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  1. Epistemic injustice: power and the ethics of knowing.Miranda Fricker - 2007 - New York: Oxford University Press.
    Fricker shows that virtue epistemology provides a general epistemological idiom in which these issues can be forcefully discussed.
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  • Echo chambers and epistemic bubbles.C. Thi Nguyen - 2020 - Episteme 17 (2):141-161.
    Recent conversation has blurred two very different social epistemic phenomena: echo chambers and epistemic bubbles. Members of epistemic bubbles merely lack exposure to relevant information and arguments. Members of echo chambers, on the other hand, have been brought to systematically distrust all outside sources. In epistemic bubbles, other voices are not heard; in echo chambers, other voices are actively undermined. It is crucial to keep these phenomena distinct. First, echo chambers can explain the post-truth phenomena in a way that epistemic (...)
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  • Against Democracy: New Preface.Jason Brennan - 2016 - Princeton: Princeton University Press.
    Hobbits and hooligans -- Ignorant, irrational, misinformed nationalists -- Political participation corrupts -- Politics doesn't empower you or me -- Politics is not a poem -- The right to competent government -- Is democracy competent? -- The rule of the knowers -- Civic enemies.
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  • Tracking Epistemic Violence, Tracking Practices of Silencing.Kristie Dotson - 2011 - Hypatia 26 (2):236-257.
    Too often, identifying practices of silencing is a seemingly impossible exercise. Here I claim that attempting to give a conceptual reading of the epistemic violence present when silencing occurs can help distinguish the different ways members of oppressed groups are silenced with respect to testimony. I offer an account of epistemic violence as the failure, owing to pernicious ignorance, of hearers to meet the vulnerabilities of speakers in linguistic exchanges. Ultimately, I illustrate that by focusing on the ways in which (...)
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  • Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence against Women of Color.Kimberle Williams Crenshaw - 1991 - Stanford Law Review 43 (6):1241-99.
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  • Why do humans reason? Arguments for an argumentative theory.Dan Sperber - 2011 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 34 (2):57.
    Short abstract (98 words). Reasoning is generally seen as a means to improve knowledge and make better decisions. However, much evidence shows that reasoning often leads to epistemic distortions and poor decisions. This suggests that the function of reasoning should be rethought. Our hypothesis is that the function of reasoning is argumentative. It is to devise and evaluate arguments intended to persuade. Reasoning so conceived is adaptive given humans’ exceptional dependence on communication and vulnerability to misinformation. A wide range of (...)
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  • (1 other version)Epistemic responsibility.Lorraine Code - 1987 - Hanover, N.H.: Published for Brown University Press by University Press of New England.
    Having adequate knowledge of the world is not just a matter of survival but also one of obligation. This obligation to "know well" is what philosophers have termed "epistemic responsibility." In this innovative and eclectic study, Lorraine Code explores the possibilities inherent in this concept as a basis for understanding human attempts to know and understand the world and for discerning the nature of intellectual virtue. By focusing on the idea that knowing is a creative process guided by imperatives of (...)
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  • Knowledge, Understanding and Epistemic Value.Duncan Pritchard - 2009 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 64:19-43.
    It is argued that a popular way of accounting for the distinctive value of knowledge by appeal to the distinctive value of cognitive achievements fails because it is a mistake to identify knowledge with cognitive achievements. Nevertheless, it is claimed that understanding, properly conceived, is a type of cognitive achievement, and thus that the distinctive value of cognitive achievements can explain why understanding is of special value.
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  • Lazy, not biased: Susceptibility to partisan fake news is better explained by lack of reasoning than by motivated reasoning.Gordon Pennycook & David Rand - 2018 - Cognition 188 (C):39-50.
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  • (1 other version)Epistemic vice predicts acceptance of Covid-19 misinformation.Marco Meyer, Mark Alfano & Boudewijn de Bruin - 2024 - Episteme 21 (1):207-228.
    Why are mistaken beliefs about COVID-19 so prevalent? Political identity, education and other demographic variables explain only part of the differences between people in their susceptibility to COVID-19 misinformation. This paper focuses on another explanation: epistemic vice. Epistemic vices are character traits that interfere with acquiring, maintaining, and transmitting knowledge. If the basic assumption of vice epistemology is right, then people with epistemic vices such as indifference to the truth or rigidity in their belief structures will tend to be more (...)
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  • Fake News, Relevant Alternatives, and the Degradation of Our Epistemic Environment.Christopher Blake-Turner - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 1.
    This paper contributes to the growing literature in social epistemology of diagnosing the epistemically problematic features of fake news. I identify two novel problems: the problem of relevant alternatives; and the problem of the degradation of the epistemic environment. The former arises among individual epistemic transactions. By making salient, and thereby relevant, alternatives to knowledge claims, fake news stories threaten knowledge. The problem of the degradation of the epistemic environment arises at the level of entire epistemic communities. I introduce the (...)
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  • Introduction: Evolutionary psychology and conceptual integration.Leda Cosmides, John Tooby & Jerome H. Barkow - 1992 - In Jerome H. Barkow, Leda Cosmides & John Tooby (eds.), The Adapted Mind: Evolutionary Psychology and the Generation of Culture. Oxford University Press. pp. 3--15.
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  • The fourth revolution.Luciano Floridi - 2012 - The Philosophers' Magazine 57 (57):96-101.
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  • What is Fake News?Nikil Mukerji - 2018 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 5:923-946.
    An important way in which philosophy can contribute to public discourse is by clarifying concepts that are central to it. This paper is a philosophical contribution in that spirit. It offers an account of fake news—a notion that has entered public debate following the 2016 US presidential election. On the view I defend, fake news is Frankfurtian bullshit that is asserted in the form of a news publication. According to Frankfurt’s famous account, bullshit has two characteristics. There is, firstly, an (...)
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  • Plato: Complete Works.J. Cooper & D. S. Hutchinson - 1998 - Phronesis 43 (2):197-206.
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  • Vices of the Mind: A Reply to ALFANO, PLAKIAS, TANESINI, and VIGANI.Quassim Cassam - 2020 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 23 (5):881-888.
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  • (1 other version)Open-mindedness.Wayne Riggs - 2010 - Metaphilosophy 41 (1-2):172-188.
    Abstract: Open-mindedness is typically at the top of any list of the intellectual or "epistemic" virtues. Yet, providing an account that simultaneously explains why open-mindedness is an epistemically valuable trait to have and how such a trait is compatible with full-blooded belief turns out to be a challenge. Building on the work of William Hare and Jonathan Adler, I defend a view of open-mindedness that meets this challenge. On this view, open-mindedness is primarily an attitude toward oneself as a believer, (...)
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  • (1 other version)Epistemic Virtue and the Epistemology of Education.Duncan Pritchard - 2013 - Journal of Philosophy of Education 47 (2):236-247.
    A certain conception of the relevance of virtue epistemology to the philosophy of education is set out. On this conception, while the epistemic goal of education might initially be promoting the pupil's cognitive success, it should ultimately move on to the development of the pupil's cognitive agency. A continuum of cognitive agency is described, on which it is ultimately cognitive achievement, and thus understanding, which is the epistemic goal of education. This is contrasted with a view on which knowledge is (...)
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  • Against Epistocracy.Paul Gunn - 2019 - Critical Review: A Journal of Politics and Society 31 (1):26-82.
    In Against Democracy, Jason Brennan argues that public ignorance undermines the legitimacy of democracy because, to the extent that ignorant voters make bad policy choices, they harm their own and one another’s interests. The solution, he thinks, is epistocracy, which would leave policy decisions largely in the hands of social-scientific experts or voters who pass tests of political knowledge. However, Brennan fails to explain why we should think that these putative experts are sufficiently knowledgeable to avoid making errors as damaging (...)
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  • Fake News vs. Echo Chambers.Jeremy Fantl - 2021 - Social Epistemology 35 (6):645-659.
    I argue that there is a prima facie tension between solutions to the problem of fake news and solutions to the problem presented by various cognitive biases that dispose us to dismiss evidence against our prior beliefs (what might seem to be the driving force behind echo chambers). We can guard against fake news by strengthening belief. But we can exit echo chambers by becoming more sensitive to counterevidence, which seems to require weakening our beliefs. I resolve the tension by (...)
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  • Expertise, Agreement, and the Nature of Social Scientific Facts or: Against Epistocracy.Julian Reiss - 2019 - Social Epistemology 33 (2):183-192.
    ABSTRACTTaking some controversial claims philosopher Jason Brennan makes in his book Against Democracy as a starting point, this paper argues in favour of two theses: There is No Such Thing as Superior Political Judgement; There Is No Such Thing as Uncontroversial Social Scientific Knowledge. I conclude that social science experts need to be kept in check, not given more power.
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  • Epistemic Environmentalism.Shane Ryan - 2018 - Journal of Philosophical Research 43:97-112.
    I motivate and develop a normative framework for undertaking work in applied epistemology. I set out the framework, which I call epistemic environmentalism, explaining the role of social epistemology and epistemic value theory in the framework. Next, I explain the environmentalist terminology that is employed and its usefulness. In the second part of the paper, I make the case for a specific epistemic environmentalist proposal. I argue that dishonest testimony by experts and certain institutional testifiers should be liable to the (...)
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  • Epistemic Virtues in the Sciences and the Humanities.Herman Paul & Jeroen van Dongen (eds.) - 2017 - Springer Verlag.
    This book explores how physicists, astronomers, chemists, and historians in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries employed ‘epistemic virtues’ such as accuracy, objectivity, and intellectual courage. In doing so, it takes the first step in providing an integrated history of the sciences and humanities. It assists in addressing such questions as: What kind of perspective would enable us to compare organic chemists in their labs with paleographers in the Vatican Archives, or anthropologists on a field trip with mathematicians poring (...)
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  • COVID-19 and Biomedical Experts: When Epistemic Authority is (Probably) Not Enough.Pietro Pietrini, Andrea Lavazza & Mirko Farina - 2022 - Journal of Bioethical Inquiry 19 (1):135-142.
    This critical essay evaluates the potential integration of distinct kinds of expertise in policymaking, especially during situations of critical emergencies, such as the COVID-19 pandemic. This article relies on two case studies: herd immunity and restricted access to ventilators for disabled people. These case studies are discussed as examples of experts’ recommendations that have not been widely accepted, though they were made within the boundaries of expert epistemic authority. While the fundamental contribution of biomedical experts in devising public health policies (...)
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  • Human Emotions: An Evolutionary Psychological Perspective.Laith Al-Shawaf, Daniel Conroy-Beam, Kelly Asao & David M. Buss - 2016 - Emotion Review 8 (2):173-186.
    Evolutionary approaches to the emotions have traditionally focused on a subset of emotions that are shared with other species, characterized by distinct signals, and designed to solve a few key adaptive problems. By contrast, an evolutionary psychological approach (a) broadens the range of adaptive problems emotions have evolved to solve, (b) includes emotions that lack distinctive signals and are unique to humans, and (c) synthesizes an evolutionary approach with an information-processing perspective. On this view, emotions are superordinate mechanisms that evolved (...)
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  • Post-Truth, Philosophy and Law.Angela Condello & Tiziana Andina (eds.) - 2019 - New York, NY: Routledge.
    In the wake of Brexit and Trump, the debate surrounding post-truth fills the newspapers and is at the center of the public debate. Democratic institutions and the rule of law have always been constructed and legitimized by discourses of truth. And so the issue of "post-truth" or "fake truth" can be regarded as a contemporary degeneration of that legitimacy. But what, precisely, is post-truth from a theoretical point of view? Can it actually change perceptions of law, of institutions and political (...)
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  • Less than you think: prevalence and predictors of fake news dissemination on Facebook.Andrew Guess, Jonathan Nagler & Joshua Tucker - 2019 - Science Advances 5 (1):1197–201.
    Fake news sharing in 2016 was rare but significantly more common among older Americans. So-called “fake news” has renewed concerns about the prevalence and effects of misinformation in political campaigns. Given the potential for widespread dissemination of this material, we examine the individual-level characteristics associated with sharing false articles during the 2016 U.S. presidential campaign. To do so, we uniquely link an original survey with respondents’ sharing activity as recorded in Facebook profile data. First and foremost, we find that sharing (...)
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  • Epistemic Responsibility.Laurence BonJour - 1990 - Philosophical Review 99 (1):123.
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  • The meaning of Freedom after Covid-19.Mirko Farina & Andrea Lavazza - 2021 - History and Philosophy of the Life Sciences 43 (1):1-5.
    Many governments have seen digital health technologies as promising tools to tackle the current COVID-19 pandemic. A much-talked example in this context involves the recent deluge of digital contact tracing apps aimed at detecting Covid-19 exposure. In this short contribution we look at the bio-political justification of this phenomenon and reflect on whether DCT apps constitute, as it is often argued, a serious potential breach of our right to privacy. Despite praising efforts attempting to develop legal and ethical frameworks for (...)
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  • Reducing Responsibility: An Evidentialist Account of Epistemic Blame.Trent Dougherty - 2010 - European Journal of Philosophy 20 (4):534-547.
    Abstract: This paper argues that instances of what are typically called ‘epistemic irresponsibility’ are better understood as instances of moral or prudenial failure. This hypothesis covers the data and is simpler than postulating a new sui generis form of normativitiy. The irresponsibility alleged is that embeded in charges of ‘You should have known better!’ However, I argue, either there is some interest at stake in knowing or there is not. If there is not, then there is no irresponsibility. If there (...)
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  • Three Approaches to Human Cognitive Development: Neo-nativism, Neuroconstructivism, and Dynamic Enskillment.Mirko Farina - 2016 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 67 (2):617-641.
    In Section 1, I introduce three views that explain human cognitive development from different standpoints: Marcus’s neo-nativism, standard neuroconstructivism, and neo-neuroconstructivism. In Section 2, I assess Marcus’s attempt to reconcile nativism with developmental flexibility. In Section 3, I argue that in structurally reconfiguring nativism, Marcus ends up transforming it into an unrecognizable form, and I claim that his view could be accommodated within the more general framework provided by standard neuroconstructivism. In Section 4, I focus on recent empirical findings in (...)
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  • Good News, Bad News, Fake News.Duncan Pritchard - 2021 - In Sven Bernecker, Amy K. Flowerree & Thomas Grundmann (eds.), The Epistemology of Fake News. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
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  • Filter bubbles, Echo Chambers, and Online Communities.Hanna Gunn - 2021 - In Michael Hannon & Jeroen de Ridder (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Political Epistemology. New York: Routledge. pp. 192-202.
    In Neal Stephenson’s fictional novel, Diamond Age (1995), the protagonist Nell acquires a prototype of what we might today recognise as a highly sophisticated e-reader with a voice-assistant. This e-reader, the “Young Lady’s Illustrated Primer”, uses artificial intelli- gence to serve as Nell’s personal teacher. What is key to the Primer is how it is designed to respond to Nell. The Primer has a theory of Nell – her needs, her real-world situation, her abilities – and it tailors its lessons (...)
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  • The Virtues Needed by Experts in Action.Andrea Lavazza & Mirko Farina - 2021 - Epistemology and Philosophy of Science 58 (4):142-157.
    The current Covid-19 pandemic is illustrative of both the need of more experts and of the difficulties that can arise in the face of their decisions. This happens, we argue, because experts usually interact with society through a strongly naturalistic framework, which often places experts’ epistemic authority (understood as neutrality and objectivity) at the centre, sometimes at the expenses of other pluralistic values (such as axiological ones) that people (often non-experts) cherish. In this paper, we argue that we need to (...)
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  • Filter Bubbles, Echo Chambers, and Online News Consumption.Seth Flaxman, Sharad Goel & Justin M. Rao - 2016 - Public Opinion Quarterly 80 (S1):298-320.
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  • Is epistemic blame distinct from moral blame?Daniella Meehan - 2019 - Logos and Episteme 10 (2):183-194.
    In contemporary epistemology, recent attempts have been made to resist the notion of epistemic blame. This view, which I refer to as ‘epistemic blame skepticism,’ seems to challenge the notion of epistemic blame by reducing apparent cases of the phenomenon to examples of moral or practical blame. The purpose of this paper is to defend the notion of epistemic blame against a reductionist objection to epistemic blame, offered by Trent Dougherty in “Reducing Responsibility.” This paper will object to Dougherty’s position (...)
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  • Helping Open-mindedness Flourish.William Hare - 2011 - Journal of Thought 46 (1-2):9.
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  • Belief in fake news, responsiveness to cognitive conflict, and analytic reasoning engagement.Michael V. Bronstein, Gordon Pennycook, Lydia Buonomano & Tyrone D. Cannon - 2021 - Thinking and Reasoning 27 (4):510-535.
    For decades, technologies that ease information sharing (e.g., the wireless telegraph; Mckernon, 1925) have inspired concerns about the proliferation of misinformation. Today, these worries often c...
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  • Drawing lessons from the COVID-19 pandemic: science and epistemic humility should go together.Fulvio Mazzocchi - 2021 - History and Philosophy of the Life Sciences 43 (3):1-5.
    During the COVID-19 pandemic, scientific experts advised governments for measures to be promptly taken; they also helped people to understand the situation. They carried out this role in the face of a worldwide emergency, when scientific understanding was still underway. Public scientific disputes also arose, creating confusion among people. This article highlights the importance of experts’ epistemic stance under these circumstances. It suggests they should embrace the intellectual virtue of epistemic humility, regulating their epistemic behavior and communication accordingly. In so (...)
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  • The Epistemic Virtues of the Virtuous Theorist: On Albert Einstein and His Autobiography.Jeroen van Dongen - 2017 - In Herman Paul & Jeroen van Dongen (eds.), Epistemic Virtues in the Sciences and the Humanities. Springer Verlag. pp. 63-77.
    Albert Einstein’s practice in physics and his philosophical positions gradually reoriented themselves from more empiricist towards rationalist viewpoints. This change accompanied his turn towards unified field theory and different presentations of himself, eventually leading to his highly programmatic Autobiographical Notes in 1949. Einstein enlisted his own history and professional stature to mold an ideal of a theoretical physicist who represented particular epistemic virtues and moral qualities. These in turn reflected the theoretical ideas of his strongly mathematical unification program and professed (...)
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  • Miranda Fricker, Epistemic injustice: Power and the ethics of knowing[REVIEW]Michael Brady - 2007 - Analysis 69 (2):380-382.
    Miranda Fricker's book Epistemic Injustice is an original and stimulating contribution to contemporary epistemology. Fricker's main aim is to illustrate the ethical aspects of two of our basic epistemic practices, namely conveying knowledge to others and making sense of our own social experiences. In particular, she wishes to investigate the idea that there are prevalent and distinctively epistemic forms of injustice related to these aspects of our epistemic lives, injustices which reflect the fact that our actual epistemic practices are socially (...)
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