Switch to: Citations

Add references

You must login to add references.
  1. (1 other version)”Ostrich Nominalism’ or ”Mirage Realism’?Michael Devitt - 1980 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 61 (4):433-439.
    In "nominalism and realism" armstrong carefully demolishes various nominalist responses to plato's "one over many" problem but simply dismissed the quinean response as "ostrich nominalism". The paper argues that plato's problem is pseudo. So to ignore it is not to behave like an ostrich. Rather to adopt realism because of this problem that isn't there is to be a "mirage realist." there are some good reasons that lead armstrong to realism but he is largely a mirage realist. Quine does not (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   77 citations  
  • What's Wrong with Ostrich Nominalism?Howard Peacock - 2009 - Philosophical Papers 38 (2):183-217.
    Whereas traditional nominalists accept the realist's challenge to solve a 'Problem of Universals', the Ostrich Nominalist responds that there is no such Problem to answer. I suggest that Ostrich Nominalist arguments expose a genuine flaw in the realist project. However, I argue, Ostrich Nominalism is ultimately defeated by a problem about the analysis of qualitative sameness and difference. Qualitative sameness and difference are adequately understood only as sameness or difference in some respect. The need to say what these respects of (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  • Universals and scientific realism.David Malet Armstrong - 1978 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
    v. 1. Nominalism and realism.--v. 2. A theory of universals.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   313 citations  
  • Ontology and alternative languages.Eli Hirsch - 2009 - In Ryan Wasserman, David Manley & David Chalmers (eds.), Metametaphysics: New Essays on the Foundations of Ontology. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press. pp. 231--58.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   90 citations  
  • Properties.David Hugh Mellor & Alex Oliver (eds.) - 1997 - New York: Oxford University Press.
    When we say a certain rose is red, we seem to be attributing a property, redness, to it. But are there really such properties? If so, what are they like, how do we know about them, and how are they related to the objects which have them and the linguistic devices which we use to talk about them? This collection presents these ancient problems in a modern light. In particular, it makes accessible for the first time the most important contributions (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   33 citations  
  • Abstract particulars.Keith Campbell - 1990 - Cambridge, Mass., USA: Blackwell.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   314 citations  
  • A relational theory of the act.Kevin Mulligan & Barry Smith - 1986 - Topoi 5 (2):115-130.
    ‘What is characteristic of every mental activity’, according to Brentano, is ‘the reference to something as an object. In this respect every mental activity seems to be something relational.’ But what sort of a relation, if any, is our cognitive access to the world? This question – which we shall call Brentano’s question – throws a new light on many of the traditional problems of epistemology. The paper defends a view of perceptual acts as real relations of a subject to (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   35 citations  
  • Essence and modality.Kit Fine - 1994 - Philosophical Perspectives 8 (Logic and Language):1-16.
    It is my aim in this paper to show that the contemporary assimilation of essence to modality is fundamentally misguided and that, as a consequence, the corresponding conception of metaphysics should be given up. It is not my view that the modal account fails to capture anything which might reasonably be called a concept of essence. My point, rather, is that the notion of essence which is of central importance to the metaphysics of identity is not to be understood in (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   944 citations  
  • What is the problem of universals?Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra - 2000 - Mind 109 (434):255-273.
    In this article I address the Problem of Universals by answering questions about what facts a solution to the Problem of Universals should explain and how the explanation should go. I argue that a solution to the Problem of Universals explains the facts the Problem of Universals is about by giving the truthmakers (as opposed to the conceptual content and the ontological commitments) of the sentences stating those facts. I argue that the sentences stating the relevant facts are those like (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   41 citations  
  • (3 other versions)Truth-Makers.Kevin Mulligan, Peter Simons & Barry Smith - 1984 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 44 (3):287-321.
    A realist theory of truth for a class of sentences holds that there are entities in virtue of which these sentences are true or false. We call such entities ‘truthmakers’ and contend that those for a wide range of sentences about the real world are moments (dependent particulars). Since moments are unfamiliar, we provide a definition and a brief philosophical history, anchoring them in our ontology by showing that they are objects of perception. The core of our theory is the (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   321 citations  
  • (1 other version)Steps toward a constructive nominalism.Nelson Goodman & Willard van Orman Quine - 1947 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 12 (4):105-122.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   166 citations  
  • Ontological commitments.William P. Alston - 1958 - Philosophical Studies 9 (1-2):8 - 17.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   73 citations  
  • (1 other version)New work for a theory of universals.David K. Lewis - 1983 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 61 (4):343-377.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1583 citations  
  • (1 other version)Universals.F. P. Ramsey - 1997 - In David Hugh Mellor & Alex Oliver (eds.), Properties. New York: Oxford University Press.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   56 citations  
  • (3 other versions)Truth­-Makers.Kevin Mulligan, Peter Simons & Barry Smith - 2009 - Swiss Philosophical Preprints.
    During the realist revival in the early years of this century, philosophers of various persuasions were concerned to investigate the ontology of truth. That is, whether or not they viewed truth as a correspondence, they were interested in the extent to which one needed to assume the existence of entities serving some role in accounting for the truth of sentences. Certain of these entities, such as the Sätze an sich of Bolzano, the Gedanken of Frege, or the propositions of Russell (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   172 citations  
  • (1 other version)Steps Toward a Constructive Nominalism.Nelson Goodman & W. V. Quine - 1947 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 13 (1):49-50.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   151 citations  
  • Ramsey, Particulars, and Universals.Peter Simons - 1991 - Theoria 57 (3):150-161.
    My subject is the arguments brought by Ramsey in his paper “ Universals ” ’ against the generally held distinction between particulars and universals. This paper is provocative, suggestive, and radical, and it is humbling to reflect that its author was just 22 years old when it was published in Mind. As so often with Ramsey, the paper is superficially very easy to follow and hardly requires any introduction other than the imperative, “Read it through”, but underneath the surface are (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   14 citations  
  • (1 other version)Universals.Frank P. Ramsey - 1925 - Mind 34 (136):401-417.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   105 citations  
  • The metaphysics of properties.Alex Oliver - 1996 - Mind 105 (417):1-80.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   152 citations  
  • The particular–universal distinction: A dogma of metaphysics?Fraser Macbride - 2005 - Mind 114 (455):565-614.
    Is the assumption of a fundamental distinction between particulars and universals another unsupported dogma of metaphysics? F. P. Ramsey famously rejected the particular – universal distinction but neglected to consider the many different conceptions of the distinction that have been advanced. As a contribution to the piecemeal investigation of this issue three interrelated conceptions of the particular – universal distinction are examined: universals, by contrast to particulars, are unigrade; particulars are related to universals by an asymmetric tie of exemplification; universals (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   64 citations  
  • Universals and Metaphysical Realism.Alan Donagan - 1963 - The Monist 47 (2):211-246.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   14 citations  
  • (1 other version)New Work For a Theory of Universals.David Lewis - 1997 - In David Hugh Mellor & Alex Oliver (eds.), Properties. New York: Oxford University Press.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1026 citations  
  • (1 other version)Predication Without Universals?: A Fling with Ostrich Nominalism.James Van Cleve - 1994 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 54 (3):577 - 590.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   31 citations  
  • Ontological Commitments.William P. Alston - 1958 - Bobbs-Merrill.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   40 citations  
  • (1 other version)Predication Without Universals?James Van Cleve - 1994 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 54 (3):577-590.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   12 citations  
  • Universals and Scientific Realism.Laurence Goldstein - 1979 - Philosophical Quarterly 29 (117):360-362.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   66 citations  
  • Properties and Predicates.D. H. Mellor - 1997 - In David Hugh Mellor & Alex Oliver (eds.), Properties. New York: Oxford University Press.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   57 citations  
  • Truthmaking without truthmakers.Joseph Melia - 2005 - In Helen Beebee & Julian Dodd (eds.), Truthmakers: The Contemporary Debate. Oxford, GB: Clarendon Press. pp. 67.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   87 citations  
  • Ockham's razor and Chateaubriand's goatee.Guido Imaguire - 2008 - Manuscrito 31 (1):139-154.
    In Logical Forms II Chateaubriand puts the simple question: Why should we accept Ockham’s razor? He blames the principle of reduction as an unjustified dogma of nominalism. In this paper I present a justification for it. Contrary to Russell`s conception of reduction as elimination, I propose the thesis that reduction is explanation.Em Logical Forms II, Chateaubriand levanta a questão: Por que deveríamos aceitar a navalha de Ockham? Ele critica esse princípio de redução como um dogma não justificado do nominalismo. Neste (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation