 - MIT Press.details
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Concepts: Where Cognitive Science Went Wrong.Jerry A. Fodor - 1998 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.details
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The Intentional Stance.Daniel Clement Dennett - 1981 - MIT Press.details
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Mental Mechanisms: Philosophical Perspectives on Cognitive Neuroscience.William Bechtel - 2007 - Psychology Press.details
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Theoretical Pluralism and the Scientific Study of Behavior.Helen Longino - 2006 - In Stephen Kellert, Helen Longino & C. Kenneth Waters (eds.), Theoretical Pluralism and the Scientific Study of Behavior. University of Minnesota Press. pp. 102-31.details
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Intentional Models as Essential Scientific Tools.Eric Hochstein - 2013 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 27 (2):199-217.details
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Towards a General Theory of Reduction. Part I: Historical and Scientific Setting.C. A. Hooker - 1981 - Dialogue 20 (1):38-59.details
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Mechanisms and natural kinds.Carl F. Craver - 2009 - Philosophical Psychology 22 (5):575-594.details
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(1 other version)Readings in Philosophy of Psychology: 1.Ned Joel Block (ed.) - 1980 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.details
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What Emotions Really Are: The Problem of Psychological Categories.Paul E. Griffiths - 1997 - University of Chicago Press.details
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Psychology as philosophy.Donald Davidson - 1974 - In Stuart C. Brown (ed.), Philosophy Of Psychology. London: : Macmillan. pp. 41-52.details
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Model testing, prediction and experimental protocols in neuroscience: A case study.Edoardo Datteri & Federico Laudisa - 2012 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 43 (3):602-610.details
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Understanding pluralism in climate modeling.Wendy Parker - 2006 - Foundations of Science 11 (4):349-368.details
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Reducing psychology while maintaining its autonomy via mechanistic explanations.William Bechtel - 2007 - In Maurice Kenneth Davy Schouten & Huibert Looren de Jong (eds.), The matter of the mind: philosophical essays on psychology, neuroscience, and reduction. Malden, MA: Blackwell.details
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Shocking lessons from electric fish: The theory and practice of multiple realization.Brian L. Keeley - 2000 - Philosophy of Science 67 (3):444-465.details
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(1 other version)From Folk Psychology to Cognitive Science: The Case against Belief.Stephen P. Stich - 1983 - Behaviorism 14 (2):159-182.details
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(1 other version)The causal autonomy of the special sciences.Peter Menzies & Christian List - 2010 - In Graham Macdonald & Cynthia Macdonald (eds.), Emergence in mind. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 108-129.details
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Strategies in the interfield discovery of the mechanism of protein synthesis.Lindley Darden & Carl Craver - 2002 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 33 (1):1-28.details
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Multiple Realizability Revisited: Linking Cognitive and Neural States.William Bechtel - 1999 - Philosophy of Science 66 (2):175-207.details
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Readings in Philosophy of Psychology.Ned Block - 1980 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 33 (2):227-230.details
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Relations among fields in the evolutionary synthesis.Lindley Darden - 1986 - In William Bechtel (ed.), Integrating Scientific Disciplines. University of Chicago Press. pp. 113--123.details
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The Status of Rationality Assumptions in Interpretation and in the Explanation of Action.Dagfinn Follesdal - 1982 - Dialectica 36 (4):301-316.details
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Reconceptualizations and interfield connections: The discovery of the link between vitamins and coenzymes.William Bechtel - 1984 - Philosophy of Science 51 (2):265-292.details
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