- Essence and modality.Kit Fine - 1994 - Philosophical Perspectives 8 (Logic and Language):1-16.details
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Metaphor and that certain 'je ne sais quoi'.Elisabeth Camp - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 129 (1):1 - 25.details
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(1 other version)Acquaintance and the Mind-Body Problem.Katalin Balog - 2012 - In Simone Gozzano & Christopher S. Hill (eds.), New Perspectives on Type Identity: The Mental and the Physical. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 16-43.details
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(1 other version)Grasping phenomenal properties.Martine Nida-Rümelin - 2006 - In Torin Andrew Alter & Sven Walter (eds.), Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge: New Essays on Consciousness and Physicalism. New York, US: Oxford University Press.details
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Phenomenal and perceptual concepts.David Papineau - 2006 - In Torin Andrew Alter & Sven Walter (eds.), Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge: New Essays on Consciousness and Physicalism. New York, US: Oxford University Press. pp. 111--144.details
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The argument from revelation.Daniel Stoljar - 2008 - In David Braddon-Mitchell & Robert Nola (eds.), Conceptual Analysis and Philosophical Naturalism. Bradford.details
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(2 other versions)Phenomenal states.Brian Loar - 1990 - Philosophical Perspectives 4:81-108.details
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The Philosophical Writings of Descartes: Volume 1.René Descartes - 1985 - Cambridge University Press. Edited by John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff & Dugald Murdoch.details
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(1 other version)Clear and distinct perception.Sarah Patterson - 2007 - In Janet Broughton & John Carriero (eds.), A Companion to Descartes. Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 216-234.details
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Consciousness and Fundamental Reality.Philip Goff - 2017 - New York, USA: Oup Usa.details
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(4 other versions)A treatise of human nature.David Hume & A. D. Lindsay - 1739 - Oxford,: Clarendon press. Edited by L. A. Selby-Bigge.details
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Purple Haze: The Puzzle of Consciousness.Joseph Levine - 2001 - Philosophy 77 (299):130-135.details
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(1 other version)A Posteriori Physicalism and Introspection.Andreas Elpidorou - 2017 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98 (1):474-500.details
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(1 other version)An Argument for the Identity Theory.David K. Lewis - 1966 - Journal of Philosophy 63 (1):17-25.details
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Revelation and physicalism.Kelly Trogdon - 2017 - Synthese 194 (7):2345-2366.details
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Ignorance and Imagination: The Epistemic Origin of the Problem of Consciousness.Daniel Stoljar - 2006 - New York, US: Oxford University Press USA.details
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(2 other versions)Troubles with Functionalism.Ned Block - 1993 - In Alvin I. Goldman (ed.), Readings in Philosophy and Cognitive Science. Cambridge: MIT Press. pp. 231.details
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Knowing How.Jason Stanley & Timothy Willlamson - 2001 - Journal of Philosophy 98 (8):411-444.details
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(1 other version)Clearness and Distinctness in Descartes.Alan Gewirth - 1943 - Philosophy 18 (69):17 - 36.details
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(1 other version)Should a materialist believe in qualia?David K. Lewis - 1995 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 73 (1):140-44.details
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Powerful Qualities, Phenomenal Concepts, and the New Challenge to Physicalism.Henry Taylor - 2017 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 96 (1):53-66.details
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Real acquaintance and physicalism.Philip Goff - 2015 - In Paul Coates & Sam Coleman (eds.), Phenomenal Qualities: Sense, Perception, and Consciousness. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press UK.details
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Revelation and Physicalism.Nic Damnjanovic - 2012 - Dialectica 66 (1):69-91.details
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Propositional Attitudes De Dicto and De Re.Ernest Sosa - 1970 - Journal of Philosophy 67 (21):883-896.details
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How to speak of the colors.Mark Johnston - 1992 - Philosophical Studies 68 (3):221-263.details
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(1 other version)Should a Materialist Believe in Qualia?David Lewis - 1995 - Faith and Philosophy 12 (4):467-471.details
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Belief de re and de dicto.Justin Broackes - 1986 - Philosophical Quarterly 36 (144):374-383.details
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Color, consciousness, and color consciousness.Brian P. McLaughlin - 2002 - In Aleksandar Jokic & Quentin Smith (eds.), Consciousness: New Philosophical Perspectives. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 97-154.details
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Against ontologically emergent consciousness.David Braddon-Mitchell - 2007 - In Brian P. McLaughlin & Jonathan Cohen (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Mind. Wiley-Blackwell.details
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Do a Posteriori Physicalists Get Our Phenomenal Concepts Wrong?E. Diaz-Leon - 2013 - Ratio 27 (1):1-16.details
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Meaning, Mind, and Knowledge.Christopher S. Hill - 2014 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.details
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Naming the colours.David Lewis - 1997 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 75 (3):325-42.details
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In defense of new wave materialism: A response to Horgan and Tienson.Brian P. McLaughlin - 2001 - In Carl Gillett & Barry Loewer (eds.), Physicalism and its Discontents. New York: Cambridge University Press.details
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(1 other version)An Argument for the Identity Theory.David Lewis - 2003 - In John Heil (ed.), Philosophy of Mind: A Guide and Anthology. New York: Oxford University Press.details
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