- Disagreement, Question-Begging and Epistemic Self-Criticism.David Christensen - 2011 - Philosophers' Imprint 11.details
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(1 other version)Peer disagreement and higher order evidence.Thomas Kelly - 2011 - In Alvin I. Goldman & Dennis Whitcomb (eds.), Social Epistemology: Essential Readings. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 183--217.details
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(1 other version)Experts: Which ones should you trust?Alvin I. Goldman - 2001 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63 (1):85-110.details
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(1 other version)Experts: which ones should you trust?Alvin I. Goldman - 2011 - In Alvin I. Goldman & Dennis Whitcomb (eds.), Social Epistemology: Essential Readings. New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Epistemic circularity and epistemic incommensurability.Michael P. Lynch - forthcoming - Social Epistemology:262--77.details
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Rational Disagreement after Full Disclosure.Michael Bergmann - 2009 - Episteme 6 (3):336-353.details
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(1 other version)The logic of deep disagreements.Robert Fogelin - 1985 - Informal Logic 7 (1):3-11.details
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Epistemic circularity.William P. Alston - 1986 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 47 (1):1-30.details
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(1 other version)Peer Disagreement and Higher Order Evidence.Thomas Kelly - 2010 - In Richard Feldman & Ted A. Warfield (eds.), Disagreement. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.details
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Epistemic Circularity and Epistemic Disagreement.Michael P. Lynch - 2008 - In Duncan Pritchard, Alan Millar & Adrian Haddock (eds.), Social Epistemology. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.details
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Disagreement and the Burdens of Judgment.Thomas Kelly - 2013 - In David Phiroze Christensen & Jennifer Lackey (eds.), The Epistemology of Disagreement: New Essays. Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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The Problem of Deep Disagreement.Klemens Kappel - 2012 - Discipline Filosofiche 22 (2):7-25.details
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(1 other version)The Logic of Deep Disagreements.Robert Fogelin - 2005 - Informal Logic 25 (1):3-11.details
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Argumentation and the epistemology of disagreement.Harvey Siegal - unknowndetails
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Bottom up justification, asymmetric epistemic push, and the fragility of higher order justification.Klemens Kappel - 2019 - Episteme 16 (2):119-138.details
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Fact-Dependent Policy Disagreements and Political Legitimacy.Klemens Kappel - 2017 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 20 (2):313-331.details
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