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Meaning and Necessity

University of Chicago Press (1947)

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  1. Die Relative Konsistenz Axiomatischer Mengentheorien.Martin Kühnrich - 1968 - Mathematical Logic Quarterly 14 (1-5):1-38.
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  • Metaphysics, Verbal Disputes and the Limits of Charity.Brendan Balcerak Jackson - 2013 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 86 (2):412-434.
    Intuitively, (1)-(3) seem to express genuine claims (true or false) about what the world is like, attempts to correctly describe parts of extra-linguistic reality. By contrast, it is tempting to regard (4)-(6) as merely reflecting decisions (or conventions, or dispositions, or rules) concerning the terms in which that extra-linguistic reality is described, decisions about which things to label with 'vixen', 'bachelor' or 'cup'.
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  • On What We Can Ensure.Benjamin Schnieder - 2008 - Synthese 162 (1):101 - 115.
    The Conjunction Principle says, roughly, that if the truth of a conjunction can be brought about, then the truth of each conjunct can be brought about. The current essay argues that this principle is not valid. After a clarification of the principle, it is shown how a proper understanding of the involved notions falsify the principle. As a corollary, a recent attack on van Inwagen’s Consequence Argument will be rebutted, because it relies on the invalid conjunction principle.
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  • Indeterminacy and the Analytic/Synthetic Distinctions: A Survey.Peter Pagin - 2008 - Synthese 164 (1):1-18.
    It is often assumed that there is a close connection between Quine's criticism of the analytic/synthetic distinction, in 'Two dogmas of empiricism' and onwards, and his thesis of the indeterminacy of translation, in Word and Object and onwards. Often, the claim that the distinction is unsound (in some way or other) is taken to follow from the indeterminacy thesis, and sometimes the indeterminacy thesis is supported by such a claim. However, a careful scrutiny of the indeterminacy thesis as stated by (...)
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  • Actualism and Modal Semantics.José Zalabardo - 2018 - Acta Analytica 33 (1):35-49.
    According to actualism, modal reality is constructed out of valuations. According to possibilism, modal reality consists in a set of possible worlds, conceived as independent objects that assign truth values to propositions. According to possibilism, accounts of modal reality can intelligibly disagree with each other even if they agree on which valuations are contained in modal reality. According to actualism, these disagreements are completely unintelligible. An essentially actualist semantics for modal propositional logic specifies which sets of valuations are compatible with (...)
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  • “The Boundless Ocean of Unlimited Possibilities”: Logic in Carnap'slogical Syntax of Language. [REVIEW]Sahotra Sarkar - 1992 - Synthese 93 (1-2):191 - 237.
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  • Was Carnap Entirely Wrong, After All?Howard Stein - 1992 - Synthese 93 (1-2):275-295.
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  • Rudolf Carnap, 1891–1970: The Editor's Introduction.Sahotra Sarkar - 1992 - Synthese 93 (1-2):1-14.
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  • An Alternative Semantics for Modal Predicate-Logic.Uwe Meixner - 1992 - Erkenntnis 37 (3):377 - 400.
    The semantical framework is fundamentally intensional: neither possible worlds nor sets as basic entities, but rather, besides individuals, propositions, properties and relations (in intension). Logical truth is defined in terms of logical form (without mentioning this notion) without employing sets of models and the concept of truth in a model. Truth itself is explicitly defined (without recursion); the truth-conditions for the logical constants of the object-language become theorems derivable from the axioms for "to intend"--the basic semantical relation.
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  • Interpreted Logical Forms.Richard K. Larson & Peter Ludlow - 1993 - Synthese 95 (3):305 - 355.
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  • Carnap's Work in the Foundations of Logic and Mathematics in a Historical Perspective.Jaakko Hintikka - 1992 - Synthese 93 (1-2):167 - 189.
    Carnap's philosophy is examined from new viewpoints, including three important distinctions: (i) language as calculus vs language as universal medium; (ii) different senses of completeness: (iii) standard vs nonstandard interpretations of (higher-order) logic. (i) Carnap favored in 1930-34 the "formal mode of speech," a corollary to the universality assumption. He later gave it up partially but retained some of its ingredients, e.g., the one-domain assumption. (ii) Carnap's project of creating a universal self-referential language is encouraged by (ii) and by the (...)
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  • Darwin's Legacy.Michael Bradie - 1992 - Biology and Philosophy 7 (1):111-126.
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  • Definite Descriptions and Definite Generics.Almerindo E. Ojeda - 1991 - Linguistics and Philosophy 14 (4):367 - 397.
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  • What is Character?David Braun - 1995 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 24 (3):241--273.
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  • Propositions, Circumstances, Objects.Walter Edelberg - 1994 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 23 (1):1 - 34.
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  • Communication and Strong Compositionality.Peter Pagin - 2003 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 32 (3):287-322.
    Ordinary semantic compositionality (meaning of whole determined from meanings of parts plus composition) can serve to explain how a hearer manages to assign an appropriate meaning to a new sentence. But it does not serve to explain how the speaker manages to find an appropriate sentence for expressing a new thought. For this we would need a principle of inverse compositionality, by which the expression of a complex content is determined by the expressions of it parts and the mode of (...)
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  • Recent Work on Structured Meaning and Propositional Unity.Bjørn Jespersen - 2012 - Philosophy Compass 7 (9):620-630.
    Logical semantics includes once again structured meanings in its repertoire. The leading idea is that semantic and syntactic structure are more or less isomorphic. A key motive for reintroducing sensitivity to semantic structure is to obtain fine‐grained meanings, which are individuated more finely than in possible‐world semantics, namely up to necessary equivalence. Just getting the truth‐conditions right is deemed insufficient for a full semantic analysis of sentences. This paper surveys some of the most recent contributions to the program of structured (...)
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  • Classes, Worlds and Hypergunk.Daniel Nolan - 2004 - The Monist 87 (3):303-321.
    The question of what truths are necessary in the broadest possible sense is a difficult one to answer, as is the question of what the limits are to what is possible. (Most people would see these two questions as different sides of the same coin, of course, since many think the question of what is possible is just the question of what is not necessarily ruled out). We have three general sorts of strategies for determining whether something is necessary (or (...)
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  • Justification Through Biological Faith: A Rejoinder. [REVIEW]Robert J. Richards - 1986 - Biology and Philosophy 1 (3):337-354.
    Though I have not found enough of the latter to test out this bromide, I am sensible of the value bestowed by colleagues who have taken such exacting care in analyzing my arguments. While their incisive observation and hard objections threaten to leave an extinct theory, I hope the reader will rather judge it one strengthened by adversity. Let me initially expose the heart of my argument so as to make obvious the shocks it must endure. I ask the reader (...)
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  • Putnam, Searle, and Externalism.Amir Horowitz - 1995 - Philosophical Studies 81 (1):27-69.
    To sum up, then, both kinds of Putnam's arguments established externalism, though they suffer from several defects. Yet, I think Searle's discussion of these arguments contributes to our understanding of what makes externalism true, and forces us to accept a moderate version of externalism. Searle's own account of the TE story shows us, within a solipsistic outline, how two identical mental states can be directed towards different objects, and further, that the content-determination of indexical thoughts does not necessarily involve external (...)
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  • Why Combine Logics?Patrick Blackburn & Maarten de Rijke - 1997 - Studia Logica 59 (1):5 - 27.
    Combining logics has become a rapidly expanding enterprise that is inspired mainly by concerns about modularity and the wish to join together tailor made logical tools into more powerful but still manageable ones. A natural question is whether it offers anything new over and above existing standard languages. By analysing a number of applications where combined logics arise, we argue that combined logics are a potentially valuable tool in applied logic, and that endorsements of standard languages often miss the point. (...)
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  • Proper Names as Variables.Takashi Yagisawa - 1984 - Erkenntnis 21 (2):195 - 208.
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  • Carnap’s Theory of Descriptions and its Problems.Jan Heylen - 2010 - Studia Logica 94 (3):355-380.
    Carnap's theory of descriptions was restricted in two ways. First, the descriptive conditions had to be non-modal. Second, only primitive predicates or the identity predicate could be used to predicate something of the descriptum . The motivating reasons for these two restrictions that can be found in the literature will be critically discussed. Both restrictions can be relaxed, but Carnap's theory can still be blamed for not dealing adequately with improper descriptions.
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  • Indirect Speech: A Rejoinder to Prof. A. N. Prior. [REVIEW]L. Jonathan Cohen - 1963 - Philosophical Studies 14 (1-2):15 - 18.
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  • Artificial Language Philosophy of Science.Sebastian Lutz - 2011 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 2 (2):181–203.
    Abstract Artificial language philosophy (also called ‘ideal language philosophy’) is the position that philosophical problems are best solved or dissolved through a reform of language. Its underlying methodology—the development of languages for specific purposes—leads to a conventionalist view of language in general and of concepts in particular. I argue that many philosophical practices can be reinterpreted as applications of artificial language philosophy. In addition, many factually occurring interrelations between the sciences and philosophy of science are justified and clarified by the (...)
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  • Carnap's Early Semantics.Georg Schiemer - 2013 - Erkenntnis 78 (3):487-522.
    This paper concerns Carnap’s early contributions to formal semantics in his work on general axiomatics between 1928 and 1936. Its main focus is on whether he held a variable domain conception of models. I argue that interpreting Carnap’s account in terms of a fixed domain approach fails to describe his premodern understanding of formal models. By drawing attention to the second part of Carnap’s unpublished manuscript Untersuchungen zur allgemeinen Axiomatik, an alternative interpretation of the notions ‘model’, ‘model extension’ and ‘submodel’ (...)
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  • Zur Methodologie Von Kombinationstests in der Analytischen Philosophie.Hans-Ulrich Hoche - 1981 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 12 (1):28-54.
    Summary Ordinary language philosophers frequently draw on the fact that an appropriately selected sentential combination of the form p but not q can, or cannot, be uttered without absurdity; however, they do so without sufficient reflection on the methodology of such combination tests, which results in considerable shortcomings even in practical application. To improve things, I shall discuss two criteria for distinguishing ‘pragmatic’ from ‘non-pragmatic’ implications and for separating the latter into ‘linguistic’ (‘semantic’ and ‘syntactical’) and ‘non-linguistic’ ones (2–3); consider (...)
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  • In Defense of Proper Names Against Descriptions.Neil L. Wilson - 1953 - Philosophical Studies 4 (5):72 - 78.
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  • Pragmatics in Carnap and Morris and the Bipartite Metatheory Conception.Thomas Uebel - 2013 - Erkenntnis 78 (3):523-546.
    This paper concerns the issue of whether the so-called left wing of the Vienna Circle (Carnap, Neurath, Frank) can be understood as having provided the blueprint for a bipartite metatheory with a formal-logical part (the “logic of science”) supporting and being supported by a naturalistic-empirical part (the “behavioristics of science”). A claim to this effect was recently met by a counterclaim that there was indeed an attempt made to broaden Carnap’s formalist conception of philosophy by the pragmatist Morris, but that (...)
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  • Sense and the Computation of Reference.Reinhard Muskens - 2004 - Linguistics and Philosophy 28 (4):473 - 504.
    The paper shows how ideas that explain the sense of an expression as a method or algorithm for finding its reference, preshadowed in Frege’s dictum that sense is the way in which a referent is given, can be formalized on the basis of the ideas in Thomason (1980). To this end, the function that sends propositions to truth values or sets of possible worlds in Thomason (1980) must be replaced by a relation and the meaning postulates governing the behaviour of (...)
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  • Similarity Semantics and Minimal Changes of Belief.Sven Ove Hansson - 1992 - Erkenntnis 37 (3):401-429.
    Different similarity relations on sets are introduced, and their logical properties are investigated. Close relationships are shown to hold between similarity relations that are based on symmetrical difference and operators of belief contraction that are based on relational selection functions. Two new rationality criteria for minimal belief contraction, the maximizing property and the reducing property, are proposed.
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  • Structures and Circumstances: Two Ways to Fine-Grain Propositions.David Ripley - 2012 - Synthese 189 (1):97 - 118.
    This paper discusses two distinct strategies that have been adopted to provide fine-grained propositions; that is, propositions individuated more finely than sets of possible worlds. One strategy takes propositions to have internal structure, while the other looks beyond possible worlds, and takes propositions to be sets of circumstances, where possible worlds do not exhaust the circumstances. The usual arguments for these positions turn on fineness-of-grain issues: just how finely should propositions be individuated? Here, I compare the two strategies with an (...)
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  • A Contextual-Hierarchical Approach to Truth and the Liar Paradox.Michael Glanzberg - 2004 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 33 (1):27-88.
    This paper presents an approach to truth and the Liar paradox which combines elements of context dependence and hierarchy. This approach is developed formally, using the techniques of model theory in admissible sets. Special attention is paid to showing how starting with some ideas about context drawn from linguistics and philosophy of language, we can see the Liar sentence to be context dependent. Once this context dependence is properly understood, it is argued, a hierarchical structure emerges which is neither ad (...)
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  • Necessity and the Ontological Argument.Joel I. Friedman - 1980 - Erkenntnis 15 (3):301-331.
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  • Wissenschaftslogik: The Role of Logic in the Philosophy of Science.Michael Friedman - 2008 - Synthese 164 (3):385-400.
    Carl Hempel introduced what he called "Craig's theorem" into the philosophy of science in a famous discussion of the "problem of theoretical terms." Beginning with Hempel's use of 'Craig's theorem," I shall bring out some of the key differences between Hempel's treatment of the "problem of theoretical terms" and Carnap's in order to illuminate the peculiar function of Wissenschaftslogik in Carnap's mature philosophy. Carnap's treatment, in particular, is fundamentally antimetaphysical—he aims to use the tools of mathematical logic to dissolve rather (...)
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  • Did Frege Believe Frege's Principle?Francis Jeffry Pelletier - 2001 - Journal of Logic, Language and Information 10 (1):87-114.
    In this essay I will consider two theses that are associated with Frege,and will investigate the extent to which Frege really believed them.Much of what I have to say will come as no surprise to scholars of thehistorical Frege. But Frege is not only a historical figure; he alsooccupies a site on the philosophical landscape that has allowed hisdoctrines to seep into the subconscious water table. And scholars in a widevariety of different scholarly establishments then sip from thesedoctrines. I believe (...)
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  • The Development of the Theory of Logical Types and the Notion of a Logical Subject in Russell's Early Philosophy.Nino Cocchiarella - 1980 - Synthese 45 (1):71 - 115.
    Russell's involuted path in the development of his theory of logical types from 1903 to 1910-13 is examined and explained in terms of the development in his early philosophy of the notion of a logical subject vis-a-vis the problem of the one and many; i.e., the problem for russell, first, of a class-as-one as a logical subject as opposed to a class as many, and, secondly, of a propositional function as a single and separate logical subject as opposed to existing (...)
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  • Carnapian Extensions of S.Herbert E. Hendry & M. L. Pokriefka - 1985 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 14 (2):111 - 128.
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  • Fuzziness of Concepts and Concepts of Fuzziness.Gy Fuhrmann - 1988 - Synthese 75 (3):349 - 372.
    It has been a vexing question in recent years whether concepts are fuzzy. In this paper several views on the fuzziness of concepts are pointed out to have stemmed from dubious concepts of fuzziness. The underlying notions of the roles feasibly played byprototype, set, andprobability in modeling concepts strongly suggest that the controversy originates from a vague relation between intuitive and mathematical ideas in the cognitive sciences. It is argued that the application of fuzzy sets cannot resolve this vagueness since (...)
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  • The Elimination of de Re Formulas.Michael Kaminski - 1997 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 26 (4):411-422.
    It is shown that de re formulas are eliminable in the modal logic S5 extended with the axiom scheme □∃xφ ⊃ ∃x□φ.
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  • The Empirical Case Against Analyticity: Two Options for Concept Pragmatists.Bradley Rives - 2009 - Minds and Machines 19 (2):199-227.
    It is commonplace in cognitive science that concepts are individuated in terms of the roles they play in the cognitive lives of thinkers, a view that Jerry Fodor has recently been dubbed ‘Concept Pragmatism’. Quinean critics of Pragmatism have long argued that it founders on its commitment to the analytic/synthetic distinction, since without such a distinction there is plausibly no way to distinguish constitutive from non-constitutive roles in cognition. This paper considers Fodor’s empirical arguments against analyticity, and in particular his (...)
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  • Science, Perception, and Some Dubious Epistemological Motives.Alan Pasch - 1957 - Philosophical Studies 8 (4):55 - 61.
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  • Events, Tropes, and Truthmaking.Friederike Moltmann - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 134 (3):363-403.
    Nominalizations are expressions that are particularly challenging philosophically in that they help form singular terms that seem to refer to abstract or derived objects often considered controversial. The three standard views about the semantics of nominalizations are [1] that they map mere meanings onto objects, [2] that they refer to implicit arguments, and [3] that they introduce new objects, in virtue of their compositional semantics. In the second case, nominalizations do not add anything new but pick up objects that would (...)
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  • De Re Belief Generalized.Maxwell J. Cresswell & Arnim Stechow - 1982 - Linguistics and Philosophy 5 (4):503 - 535.
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  • Meaning and Interpretation. II.Urszula Wybraniec-Skardowska - 2007 - Studia Logica 85 (2):261-274.
    The paper enriches the conceptual apparatus of the theory of meaning and denotation that was presented in Part I (Section 3). This part concentrates on the notion of interpretation, which is defined as an equivalence class of the relation possessing the same manner of interpreting types. In this part, some relations between meaning and interpretation, as well as one between denotation an interpretational denotation are established. In the theory of meaning and interpretation, the notion of language communication has been formally (...)
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  • Meaning and Interpretation. I.Urszula Wybraniec-Skardowska - 2007 - Studia Logica 85 (1):105-132.
    The paper is an attempt at a logical explication of some crucial notions of current general semantics and pragmatics. A general, axiomatic, formal-logical theory of meaning and interpretation is outlined in this paper.In the theory, accordingto the token-type distinction of Peirce, language is formalised on two levels: first as a language of token-objects (understood as material, empirical, enduring through time-and space objects) and then – as a language of type-objects (understood as abstract objects, as classes of tokens). The basic concepts (...)
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  • Two Kinds of Universals and Two Kinds of Collections.Friederike Moltmann - 2004 - Linguistics and Philosophy 27 (6):739 - 776.
    This paper argues for an ontological distinction between two kinds of universals, 'kinds of tropes' such as 'wisdom' and properties such as 'the property of being wise'. It argues that the distinction is parallel to that between two kinds of collections, pluralities such as 'the students' and collective objects such as 'the class'. The paper argues for the priortity of distributive readings with pluralities on the basis of predicates of extent or shape, such 'large' or 'long'.
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  • The Genesis of Possible Worlds Semantics.B. Jack Copeland - 2002 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 31 (2):99-137.
    This article traces the development of possible worlds semantics through the work of: Wittgenstein, 1913-1921; Feys, 1924; McKinsey, 1945; Carnap, 1945-1947; McKinsey, Tarski and Jónsson, 1947-1952; von Wright, 1951; Becker, 1952; Prior, 1953-1954; Montague, 1955; Meredith and Prior, 1956; Geach, 1960; Smiley, 1955-1957; Kanger, 1957; Hintikka, 1957; Guillaume, 1958; Binkley, 1958; Bayart, 1958-1959; Drake, 1959-1961; Kripke, 1958-1965.
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  • Objectivism and the Study of Man (Part I).Hans Skjervheim - 1974 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 17 (1-4):213 – 239.
    The purpose of this study is to show that the distinctions made by Wilhelm Dilthey and Max Weber between the natural sciences and the 'Geisteswissen-schaften' are sound in principle, pace the arguments to the contrary within classical logical empiricism. It is held that intentional contexts are characteristic of social science. Intentional contexts are held to be more important in psychology than mental states, like toothache. If logical behaviourism is to have any plausibility, it has to be shown how intentional contexts (...)
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  • Objectivism and the Study of Man (Part II).Hans Skjervheim - 1974 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 17 (1-4):265-302.
    The purpose of the study (of which this is the concluding part) is to show that the distinctions made by Wilhelm Dilthey and Max Weber between the natural sciences and the ?Geistesvrissenschaften? are sound in principle, pace the arguments to the contrary within classical logical empiricism. It is held that intentional contexts are characteristic of social science. Intentional contexts are held to be more important in psychology than mental states, like toothache. If logical behaviourism is to have any plausibility, it (...)
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