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Universals

In David Hugh Mellor & Alex Oliver (eds.), Properties. New York: Oxford University Press (1997)

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  1. The Theory of Form Logic.Wolfgang Freitag & Alexandra Zinke - 2012 - Logic and Logical Philosophy 21 (4):363-389.
    We investigate a construction schema for first-order logical systems, called “form logic”. Form logic allows us to overcome the dualistic commitment of predicate logic to individual constants and predicates. Dualism is replaced by a pluralism of terms of different “logical forms”. Individual form-logical systems are generated by the determination of a range of logical forms and of the formbased syntax rules for combining terms into formulas. We develop a generic syntax and semantics for such systems and provide a completeness proof (...)
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  • Przyczyna i Wyjaśnianie: Studium Z Filozofii i Metodologii Nauk.Paweł Kawalec - 2006 - Lublin: Wydawnictwo KUL.
    Przedmowa Problematyka związana z zależnościami przyczynowymi, ich modelowaniem i odkrywa¬niem, po długiej nieobecności w filozofii i metodologii nauk, budzi współcześnie duże zainteresowanie. Wiąże się to przede wszystkim z dynamicznym rozwojem, zwłaszcza od lat 1990., technik obli¬czeniowych. Wypracowane w tym czasie sieci bayesowskie uznaje się za matematyczny język przyczynowości. Pozwalają one na daleko idącą auto¬matyzację wnioskowań, co jest także zachętą do podjęcia prób algorytmiza¬cji odkrywania przyczyn. Na potrzeby badań naukowych, które pozwalają na przeprowadzenie eksperymentu z randomizacją, standardowe metody ustalania zależności przyczynowych (...)
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  • Paolo Crivelli, Aristotle on Truth.Christopher Shields - 2010 - Philosophical Review 119 (2):243-246.
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  • Universals.Chad Carmichael - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 150 (3):373-389.
    In this paper, I argue that there are universals. I begin (Sect. 1) by proposing a sufficient condition for a thing’s being a universal. I then argue (Sect. 2) that some truths exist necessarily. Finally, I argue (Sects. 3 and 4) that these truths are structured entities having constituents that meet the proposed sufficient condition for being universals.
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  • Nominalistic systems.Rolf A. Eberle - 1970 - Dordrecht,: Reidel.
    1. 1. PROGRAM It will be our aim to reconstruct, with precision, certain views which have been traditionally associated with nominalism and to investigate problems arising from these views in the construction of interpreted formal systems. Several such systems are developed in accordance with the demand that the sentences of a system which is acceptable to a nominalist must not imply the existence of any entities other than individuals. Emphasis will be placed on the constructionist method of philosophical analysis. To (...)
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  • The underdetermination of typings.Jan Westerhoff - 2003 - Erkenntnis 58 (3):379 - 414.
    This paper argues that there is no possible structural way of drawing a distinction between objects of different types, such as individuals and properties of different adicities and orders. We show first that purely combinatorial information (information about how objects combine to form states of affairs) is not sufficient for doing this. We show that for any set of such combinatorial data there is always more than one way of typing them – that is, there are always several ways of (...)
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  • Wittgenstein and finitism.Mathieu Marion - 1995 - Synthese 105 (2):141 - 176.
    In this paper, elementary but hitherto overlooked connections are established between Wittgenstein's remarks on mathematics, written during his transitional period, and free-variable finitism. After giving a brief description of theTractatus Logico-Philosophicus on quantifiers and generality, I present in the first section Wittgenstein's rejection of quantification theory and his account of general arithmetical propositions, to use modern jargon, as claims (as opposed to statements). As in Skolem's primitive recursive arithmetic and Goodstein's equational calculus, Wittgenstein represented generality by the use of free (...)
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  • Psychophysical and tractarian analysis.Timm Lampert - 2003 - Perspectives on Science 11 (3):285-317.
    This paper argues for a physicalistic interpretation of Wittgenstein's Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. Wittgenstein's general conception of world and language analysis is interpreted and exemplified in relation to the historical background of the psychophysical analysis of sense data and, in particular, color analysis. Three of his main principles of analysis—the principle of independence, the context principle and the principle of atomism—are interpreted and justified on the background of physicalism. From his proof of color exclusion in the Tractatus, it is shown that Wittgenstein (...)
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  • Wittgenstein on Weyl: the law of the excluded middle and the natural numbers.Jann Paul Engler - 2023 - Synthese 201 (6):1-23.
    In one of his meetings with members of the Vienna Circle, Wittgenstein discusses Hermann Weyl’s brief conversion to intuitionism and criticizes his arguments against applying the law of the excluded middle to generalizations over the natural numbers. Like Weyl, however, Wittgenstein rejects the classical model theoretic conception of generality when it comes to infinite domains. Nonetheless, he disagrees with him about the reasons for doing so. This paper provides an account of Wittgenstein’s criticism of Weyl that is based on his (...)
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  • Features and Bugs in Schnieder’s Theory of Properties.Arvid Båve - 2024 - Erkenntnis 89 (8):3379-3384.
    Although Benjamin Schnieder’s theory of the “ordinary conception” of properties successfully handles paradoxical properties—particularly, the property of non-self-instantiation—it fails to account for ordinary, non-pathological cases. The theory allows the inference of ‘a has the property of being F’ only given F(a) and the prior assertibility of ‘the property of being F can exist’. While this allows us to block an inference to a contradiction, it also blocks all of the non-pathological instances of the inference from ‘a is F’ to ‘a (...)
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  • Identity Metaphysics.Galen Strawson - 2021 - The Monist 104 (1):60-90.
    Identity metaphysics finds identity or unity where other metaphysical theories find difference or diversity. It denies the fundamentality of ontological distinctions that other theories treat as fundamental. It’s opposed to separatism, which mistakes natural conceptual distinctions for ground-floor ontological differences. It proposes that the distinctions between the concepts substance, object, quality, property, process, state, and event are metaphysically superficial; so too the distinctions between the concepts energy, lawsofnature, force, causation, power, and naturalnecessity. So too the distinction between these two sets (...)
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  • The Indeterminacy of the Distinction between Objects and Ways of Being.Julio De Rizzo - 2022 - Erkenntnis 87 (6):2923-2941.
    Few if any distinctions are more easily recognisable and assented to than that between _objects_, that is, things which are some ways, and that which they are, that is, _ways for objects to be_ (‘ways of being’ for short). In this paper I present an argument designed to show that this distinction is indeterminate in the sense that the truth-conditions of predicational sentences leave open what should count as an object and a way of being. The bulk of the argument (...)
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  • (2 other versions)Spinoza’s Metaphysics of Substance.Yitzhak Y. Melamed - 2008 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 78 (1):17-82.
    In his groundbreaking work of 1969, Spinoza's Metaphysics: An Essay in Interpretation, Edwin Curley attacked the traditional understanding of the substance-mode relation in Spinoza, which makes modes inhere in the substance. Curley argued that such an interpretation generates insurmountable problems, as had been already claimed by Pierre Bayle in his famous entry on Spinoza. Instead of having the modes inhere in the substance Curley suggested that the modes’ dependence upon the substance should be interpreted in terms of (efficient) causation, i.e., (...)
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  • Is There a Single True Theory of Properties?Lars Binderup - 2004 - Res Cogitans 1 (1).
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  • Acts and Alternative Analyses.Arvid Båve - 2019 - Journal of Philosophy 116 (4):181–205.
    I show that the act-type theories of Soames and Hanks entail that every sentence with alternative analyses (including every atomic sentence with a polyadic predicate) is ambiguous, many of them massively so. I assume that act types directed toward distinct objects are themselves distinct, plus some standard semantic axioms, and infer that act-type theorists are committed to saying that ‘Mary loves John’ expresses both the act type of predicating [loving John] of Mary and that of predicating [being loved by Mary] (...)
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  • Russell on Negative Judgement.Anssi Korhonen - 2020 - Topoi 39 (3):727-742.
    This paper concerns Bertrand Russell’s changing views on negative judgement. ‘Negative judgement’ is considered in the context of three theories of judgement that Russell put forth at different times: a dual relation theory ; a multiple relation theory ; a psychological theory of judgement. Four issues are singled out for a more detailed discussion: quality dualism versus quality monism, that is, the question whether judgement comes in two kinds, acceptance and rejection, or whether there is only one judgement-quality ; the (...)
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  • Priority and Unity in Frege and Wittgenstein.Oliver Thomas Spinney - 2018 - Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy 6 (5).
    In the following article I intend to examine the problem of the unity of the proposition in Russell, Frege, and Wittgenstein. My chief aim will be to draw attention to the distinction between Russell’s conception of propositional constituents, on the one hand, with Frege and Wittgenstein’s on the other. My focus will be on Russell’s view of terms as independent, propositions being built up out of these building blocks, compared with Frege and Wittgenstein’s ‘top down’ approach. Furthermore, I will argue (...)
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  • Fizykalistyczny panpsychizm.Galen Strawson - 2018 - Roczniki Filozoficzne 66 (1):181-205.
    W najogólniejszym sformułowaniu panpsychizm to pogląd, który głosi, że wszystko jest umysłem lub świadomością. Mimo że stanowisko to ma długą tradycję i staje się coraz popularniejsze we współczesnej debacie, wciąż ma ono wielu przeciwników. Celem tego artykułu jest dowiedzenie, że panpsychizm stanowi najlepsze metafizyczne wyjaśnienie natury tego, co stanowi ostateczne tworzywo rzeczywistości. Jest to zarazem odmiana fizykalizmu, zgodnie z którą doświadczenie jest budulcem wszystkich konkretnie istniejących przedmiotów.
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  • Following logical realism where it leads.Michaela Markham McSweeney - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (1):117-139.
    Logical realism is the view that there is logical structure in the world. I argue that, if logical realism is true, then we are deeply ignorant of that logical structure: either we can’t know which of our logical concepts accurately capture it, or none of our logical concepts accurately capture it at all. I don’t suggest abandoning logical realism, but instead discuss how realists should adjust their methodology in the face of this ignorance.
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  • In defense of quine’s ostrich nominalism.Guido Imaguire - 2014 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 89 (1):185-203.
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  • The Subject of Experience.Galen Strawson - 2017 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
    Does the self exist? If so, what is its nature? How long do selves last? Galen Strawson draws on literature and psychology as well as philosophy to discuss various ways we experience having or being a self. He argues that it is legitimate to say that there is such a thing as the self, distinct from the human being.
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  • The identity of the categorical and the dispositional.Galen Strawson - 2008 - Analysis 68 (4):271-282.
    Suppose that X and Y can’t possibly exist apart in reality; then—by definition—there’s no real distinction between them, only a conceptual distinction. There’s a conceptual distinction between a rectilinear figure’s triangularity and its trilaterality, for example, but no real distinction. In fundamental metaphysics there is no real distinction between an object’s categorical properties and its dispositional properties. So too there is no real distinction between an object and its properties. And in fundamental metaphysics, for X and Y to be such (...)
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  • (1 other version)The Bearable Lightness of Being (vol 20, pg 399, 2010).Bob Hale - 2011 - Axiomathes 21 (4):597 - 597.
    How are philosophical questions about what kinds of things there are to be understood and how are they to be answered? This paper defends broadly Fregean answers to these questions. Ontological categories—such as object , property , and relation —are explained in terms of a prior logical categorization of expressions, as singular terms, predicates of varying degree and level, etc. Questions about what kinds of object, property, etc., there are are, on this approach, reduce to questions about truth and logical (...)
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  • Formalization and the objects of logic.Georg Brun - 2008 - Erkenntnis 69 (1):1 - 30.
    There is a long-standing debate whether propositions, sentences, statements or utterances provide an answer to the question of what objects logical formulas stand for. Based on the traditional understanding of logic as a science of valid arguments, this question is firstly framed more exactly, making explicit that it calls not only for identifying some class of objects, but also for explaining their relationship to ordinary language utterances. It is then argued that there are strong arguments against the proposals commonly put (...)
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  • Putting form before function: Logical grammar in Frege, Russell, and Wittgenstein.Kevin C. Klement - 2004 - Philosophers' Imprint 4:1-47.
    The positions of Frege, Russell and Wittgenstein on the priority of complexes over (propositional) functions are sketched, challenging those who take the "judgment centered" aspects of the Tractatus to be inherited from Frege not Russell. Frege's views on the priority of judgments are problematic, and unlike Wittgenstein's. Russell's views on these matters, and their development, are discussed in detail, and shown to be more sophisticated than usually supposed. Certain misreadings of Russell, including those regarding the relationship between propositional functions and (...)
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  • Phenomenal Intentionality and the Problem of Cognitive Contact.Christopher A. Young - unknown
    Part 1 of the thesis questions the traditional relation model of intentionality. After fixing reference on the target phenomenon, intentionality, and explaining my interest in it, I ask what sorts of things intentionality might be a relation to. I consider ordinary objects, properties, propositions and hybrid views, and conclude all make the intentional relation appear rather mysterious. From there, I move on to examine the relation view’s most prominent proponents, the tracking theorists—pointing out some challenges such views face, and concluding (...)
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  • Odpowiedź Lowe’a na argument Ramseya przeciwko rozróżnieniu uniwersalia–indywidua.L. U. C. Joanna - 2016 - Argument: Biannual Philosophical Journal 6 (1):223-238.
    The answer of Lowe to Ramsey’s argument against the distinction universal vs. indivi- dual: At the beginning of this article Ramsey’s argumentation against universal‐particular distinction is presented. It is based on the assumption that this division requires another one: namely, subject‐predicate distinction. This argumentation was a starting point for Lowe, who does not respect the aforementioned assumption. In his theory, there are not two but four categories, namely: substantial universals, non‐substantial universals, substantial particulars, and non‐substantial particulars. Two of these categories (...)
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  • Exclusion Problems and the Cardinality of Logical Space.Tim Button - 2017 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 46 (6):611-623.
    Wittgenstein’s atomist picture, as embodied in his Tractatus, is initially very appealing. However, it faces the famous colour-exclusion problem. In this paper, I shall explain when the atomist picture can be defended in the face of that problem; and, in the light of this, why the atomist picture should be rejected. I outline the atomist picture in Section 1. In Section 2, I present a very simple necessary and sufficient condition for the tenability of the atomist picture. The condition is: (...)
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  • Predication as Ascription.David Liebesman - 2015 - Mind 124 (494):517-569.
    I articulate and defend a necessary and sufficient condition for predication. The condition is that a term or term-occurrence stands in the relation of ascription to its designatum, ascription being a fundamental semantic relation that differs from reference. This view has dramatically different semantic consequences from its alternatives. After outlining the alternatives, I draw out these consequences and show how they favour the ascription view. I then develop the view and elicit a number of its virtues.
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  • (1 other version)Predicate reference.Fraser MacBride - 2005 - In Ernie Lepore & Barry C. Smith (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Language. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press. pp. 422--475.
    Whether a predicate is a referential expression depends upon what reference is conceived to be. Even if it is granted that reference is a relation between words and worldly items, the referents of expressions being the items to which they are so related, this still leaves considerable scope for disagreement about whether predicates refer. One of Frege's great contributions to the philosophy of language was to introduce an especially liberal conception of reference relative to which it is unproblematic to suppose (...)
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  • Self-intimation.Galen Strawson - 2013 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 14 (1):1-31.
    Aristotle, Dignāga, Descartes, Arnauld, Locke, Brentano, Sartre and many others are right about the nature of conscious awareness: all such awareness comports—somehow carries within itself—awareness of itself . This is a necessary condition of awareness being awareness at all: no ‘higher-order’ account of what makes conscious states conscious can be correct. But is very paradoxical: it seems to require that awareness be somehow already present, in such a way as to be available to itself as object of awareness, in order (...)
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  • Same but Different.Anna-Sofia Maurin - 2005 - Metaphysica 6 (1):131-146.
    Paper responding to critique of Maurin (2002) presented by Herbert Hochberg in his “Relations, Properties and Particulars” (2004).
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  • Once More: Bradleyan Regresses.Benjamin Schnieder - 2013 - In Herbert Hochberg & Kevin Mulligan (eds.), Relations and predicates. Lancaster, LA: Ontos Verlag. pp. 219-256.
    ld English manors have their ghosts. And though I would not want to call analytic philosophy a ‘manor’, nor exactly ‘old’, it certainly is of some decent English origin, and it left adolescence a while ago. No wonder then, that it is not exempt from haunting terrors. One particular spectre has been haunting it for decades; it already gave some analytic pioneers the creeps, and we still now and then find people terrified by it: the ghost of old Bradley has (...)
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  • Propositional Structure and B. Russell's Theory of Denoting in The Principles of Mathematics.Antonio Rauti - 2004 - History and Philosophy of Logic 25 (4):281-304.
    In every introductory course on logic, students learn that expressions like ‘somebody’, ‘nothing’ or ‘every woman’ are not names or referring expressions, but quantifiers, and that, owing to this,...
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  • Combinatorialism revisited.David Armstrong - 2004 - In Armstrong David (ed.).
    The object of this paper is to argue once again for the combinatorial account of possibility defended in earlier work. But there I failed fully to realise the dialectical advantages that accrue once one begins by assuming the hypothesis of logical atomism, the hypothesis that postulates simple particulars and simple universals at the bottom of the world. Logical atomism is, I incline to think, no better than ‘speculative cosmology’ as opposed to ‘analytic ontology’, to use Donald Williams’ terminology. It is, (...)
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  • Trope Sheaves. A Topological Ontology of Tropes.Thomas Mormann - 1995 - Logic and Logical Philosophy of Science 3:129-150.
    In this paper I want to show that topology has a bearing on the theory of tropes. More precisely, I propose a topological ontology of tropes. This is to be understood as follows: trope ontology is a „one-category”-ontology countenancing only one kind of basic entities, to wit, tropes. 1 Hence, individuals, properties, relations, etc. are to be constructed from tropes.
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  • Substitution in a sense.Robert Trueman - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (12):3069-3098.
    The Reference Principle states that co-referring expressions are everywhere intersubstitutable salva congruitate. On first glance, looks like a truism, but a truism with some bite: transforms difficult philosophical questions about co-reference into easy grammatical questions about substitutability. This has led a number of philosophers to think that we can use to make short work of certain longstanding metaphysical debates. For example, it has been suggested that all we need to do to show that the predicate ‘ is a horse’ does (...)
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  • THE TRANSCENDENTAL METAPHYSIC OF G.F. STOUT: HIS DEFENCE AND ELABORATION OF TROPE THEORY.Fraser Macbride - 2014 - In A. Reboul (ed.), Mind, Value and Metaphysics: Papers Dedicated to Kevin Mulligan. Springer. pp. 141-58.
    G. F. Stout is famous as an early twentieth century proselyte for abstract particulars, or tropes as they are now often called. He advanced his version of trope theory to avoid the excesses of nominalism on the one hand and realism on the other. But his arguments for tropes have been widely misconceived as metaphysical, e.g. by Armstrong. In this paper, I argue that Stout’s fundamental arguments for tropes were ideological and epistemological rather than metaphysical. He moulded his scheme to (...)
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  • Ramsey on truth and truth on Ramsey.Pierre Le Morvan - 2004 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 12 (4):705 – 718.
    It is widely held, to the point of being the received interpretation, that Frank Ramsey was the first to defend the so-called Redundancy Theory of Truth in his landmark article ‘Facts and Propositions’ (hereafter ‘FP’) of 1927.1 For instance, A.J. Ayer2 cited this article in the context of arguing that saying that p is true is simply a way of asserting p and that truth is not a real quality or relation. Other holders of the received interpretation, such as George (...)
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  • Dimensions: A New Ontology of Properties.Xi-Yang Guo - 2017 - Dissertation, University of Durham
    This thesis advances and defends a novel two-category ontology of objects and dimensions, latterly conceived as respects of comparability. The proposed 'dimensionist' ontology is set out and brought to bear on discussions of determinables and determinates, the problem of universals, fact ontologies, and nomic governance. Dimensionism is argued to fare well in comparison to a range of rival ontological accounts of property possession. A metametaphysical framework is set out to undergird the discussion, which draws on both realist and pragmatist resources.
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  • Cause, Effect, And Fake Causation.Johannes Persson - 2002 - Synthese 131 (1):129-143.
    The possibility of apparently negative causation has been discussed in a number of recent works on causation, but the discussion has suffered from beingscattered. In this paper, the problem of apparently negative causation and its attemptedsolutions are examined in more detail. I discuss and discard three attempts that have beensuggested in the literature. My conclusion is negative: Negative causation shows that thetraditional cause & effect view is inadequate. A more unified causal perspective is needed.
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  • Proper nouns.Samuel Cumming - 2007 - Dissertation, Rutgers - New Brunswick
    This dissertation is an experiment: what happens if we treat proper names as anaphoric expressions on a par with pronouns? The first thing to notice is that a name's 'antecedent' can occur in a discourse prior to the one containing the name. An individual may be introduced and tagged with a name in one context, and then retrieved using the name in a later context. To allow for discourse crossing anaphora, in addition to the usual cross-sentential anaphora, a revision of (...)
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  • Ramsey, ‘Universals’ and atomic propositions.S. J. Methven - 2019 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 27 (1):134-154.
    ABSTRACTIn ‘Universals’, Ramsey declares that we do not, and cannot, know the forms of atomic propositions. A year later, in a symposium with Braithwaite and Joseph, he announces a change of mind: atomic propositions may, after all, be discoverable by analysis. It is clear from the 1926 paper that Ramsey intends this to be a revision of the 1925 claim. Puzzlingly, however, Ramsey does not mention analysis in 1925. My task in this article is to provide a justification for that (...)
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  • Elementary categorial logic, predicates of variable degree, and theory of quantity.Brent Mundy - 1989 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 18 (2):115 - 140.
    Developing some suggestions of Ramsey (1925), elementary logic is formulated with respect to an arbitrary categorial system rather than the categorial system of Logical Atomism which is retained in standard elementary logic. Among the many types of non-standard categorial systems allowed by this formalism, it is argued that elementary logic with predicates of variable degree occupies a distinguished position, both for formal reasons and because of its potential value for application of formal logic to natural language and natural science. This (...)
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  • May Sim, Remastering Morals with Aristotle and Confucius.Robert Wardy - 2010 - Philosophical Review 119 (2):250-255.
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  • Jeffrey C. King, The Nature and Structure of Content. [REVIEW]David Liebesman - 2010 - Philosophical Review 119 (2):246-250.
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  • Bealer's quality and concept.C. Anthony Anderson - 1987 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 16 (2):115 - 164.
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  • Nagative Attributes, Partitions, and Rational Decisions: Why Not Speak Notspeak.Arthur Merin - 1999 - Philosophical Studies 94 (3):253-271.
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  • What Is Existence?João Branquinho - 2012 - Disputatio 4 (34):575-590.
    This paper has a negative and a positive claim. The negative claim is that the Frege-Russell account of existence as a higher-order predicate is mistaken and should be abandoned, even with respect to general statements of existence such as “Flying mammals exist” (where statements of this sort are supposed to be best accommodated by the account). The Frege-Russell view seems to be supported by two ideas. First, the idea that existence is entirely expressed by the existential quantifier of standard predicate (...)
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  • Generale e Particolare.Andrea Borghini - unknown
    Is it true that some entities are general, while others are particular? Ramsey famously challenged this distinction, and more recently Fraser McBride has revived the challenge. In this paper I argue that there are at least five substantial distinctions among entities, and that the distinction between general and particular entities should be made to correspond to one or more of those substantial distinctions.
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