Switch to: Citations

Add references

You must login to add references.
  1. Change in View: Principles of Reasoning, Cambridge, Mass.Gilbert Harman - 1986 - Behaviorism 16 (1):93-96.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   714 citations  
  • Knowledge and Action.J. Stanley & J. Hawthorne - 2008 - Revista Cultura E Fé 37 (144).
    Reconhecido centro de formação profissional em carreiras jurídicas, o IDC oferece Especialização, preparação para Exame de Ordem e Cursos de Extensão em mais de 20 áreas do Direito, aprofundando os conhecimentos de advogados e bacharéis. Possui também graduação em Filosofia, além de promover Cursos Preparatórios para Concursos em diversas áreas, obtendo excelentes resultados de aprovação graças à preocupação constante na qualificação e excelência de seu corpo docente e infra-estrutura.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   270 citations  
  • Contextualism and Knowledge Attributions.Keith DeRose - 1992 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52 (4):913-929.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   325 citations  
  • Experimental Evidence in Support of Anti-Intellectualism About Knowledge.Ángel Pinillos & Shawn Simpson - 2014 - In James R. Beebe (ed.), Advances in Experimental Epistemology. New York: Bloomsbury Academic. pp. 9-44.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   18 citations  
  • Actionability Judgments Cause Knowledge Judgments.John Turri, Wesley Buckwalter & David Rose - 2016 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 5 (3):212-222.
    Researchers recently demonstrated a strong direct relationship between judgments about what a person knows and judgments about how a person should act. But it remains unknown whether actionability judgments cause knowledge judgments, or knowledge judgments cause actionability judgments. This paper uses causal modeling to help answer this question. Across two experiments, we found evidence that actionability judgments cause knowledge judgments.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   33 citations  
  • "Construal-level theory of psychological distance": Correction to Trope and Liberman (2010).Yaacov Trope & Nira Liberman - 2010 - Psychological Review 117 (3):1024-1024.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   106 citations  
  • Construal-level theory of psychological distance.Yaacov Trope & Nira Liberman - 2010 - Psychological Review 117 (2):440-463.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   181 citations  
  • Rational choice and the structure of the environment.Herbert A. Simon - 1956 - Psychological Review 63 (2):129-138.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   327 citations  
  • Social functionalist frameworks for judgment and choice: Intuitive politicians, theologians, and prosecutors.Philip E. Tetlock - 2002 - Psychological Review 109 (3):451-471.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   45 citations  
  • Motivated closing of the mind: "Seizing" and "freezing.".Arie W. Kruglanski & Donna M. Webster - 1996 - Psychological Review 103 (2):263-283.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   84 citations  
  • Dual-Process Theories of Higher Cognition Advancing the Debate.Jonathan Evans & Keith E. Stanovich - 2013 - Perspectives on Psychological Science 8 (3):223-241.
    Dual-process and dual-system theories in both cognitive and social psychology have been subjected to a number of recently published criticisms. However, they have been attacked as a category, incorrectly assuming there is a generic version that applies to all. We identify and respond to 5 main lines of argument made by such critics. We agree that some of these arguments have force against some of the theories in the literature but believe them to be overstated. We argue that the dual-processing (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   399 citations  
  • A perspective on judgment and choice: mapping bounded rationality.Daniel Kahneman - 2003 - American Psychologist 58 (9):697.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   263 citations  
  • Epistemic Contextualism: An Idle Hypothesis.John Turri - 2017 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 95 (1):141-156.
    Epistemic contextualism is one of the most hotly debated topics in contemporary epistemology. Contextualists claim that ‘know’ is a context-sensitive verb associated with different evidential standards in different contexts. Contextualists motivate their view based on a set of behavioural claims. In this paper, I show that several of these behavioural claims are false. I also show that contextualist test cases suffer from a critical confound, which derives from people's tendency to defer to speakers’ statements about their own mental states. My (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   34 citations  
  • What's wrong with contextualism?John Greco - 2008 - Philosophical Quarterly 58 (232):416-436.
    This paper addresses two worries that might be raised about contextualism in epistemology and that carry over to its moral analogues: that contextualism robs epistemology (and moral theory) of a proper subject-matter, and that contextualism robs knowledge claims (and moral claims) of their objectivity. Two theses are defended: (1) that these worries are appropriately directed at interestdependent theories in general rather than at contextualism in particular, and (2) that the two worries are over-stated in any case. Finally, the paper offers (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   73 citations  
  • The Epistemic Value of Speculative Fiction.Johan De Smedt & Helen De Cruz - 2015 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 39 (1):58-77.
    Speculative fiction, such as science fiction and fantasy, has a unique epistemic value. We examine similarities and differences between speculative fiction and philosophical thought experiments in terms of how they are cognitively processed. They are similar in their reliance on mental prospection, but dissimilar in that fiction is better able to draw in readers (transportation) and elicit emotional responses. By its use of longer, emotionally poignant narratives and seemingly irrelevant details, speculative fiction allows for a better appraisal of the consequences (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   9 citations  
  • Epistemic Evaluation: Purposeful Epistemology.David K. Henderson & John Greco (eds.) - 2015 - Oxford: Oxford University Press UK.
    Epistemic Evaluation aims to explore and apply a particular methodology in epistemology. The methodology is to consider the point or purpose of our epistemic evaluations, and to pursue epistemological theory in light of such matters. Call this purposeful epistemology. The idea is that considerations about the point and purpose of epistemic evaluation might fruitfully constrain epistemological theory and yield insights for epistemological reflection. Several contributions to this volume explicitly address this general methodology, or some version of it. Others focus on (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   13 citations  
  • What is adaptive about adaptive decision making? A parallel constraint satisfaction account.Andreas Glöckner, Benjamin E. Hilbig & Marc Jekel - 2014 - Cognition 133 (3):641-666.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   12 citations  
  • From relative truth to Finean non-factualism.Alexander Jackson - 2016 - Synthese 193 (3):971-989.
    This paper compares two ‘relativist’ theories about deliciousness: truth-relativism, and Kit Fine’s non-factualism about a subject-matter. Contemporary truth-relativism is presented as a linguistic thesis; its metaphysical underpinning is often neglected. I distinguish three views about the obtaining of worldly states of affairs concerning deliciousness, and argue that none yields a satisfactory version of truth-relativism. Finean non-factualism about deliciousness is not subject to the problems with truth-relativism. I conclude that Finean non-factualism is the better relativist theory. As I explain, non-facualism about (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  • A Bayesian framework for knowledge attribution: Evidence from semantic integration.Derek Powell, Zachary Horne, Ángel Pinillos & Keith Holyoak - 2015 - Cognition 139 (C):92-104.
    We propose a Bayesian framework for the attribution of knowledge, and apply this framework to generate novel predictions about knowledge attribution for different types of “Gettier cases”, in which an agent is led to a justified true belief yet has made erroneous assumptions. We tested these predictions using a paradigm based on semantic integration. We coded the frequencies with which participants falsely recalled the word “thought” as “knew” (or a near synonym), yielding an implicit measure of conceptual activation. Our experiments (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   11 citations  
  • Knowledge and Presuppositions.Michael Blome-Tillmann - 2014 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    Knowledge and Presuppositions develops a novel account of epistemic contextualism based on the idea that pragmatic presuppositions play a central role in the semantics of knowledge attributions. According to Blome-Tillmann, knowledge attributions are sensitive to what is pragmatically presupposed at the context of ascription. The resulting theory--Presuppositional Epistemic Contextualism (PEC)--is simple and straightforward, yet powerful enough to have far-reaching and important consequences for a variety of hotly debated issues in epistemology and philosophy of language. -/- In this book, Blome-Tillmann first (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   86 citations  
  • Arguing for shifty epistemology.J. Fantl & M. McGrath - 2012 - In Jessica Brown & Mikkel Gerken (eds.), Knowledge Ascriptions. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press. pp. 55--74.
    Shifty epistemologists allow that the truth value of “knowledge”-ascriptions can vary not merely because of such differences, but because of factors not traditionally deemed to matter to whether someone knows, like salience of error possibilities and practical stakes. Thus, contextualists and subject-sensitive invariantists are both examples. This paper examines two strategies for arguing for shifty epistemology: the argument-from-instances strategy, which attempts to show that the truth-value of knowledge-ascriptions can vary by proposing cases in which they vary (e.g., the bank cases, (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   18 citations  
  • Gate-Keeping Contextualism.David Henderson - 2011 - Episteme 8 (1):83-98.
    This paper explores a position that combines contextualism regarding knowledge with the idea that the central point or purpose of the concept of knowledge is to feature in attributions that keep epistemic gate for contextually salient communities. After highlighting the main outlines and virtues of the suggested gate-keeping contextualism, two issues are pursued. First, the motivation for the view is clarified in a discussion of the relation between evaluative concepts and the purposes they serve. This clarifies why one's sense for (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   26 citations  
  • Conflicting intuitions may be based on differing abilities: evidence from mental imaging research.Bill Faw - 2009 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 16 (4):45-68.
    Much of the current imaging literature either denies the existence of wakeful non-mental imagers, views non-imagers motivationally as 'repressors' or 'neurotic', or acknowledges them but does not fully incorporate them into their models. Neurobiologists testing for imaging loss seem to assume that visual recognition, describing objects, and free-hand drawing require the forming of conscious images. The intuition that 'the psyche never thinks without an image.... the reasoning mind thinks its ideas in the form of images' (Aristotle) has a long tradition (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   21 citations  
  • The Practical Origins of Epistemic Contextualism.Michael Hannon - 2013 - Erkenntnis 78 (4):899-919.
    This paper explores how the purpose of the concept of knowledge affects knowledge ascriptions in natural language. I appeal to the idea that the role of the concept of knowledge is to flag reliable informants, and I use this idea to illuminate and support contextualism about ‘knows’. I argue that practical pressures that arise in an epistemic state of nature provide an explanatory basis for a brand of contextualism that I call ‘practical interests contextualism’. I also answer some questions that (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   22 citations  
  • Bayesianism II: Applications and Criticisms.Kenny Easwaran - 2011 - Philosophy Compass 6 (5):321-332.
    In the first paper, I discussed the basic claims of Bayesianism (that degrees of belief are important, that they obey the axioms of probability theory, and that they are rationally updated by either standard or Jeffrey conditionalization) and the arguments that are often used to support them. In this paper, I will discuss some applications these ideas have had in confirmation theory, epistemol- ogy, and statistics, and criticisms of these applications.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   31 citations  
  • Bayesianism I: Introduction and Arguments in Favor.Kenny Easwaran - 2011 - Philosophy Compass 6 (5):312-320.
    Bayesianism is a collection of positions in several related fields, centered on the interpretation of probability as something like degree of belief, as contrasted with relative frequency, or objective chance. However, Bayesianism is far from a unified movement. Bayesians are divided about the nature of the probability functions they discuss; about the normative force of this probability function for ordinary and scientific reasoning and decision making; and about what relation (if any) holds between Bayesian and non-Bayesian concepts.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   40 citations  
  • Two Ways to Put Knowledge First.Alexander Jackson - 2012 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90 (2):353 - 369.
    This paper distinguishes two ways to ?put knowledge first?. One way affirms a knowledge norm. For example, Williamson [2000] argues that one must only assert that which one knows. Hawthorne and Stanley [2008] argue that one must only treat as a reason for action that which one knows. Another way to put knowledge first affirms a determination thesis. For example, Williamson [2000] argues that what one knows determines what one is justified in believing. Hawthorne and Stanley [2008] argue that what (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   18 citations  
  • Knowledge Ascriptions.Jessica Brown & Mikkel Gerken (eds.) - 2012 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
    Knowledge ascriptions are a central topic of research in both philosophy and science. In this collection of new essays on knowledge ascriptions, world class philosophers offer novel approaches to this long standing topic.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   22 citations  
  • Scepticism and the Genealogy of Knowledge: Situating Epistemology in Time.Miranda Fricker - 2008 - Philosophical Papers 37 (1):27-50.
    My overarching purpose is to illustrate the philosophical fruitfulness of expanding epistemology not only laterally across the social space of other epistemic subjects, but at the same time vertically in the temporal dimension. I set about this by first presenting central strands of Michael Williams' diagnostic engagement with scepticism, in which he crucially employs a Default and Challenge model of justification. I then develop three key aspects of Edward Craig's ‘practical explication' of the concept of knowledge so that they may (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   34 citations  
  • Do You Know More When It Matters Less?Adam Feltz & Chris Zarpentine - 2010 - Philosophical Psychology 23 (5):683–706.
    According to intellectualism, what a person knows is solely a function of the evidential features of the person's situation. Anti-intellectualism is the view that what a person knows is more than simply a function of the evidential features of the person's situation. Jason Stanley (2005) argues that, in addition to “traditional factors,” our ordinary practice of knowledge ascription is sensitive to the practical facts of a subject's situation. In this paper, we investigate this question empirically. Our results indicate that Stanley's (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   87 citations  
  • Knowledge in an uncertain world.Jeremy Fantl & Matthew McGrath - 2009 - New York: Oxford University Press. Edited by Matthew McGrath.
    Introduction -- Fallibilism -- Contextualism -- Knowledge and reasons -- Justification -- Belief -- The value and importance of knowledge -- Infallibilism or pragmatic encroachment? -- Appendix I: Conflicts with bayesian decision theory? -- Appendix II: Does KJ entail infallibilism?
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   512 citations  
  • Contextualism, subject-sensitive invariantism, and knowledge of knowledge.Timothy Williamson - 2005 - Philosophical Quarterly 55 (219):213–235.
    §I schematises the evidence for an understanding of ‘know’ and other terms of epistemic appraisal that embodies contextualism or subject-sensitive invariantism, and distinguishes between those two approaches. §II argues that although the cases for contextualism and sensitive invariantism rely on a principle of charity in the interpretation of epistemic claims, neither approach satisfies charity fully, since both attribute metalinguistic errors to speakers. §III provides an equally charitable anti-sceptical insensitive invariantist explanation of much of the same evidence as the result of (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   198 citations  
  • Précis of Knowledge and Practical Interests.Jason Stanley - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75 (1):168-172.
    Jason Stanley's "Knowledge and Practical Interests" is a brilliant book, combining insights about knowledge with a careful examination of how recent views in epistemology fit with the best of recent linguistic semantics. Although I am largely convinced by Stanley's objections to epistemic contextualism, I will try in what follows to formulate a version that might have some prospect of escaping his powerful critique.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   513 citations  
  • Speaking of knowing.Patrick Rysiew - 2007 - Noûs 41 (4):627–662.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   60 citations  
  • Distance from a distance: the robustness of psychological distance effects.Stefan T. Trautmann - 2019 - Theory and Decision 87 (1):1-15.
    Psychological distance effects have attracted the attention of behavioral economists in the context of descriptive modeling and behavioral policy. Indeed, psychological distance effects have been shown for an increasing number of domains and applications relevant to economic decision-making. The current paper questions whether these effects are robust enough for economists to apply them to relevant policy questions. We demonstrate systematic replication failures for the distance-from-a-distance effect shown by Maglio et al., and relate them to theoretical arguments suggesting that psychological distance (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • Knowledge and the State of Nature.Edward Craig - 1990 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 183 (3):620-621.
    The standard philosophical project of analysing the concept of knowledge has radical defects in its arbitrary restriction of the subject matter, and its risky theoretical presuppositions. Edward Craig suggests a more illuminating approach, akin to the `state of nature' method found in political theory, which builds up the concept from a hypothesis about the social function of knowledge and the needs it fulfils. Light is thrown on much that philosophers have written about knowledge, about its analysis and the obstacles to (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   198 citations  
  • Gate-Keeping Contextualism.David Henderson - 2011 - Episteme 8 (1):83-98.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   27 citations