In this sequence of philosophical essays about natural science, the author argues that fundamental explanatory laws, the deepest and most admired successes of modern physics, do not in fact describe regularities that exist in nature. Cartwright draws from many real-life examples to propound a novel distinction: that theoretical entities, and the complex and localized laws that describe them, can be interpreted realistically, but the simple unifying laws of basic theory cannot.

I. The function of models in the empirical sciencesII. Structure and purpose: conditions of a structural nature which models should satisfy in order to accomplish their function.III. Generalisation and specialisation of the classical definition of model, in view of the above requirements:the algebraic model conceptthe semantic model conceptthe syntactical model conceptIV. Attempt towards reunification: the concept of model on a pragmatic basis.

Recent accounts of scientific method suggest that a model, or analogy, for an axiomatized theory is another theory, or postulate set, with an identical calculus. The present paper examines five central theses underlying this position. In the light of examples from physical science it seems necessary to distinguish between models and analogies and to recognize the need for important revisions in the position under study, especially in claims involving an emphasis on logical structure and similarity in form between theory and (...) analogy. While formal considerations are often relevant in the employment of an analogy they are neither as extensive as proponents of this viewpoint suggest, nor are they in most cases sufficient for allowing analogies to fulfill the roles imputed to them. Of major importance, and what these authors generally fail to consider, are physical similarities between analogue and theoretical object. Such similarities, which are characteristic in varying degrees of most analogies actually employed, play an important role in affording a better understanding of concepts in the theory and also in the development of the theoretical assumptions. (shrink)

In this systematic study, Professor Achinstein analyzes such concepts as definitions, theories, and models, and contrasts his view with currently held positions that he finds inadequate.

Metaphysicians speak of laws of nature in terms of necessity and universality; scientists, in terms of symmetry and invariance. In this book van Fraassen argues that no metaphysical account of laws can succeed. He analyzes and rejects the arguments that there are laws of nature, or that we must believe there are, and argues that we should disregard the idea of law as an adequate clue to science. After exploring what this means for general epistemology, the author develops the empiricist (...) view of science as a construction of models to represent the phenomena. (shrink)

This book is intended as an undergraduate senior level or beginning graduate level text for mathematical logic. There are virtually no prere quisites, although a familiarity with notions encountered in a beginning course in abstract algebra such as groups, rings, and fields will be useful in providing some motivation for the topics in Part III. An attempt has been made to develop the beginning of each part slowly and then to gradually quicken the pace and the complexity of the material. (...) Each part ends with a brief introduction to selected topics of current interest. The text is divided into three parts: one dealing with set theory, another with computable function theory, and the last with model theory. Part III relies heavily on the notation, concepts and results discussed in Part I and to some extent on Part II. Parts I and II are independent of each other, and each provides enough material for a one semester course. The exercises cover a wide range of difficulty with an emphasis on more routine problems in the earlier sections of each part in order to familiarize the reader with the new notions and methods. The more difficult exercises are accompanied by hints. In some cases significant theorems are devel oped step by step with hints in the problems. Such theorems are not used later in the sequence. (shrink)

" There are 31 chapters in 5 parts and approximately 320 exercises marked by difficulty and whether or not they are necessary for further work in the book.

In this book van Fraassen develops an alternative to scientific realism by constructing and evaluating three mutually reinforcing theories.

A basic aim of E. Beth's work in philosophy of science was to explore the use of formal semantic methods in the analysis of physical theories. We hope to show that a general framework for Beth's semantic analysis is provided by the theory of semi-interpreted languages, introduced in a previous paper. After developing Beth's analysis of nonrelativistic physical theories in a more general form, we turn to the notion of the 'logic' of a physical theory. Here we prove a result (...) concerning the conditions under which semantic entailment in such a theory is finitary. We argue, finally, that Beth's approach provides a characterization of physical theory which is more faithful to current practice in foundational research in the sciences than the familiar picture of a partly interpreted axiomatic theory. (shrink)

Traditionally a scientific theory is viewed as based on universal laws of nature that serve as axioms for logical deduction. In analyzing the logical structure of evolutionary biology, Elisabeth Lloyd argues that the semantic account is more appropriate and powerful. This book will be of interest to biologists and philosophers alike.

Suppe, F. The search for philosophic understanding of scientific theories (p. [1]-241)--Proceedings of the symposium.--Bibliography, compiled by Rew A. Godow, Jr. (p. [615]-646).

This book publishes 31 of the author's selected papers which have appeared, with one exception, since 1970. The papers cover a wide range of topics in the philosophy of science. Part I is concerned with general methodology, including formal and axiomatic methods in science. Part II is concerned with causality and explanation. The papers extend the author's earlier work on a probabilistic theory of causality. The papers in Part III are concerned with probability and measurement, especially foundational questions about probability. (...) Part IV consists of several papers, including two historical ones, on the foundations of physics, with the main emphasis being on quantum mechanics. Part V, the longest part, is on the foundations of psychology and includes papers mainly on learning and perception. The book is aimed at philosophers of science, scientists concerned with the methodology of the social sciences, and mathematical psychologists interested in theories of learning, perception and measurement. (shrink)

Structural analogies between physical laws have received considerable attention from philosospheres of science. This paper, however, focusses on structural analogies between physical systems; this type of analogy plays an important role in the physical and technological sciences. A formal, set-theoretic description of structural analogies between physical systems is presented, and it is shown that a structural analogy between systems does not require a structural analogy with regard to the laws involved, nor conversely.

This paper explores a new reason for preferring a model-theoretic approach to understanding the nature of scientific theories. Identifying the models in philosophers' model-theoretic accounts of theories with the concepts in cognitive scientists' accounts of categorization suggests a structure to families of models far richer than has commonly been assumed. Using classical mechanics as an example, it is argued that families of models may be "mapped" as an array with "horizontal" graded structures, multiply hierarchical "vertical" structures, and local "radial" structures. (...) These structures promise important implications for how scientific theories are learned and used in actual scientific practice. (shrink)

Provability, Computability and Reflection.

This book has grown out of eight years of close collaboration among its authors. From the very beginning we decided that its content should come out as the result of a truly common effort. That is, we did not "distribute" parts of the text planned to each one of us. On the contrary, we made a point that each single paragraph be the product of a common reflection. Genuine team-work is not as usual in philosophy as it is in other (...) academic disciplines. We think, however, that this is more due to the idiosyncrasy of philosophers than to the nature of their subject. Close collaboration with positive results is as rewarding as anything can be, but it may also prove to be quite difficult to implement. In our case, part of the difficulties came from purely geographic separation. This caused unsuspected delays in coordinating the work. But more than this, as time passed, the accumulation of particular results and ideas outran our ability to fit them into an organic unity. Different styles of exposition, different ways of formalization, different levels of complexity were simultaneously present in a voluminous manuscript that had become completely unmanageable. In particular, a portion of the text had been conceived in the language of category theory and employed ideas of a rather abstract nature, while another part was expounded in the more conventional set-theoretic style, stressing intui tivity and concreteness. (shrink)

The material contained in the following translation was given in substance by Professor Hilbertas a course of lectures on euclidean geometry at the University of G]ottingen during the wintersemester of 1898-1899. The results of his investigation were re-arranged and put into the formin which they appear here as a memorial address published in connection with the celebration atthe unveiling of the Gauss-Weber monument at G]ottingen, in June, 1899. In the French edition, which appeared soon after, Professor Hilbert made some additions, (...) particularly in the concludingremarks, where he gave an account of the results of a recent investigation made by Dr. Dehn.These additions have been incorporated in the following translation.Geometry, like arithmetic, requires for its logical development only a small number ofsimple, fundamental principles. These fundamental principles are called the axioms ofgeometry. The choice of the axioms and the investigation of their relations to one anotheris a problem which, since the time of Euclid, has been discussed in numerous excellentmemoirs to be found in the mathematical literature.1 This problem is tantamount to thelogical analysis of our intuition of space. (shrink)

Frederick Suppe has come to enjoy a position of undisputed leadership in the post-positivistic philosophy of science.

This book offers a comprehensive overview of the structure, strategy and methods of assessment of orthodox theoretical economics. In Part I Professor Hausman explains how economists theorise, emphasising the essential underlying commitment of economists to a vision of economics as a separate science. In Part II he defends the view that the basic axioms of economics are 'inexact' since they deal only with the 'major' causes; unlike most writers on economic methodology, the author argues that it is the rules that (...) economists espouse rather than their practice that is at fault. Part III links the conception of economics as a separate science to the fact that economic theories offer reasons and justifications for human actions, not just their causes. With its lengthy appendix introducing relevant issues in philosophy of science, this book is a major addition to philosophy of economics and of social science. (shrink)