- The Structure of Defeat: Pollock's Evidentialism, Lackey's Framework, and Prospects for Reliabilism.Peter J. Graham & Jack C. Lyons - 2021 - In Jessica Brown & Mona Simion (eds.), Reasons, Justification, and Defeat. Oxford Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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Knowledge‐first functionalism.Mona Simion - 2019 - Philosophical Issues 29 (1):254-267.details
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Credibility and the Distribution of Epistemic Goods.Jennifer Lackey - 2018 - In McCain Kevin (ed.), Believing in Accordance with the Evidence: New Essays on Evidentialism. Cham: Springer Verlag.details
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Knowledge as Achievement, More or Less.John Turri - 2016 - In Miguel Ángel Fernández Vargas (ed.), Performance Epistemology: Foundations and Applications. New York, NY: Oxford University Press UK. pp. 124-134.details
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No Epistemic Norm for Action.SImion Mona - 2018 - American Philosophical Quarterly 55 (3):231-238.details
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Robust Virtue Epistemology As Anti‐Luck Epistemology: A New Solution.J. Adam Carter - 2016 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 97 (1):140-155.details
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Process reliabilism's Troubles with Defeat.Bob Beddor - 2015 - Philosophical Quarterly 65 (259):145-159.details
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(4 other versions)Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?Edmund L. Gettier - 1963 - Analysis 23 (6):121-123.details
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What is Justified Belief?Alvin I. Goldman - 1979 - In George Pappas (ed.), Justification and Knowledge: New Studies in Epistemology. Boston: D. Reidel. pp. 1-25.details
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The Process Dynamics of Normative Function.Wayne David Christensen & Mark H. Bickhard - 2002 - The Monist 85 (1):3-28.details
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(4 other versions)A (Different) Virtue Epistemology.John Greco - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (1):1-26.details
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Varieties of Meaning: The 2002 Jean Nicod Lectures.Ruth Garrett Millikan - 2004 - MIT Press.details
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Epistemic Explanations: A Theory of Telic Normativity, and What It Explains.Ernest Sosa - 2021 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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Inquiry, Knowledge, and Understanding.Christoph Kelp - 2021 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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Theory of inquiry.Christoph Kelp - 2021 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 103 (2):359-384.details
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(3 other versions)Knowledge First Virtue Epistemology.Christoph9 Kelp - 2017 - In J. Adam Carter, Emma C. Gordon & Benjamin W. Jarvis (eds.), Knowledge First: Approaches in Epistemology and Mind. Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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The teleological notion of 'function'.Karen Neander - 1991 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 69 (4):454 – 468.details
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Resistance to evidence and the duty to believe.Mona Simion - 2023 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 108 (1):203-216.details
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A modern history theory of functions.Peter Godfrey-Smith - 1994 - Noûs 28 (3):344-362.details
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To the Best of Our Knowledge: Social Expectations and Epistemic Normativity.Sanford Goldberg - 2018 - Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press.details
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Agent functionalism.Christoph Kelp - forthcoming - In Mathias Steup (ed.), Blackwell Companion to Epistemology. Blackwell.details
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Introduction: Virtue theoretic epistemology.Christoph Kelp - 2020 - In Christoph Kelp & John Greco (eds.), Virtue Theoretic Epistemology: New Methods and Approaches. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.details
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Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories.Ruth Millikan - 1984 - Behaviorism 14 (1):51-56.details
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Learning from Words: Testimony as a Source of Knowledge. [REVIEW]Jennifer Lackey - 2012 - Philosophy Now 88:44-45.details
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Preface.Robert K. Shope - 1983 - In The Analysis of Knowing: A Decade of Research. Princeton: New Jersey: Princeton University Press.details
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Theory of Knowledge.Roderick M. Chisholm & Israel Scheffler - 1966 - Synthese 16 (3):381-393.details
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Evidentialism: Essays in Epistemology.Earl Conee & Richard Feldman - 2006 - Philosophical Quarterly 56 (222):147-149.details
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Internalism, phenomenal conservatism, and defeat.Christoph Kelp - 2020 - Philosophical Issues 30 (1):192-204.details
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Contemporary Theories of Knowledge.John Pollock - 1986 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 39 (1):131-140.details
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