- On the Nature and Relationship of Individual and Collective Justification.Simon Graf - 2024 - Dissertation, University of Leedsdetails
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Islamic Insights on Religious Disagreement: A New Proposal.Jamie B. Turner - 2024 - Religions 15 (5):574.details
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No Hope for Conciliationism.Jonathan Dixon - 2024 - Synthese 203 (148):1-30.details
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(1 other version)Knowledge: A Human Interest Story.Brian Weatherson - manuscriptdetails
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Conciliating to Avoid Moral Scepticism.Nick Küspert - 2023 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 31 (3):279-300.details
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Unknown Peers.Marc Andree Weber - 2023 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 31 (3):382-401.details
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Epistemic Norms for Public Political Arguments.Christoph Lumer - 2024 - Argumentation 38 (1):63-83.details
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Immodesty and permissivism.Marc-Kevin Daoust & David Montminy - 2022 - Synthese 200 (4):1-21.details
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How Low Can You Go? A Defense of Believing Philosophical Theories.Elizabeth Jackson - forthcoming - In Mark Walker & Sanford Goldberg (eds.), Philosophy with Attitude. Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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Moral realism, quasi‐realism and moral steadfastness.James Chamberlain - 2021 - Ratio 35 (1):1-12.details
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Disagreement in science: introduction to the special issue.Finnur Dellsén & Maria Baghramian - 2020 - Synthese 198 (S25):6011-6021.details
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Tragic Flaws.Nathan Ballantyne - 2022 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 8 (1):20-40.details
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The epistemology of evolutionary debunking.Justis Koon - 2021 - Synthese 199 (5-6):12155-12176.details
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Moral discourse boosts confidence in moral judgments.Nora Heinzelmann, Benedikt Höltgen & Viet Tran - 2021 - Philosophical Psychology 34 (8):1192–216.details
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Are scrutability conditionals rationally deniable?Jens Kipper & Zeynep Soysal - 2021 - Analysis 81 (3):452-461.details
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Understanding scientific progress: the noetic account.Finnur Dellsén - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):11249-11278.details
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Zombie intuitions.Eugen Fischer & Justin Sytsma - 2021 - Cognition 215 (C):104807.details
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The Epistemology of Disagreement.Michel Croce - 2023 - Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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A Multidisciplinary Understanding of Polarization.Jiin Jung, Patrick Grim, Daniel J. Singer, Aaron Bramson, William J. Berger, Bennett Holman & Karen Kovaka - 2019 - American Psychologist 74:301-314.details
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Reply to Machery: Against the Argument from Citation.Jordan David Thomas Walters - 2021 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 29 (2):181-184.details
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A Faithful Response to Disagreement.Lara Buchak - 2021 - The Philosophical Review 130 (2):191-226.details
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Akratic (epistemic) modesty.David Christensen - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 178 (7):2191-2214.details
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Shadows of Syntax: Revitalizing Logical and Mathematical Conventionalism.Jared Warren - 2020 - New York, USA: Oxford University Press.details
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Higher-Order Evidence.Daniel Whiting - 2020 - Analysis 80 (4):789-807.details
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Beyond linear conciliation.Ko-Hung Kuan - 2020 - Synthese 198 (12):11483-11504.details
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Dilemmas, Disagreement, and Dualism.Elizabeth Jackson - 2020 - In Scott Stapleford & Kevin McCain (eds.), Epistemic Duties: New Arguments, New Angles. New York: Routledge. pp. 217–231.details
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Introduction to Philosophy: Epistemology.Brian C. Barnett (ed.) - 2021 - Rebus Community.details
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Disagreement About Scientific Ontology.Bruno Borge - 2024 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 55 (2):229-245.details
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How to endorse conciliationism.Will Fleisher - 2020 - Synthese 198 (10):9913-9939.details
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A defense of liberalism in the epistemology of perception.Megan Feeney - 2019 - Dissertation, Rutgers Universitydetails
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Circular and question-begging responses to religious disagreement and debunking arguments.Andrew Moon - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 178 (3):785-809.details
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Disagreement and Religion.Matthew A. Benton - 2021 - In Matthew A. Benton & Jonathan L. Kvanvig (eds.), Religious Disagreement and Pluralism. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 1-40.details
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Is higher-order evidence evidence?Eyal Tal - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 178 (10):3157-3175.details
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Does my total evidence support that I’m a Boltzmann Brain?Sinan Dogramaci - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (12):3717-3723.details
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Moral Disagreement and Higher-Order Evidence.Klemens Kappel & Frederik J. Andersen - 2019 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 22 (5):1103-1120.details
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Disagreement, Dogmatism, and the Bounds of Philosophy. [REVIEW]Nick Hughes - 2019 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 27 (4):591-596.details
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Reader in epistemology; Social epistemology.Samal H. R. Manee - 2018 - Kurdistan: Mexak publishing house.details
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Epistemically Pernicious Groups and the Groupstrapping Problem.Kenneth Boyd - 2018 - Social Epistemology 33 (1):61-73.details
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A new solution to the problem of peer disagreement.Ruth Weintraub - 2020 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 63 (8):795-811.details
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Framing how we think about disagreement.Joshua Alexander, Diana Betz, Chad Gonnerman & John Philip Waterman - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (10):2539-2566.details
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Evidence: A Guide for the Uncertain.Kevin Dorst - 2019 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 100 (3):586-632.details
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Higher-order uncertainty.Kevin Dorst - 2019 - In Mattias Skipper & Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen (eds.), Higher-Order Evidence: New Essays. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press.details
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‘Peer Disagreement’ and Evidence of Evidence.John Biro & Fabio Lampert - 2018 - Logos and Episteme 9 (4):379-402.details
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Peer Disagreement and the Bridge Principle.Marc-Kevin Daoust - 2021 - Topoi 40 (5):1213-1223.details
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Epistemic authority: preemption through source sensitive defeat.Jan Constantin & Thomas Grundmann - 2020 - Synthese 197 (9):4109-4130.details
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The Epistemic Value of Expert Autonomy.Finnur Dellsén - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (2):344-361.details
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Epistemic Peer Disagreement.Filippo Ferrari & Nikolaj J. L. L. Pedersen - 2019 - In Miranda Fricker, Peter Graham, David Henderson & Nikolaj Jang Pedersen (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Social Epistemology. New York, USA: Routledge.details
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Reconciling Enkrasia and Higher-Order Defeat.Mattias Skipper - 2019 - Erkenntnis 84 (6):1369-1386.details
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A patchwork epistemology of disagreement?Yoaav Isaacs - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (7):1873-1885.details
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Does luck exclude knowledge or certainty?Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen - 2020 - Synthese 197 (6):2387-2397.details
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