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Worlds and individuals, possible and otherwise.Takashi Yagisawa - 2010 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Impossible worlds and propositions: Against the parity thesis.Francesco Berto - 2010 - Philosophical Quarterly 60 (240):471-486.details
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Frege’s Puzzle (2nd edition).Nathan U. Salmon - 1986 - Atascadero, CA: Ridgeview Publishing Company.details
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(2 other versions)Meaning and Necessity: A Study in Semantics and Modal Logic.Rudolf Carnap - 1947 - Chicago, IL, USA: University of Chicago Press.details
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Metaphysics, Mathematics, and Meaning: Philosophical Papers I.Nathan U. Salmon (ed.) - 2005 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Logical information and epistemic space.Mark Jago - 2009 - Synthese 167 (2):327 - 341.details
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(1 other version)Direct Reference, Propositional Attitudes, and Semantic Content.Scott Soames - 1987 - Philosophical Topics 15 (1):47-87.details
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Essence and modality.Kit Fine - 1994 - Philosophical Perspectives 8 (Logic and Language):1-16.details
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(1 other version)Possible worlds.Robert C. Stalnaker - 1976 - Noûs 10 (1):65-75.details
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(3 other versions)Elusive knowledge.David Lewis - 1996 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74 (4):549 – 567.details
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Structured propositions and complex predicates.Jeffrey C. King - 1995 - Noûs 29 (4):516-535.details
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Structured propositions and sentence structure.Jeffrey King - 1996 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 25 (5):495 - 521.details
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(1 other version)The nature of epistemic space.David J. Chalmers - 2011 - In Andy Egan & Brian Weatherson (eds.), Epistemic Modality. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.details
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On the Plurality of Worlds.David Lewis - 1986 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 178 (3):388-390.details
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On the Plurality of Worlds.David K. Lewis - 1986 - Malden, Mass.: Wiley-Blackwell.details
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(1 other version)Direct reference, propositional attitudes, and semantic content.Scott Soames - 2009 - In Philosophical Essays, Volume 2: The Philosophical Significance of Language. Princeton University Press. pp. 33-71.details
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The Content of Deduction.Mark Jago - 2013 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 42 (2):317-334.details
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Structures and circumstances: two ways to fine-grain propositions.David Ripley - 2012 - Synthese 189 (1):97 - 118.details
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(3 other versions)Elusive Knowledge.David Lewis - 1999 - In Keith DeRose & Ted A. Warfield (eds.), Skepticism: a contemporary reader. New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Metaphysics, Mathematics, and Meaning by Nathan Salmon. [REVIEW]Brian van den Broek - 2008 - Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 14 (2):262-265.details
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(1 other version)Why Propositions Cannot be Sets of Truth-supporting Circumstances.Scott Soames - 2008 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 37 (3):267-276.details
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Impossible Worlds: A Modest Approach.Daniel Nolan - 1997 - Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 38 (4):535-572.details
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(2 other versions)Meaning and Necessity: A Study in Semantics and Modal Logic.Rudolf Carnap - 1947 - Chicago, IL, USA: University of Chicago Press.details
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Lost innocence.Scott Soames - 1985 - Linguistics and Philosophy 8 (1):59--71.details
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Propositions.Robert C. Stalnaker - 1976 - In Alfred F. Mackay & Daniel Davy Merrill (eds.), Issues in the philosophy of language: proceedings of the 1972 Oberlin Colloquium in Philosophy. New Haven: Yale University Press. pp. 79-91.details
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(2 other versions)Inquiry.Robert Stalnaker - 1984 - Synthese 79 (1):171-189.details
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(1 other version)Why propositions can't be sets of truth-supporting circumstances.Scott Soames - 2009 - In Philosophical Essays, Volume 2: The Philosophical Significance of Language. Princeton University Press. pp. 72-80.details
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