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This essay is about the ethical propriety and practical efficacy of a range of policy undertakings which, in the last twenty years, has come to be referred to as “affirmative action.” These policies have been contentious and problematic, and a variety of arguments have been advanced in their support. Here I try to close a gap, as I see it, in this “literature of justification” which has grown up around the practice of preferential treatment. My principal argument along these lines (...) |
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The beating of Rodney King and the resulting riots in South Central Los Angeles. The violent clash between Hasidim and African-Americans in Crown Heights. The boats of Haitian refugees being turned away from the Land of Opportunity. These are among the many racially-charged images that have burst across our television screens in the last year alone, images that show that for all our complacent beliefs in a melting-pot society, race is as much of a problem as ever in America. In (...) |
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This book focuses on the degree to which certain moral and legal doctrines are rooted in specific passions that are then institutionalised in the form of criminal law. A philosophical analysis is developed of the following questions: when, if ever, should hatred be overcome by sympathy or compassion? What are forgiveness and mercy and to what degree do they require - both conceptually and morally - the overcoming of certain passions and the motivation by other passions? If forgiveness and mercy (...) |
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In this classic work of feminist political thought, Iris Marion Young challenges the prevailing reduction of social justice to distributive justice. |
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Essays examine the conceptual nature of racism, and trace the history of its attempts at scientific, philosophical, political, legal, and cultural expression. |
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J.L. Mackie insists that ordinary evaluative thought presents itself as a matter of sensitivity to aspects of the world. And this phenomenological thesis seems correct. When one or another variety of philosophical non-cognitivism claims to capture the truth about what the experience of value is like, or (in a familiar surrogate for phenomenology) about what we mean by our evaluative language, the claim is never based on careful attention to the lived character of evaluative thought or discourse. The idea is, (...) |
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It is reported that the moment anyone talked to Marx about morality, he would roar with laughter. Yet, plainly, he was fired by outrage and a burning desire for a better world. This paradox is the starting point for Marxism and Morality. Discussing the positions taken by Marx, Engels, and their descendants in relation to certain moral issues, Steven Lukes addresses the questions on which Marxist thinkers and actors have taken a number of characteristic stands as well as other questions--personal (...) |
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The sort of ethical theory derived from Aristotle, variously described as virtue ethics, virtue-based ethics, or neo-Aristotelianism, is becoming better known, and is now quite widely recognized as at least a possible rival to deontological and utilitarian theories. With recognition has come criticism, of varying quality. In this article I shall discuss nine separate criticisms that I have frequently encountered, most of which seem to me to betray an inadequate grasp either of the structure of virtue theory or of what (...) |
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Most contemporary moral philosophy is concerned with issues of rationality, universality, impartiality, and principle. By contrast Laurence Blum is concerned with the psychology of moral agency. The essays in this collection examine the moral import of emotion, motivation, judgment, perception, and group identifications, and explore how all these psychic capacities contribute to a morally good life. Blum takes up the challenge of Iris Murdoch to articulate a vision of moral excellence that provides a worthy aspiration for human beings. Drawing on (...) |
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The political and ideological turmoil of the late 1960's stimulated among Anglo-American philosophers a new interest in applying moral philosophy to the problems of contemporary society, and a search for critical perspectives on Marx and Marxist thought. These essays, originally published in Philosophy & Public Affairs, contribute to both these areas in the form of new Marxist scholarship and in illuminating the way in which Marxist criticism and social theory bear on contemporary analytic moral philosophy and current moral problems. Originally (...) |
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Virtue ethics treats aretaic, as opposed to deontic, concepts as fundamental and focuses in the first instance on character traits or motives rather than actions. Virtue ethics also contrasts with utilitarianism because although both these approaches are self‐other symmetric, they embrace different forms of symmetry. Utilitarianism holds that one's concern for oneself should be no different, fundamentally, from the concern one has for each and every other individual. But such ”in sensu diviso” symmetry differs from an ”in sensu composito” symmetry (...) |
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ABSTRACT In an article in Encounter, Antony Flew usefully opens up the issue of what racism is by giving three ‘concepts’: (1) ‘unjustified discrimination’; (2) ‘heretical belief; and (3) ‘institutionalised racism’. He rejects senses (2) and (3) in favour of (1) and finds much ‘anti‐racism’in fact guilty of it. This article, while benefiting from Flew's account, argues that it basically misconceives and underestimates racism by ignoring its complex ideological (sense 2) and institutional (sense 3) character. In regard to (2) it (...) |
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