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Consciousness and Fundamental Reality.Philip Goff - 2017 - New York, USA: Oup Usa.details
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Qualitative Inaccuracy and Unconceived Alternatives.Daniel Stoljar - 2013 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 86 (3):745-752.details
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Phenomenal states.Brian Loar - 1990 - Philosophical Perspectives 4:81-108.details
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Should a materialist believe in qualia?David K. Lewis - 1995 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 73 (1):140-44.details
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Should a Materialist Believe in Qualia?David Lewis - 1995 - Faith and Philosophy 12 (4):467-471.details
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The illusion of conscious experience.François Kammerer - 2019 - Synthese 198 (1):845-866.details
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Can you believe it? Illusionism and the illusion meta-problem.François Kammerer - 2018 - Philosophical Psychology 31 (1):44-67.details
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Meaning, Mind, and Knowledge.Christopher S. Hill - 2014 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.details
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Consciousness and the Prospects of Physicalism.Derk Pereboom - 2011 - , US: Oxford University Press.details
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Sensations: A Defense of Type Materialism.Christopher S. Hill - 1991 - New York: Cambridge University Press.details
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Perceiving : A Philosophical Study.Rodrick Chisholm - 1957 - Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale 63 (4):500-500.details
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Grasping phenomenal properties.Martine Nida-Rümelin - 2006 - In Torin Andrew Alter & Sven Walter (eds.), Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge: New Essays on Consciousness and Physicalism. Oxford University Press.details
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Phenomenal Experience and the Thesis of Revelation.Michelle Liu - 2019 - In Dena Shottenkirk, Manuel Curado & Steven S. Gouveia (eds.), Perception, Cognition and Aesthetics. New York: Routledge. pp. 227-251.details
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The Meta-Problem of Consciousness.David Chalmers - 2018 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 25 (9-10):6-61.details
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Illusionism and Anti-Functionalism about Phenomenal Consciousness.D. Pereboom - 2016 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 23 (11-12):172-185.details
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The argument from revelation.Daniel Stoljar - 2009 - In Robert Nola & David Braddon Mitchell (eds.), Conceptual Analysis and Philosophical Naturalism. MIT Press.details
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Perceiving: a philosophical study.Roderick M. Chisholm - 1957 - Les Etudes Philosophiques 13 (3):365-366.details
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