- Two Physicalist Arguments for Microphysical Manyism.Simon Thunder - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-22.details
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Fragmented and conflicted: folk beliefs about vision.Paul E. Engelhardt, Keith Allen & Eugen Fischer - 2023 - Synthese 201 (3):1-33.details
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Radical Misinterpretation.Edward Elliott - 2023 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 104 (3):646-684.details
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Modal dispositionalism and necessary perfect masks.Barbara Vetter & Ralf Busse - 2022 - Analysis 82 (1):84-94.details
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Private Investigators and Public Speakers.Alexander Sandgren - 2023 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 9 (1):95-113.details
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Troubles with the Canberra Plan.Panu Raatikainen - 2020 - Synthese 1 (1-2).details
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Why Defend Humean Supervenience?Siegfried Jaag & Christian Loew - 2020 - Journal of Philosophy 117 (7):387-406.details
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Lewis on Materialism and Experience.Daniel Stoljar - 2015 - In Barry Loewer & Jonathan Schaffer (eds.), A companion to David Lewis. Chichester, West Sussex ;: Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 519–532.details
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Incoherentism and the Sorites Paradox.Matti Eklund - 2019 - In Sergi Oms & Elia Zardini (eds.), The Sorites Paradox. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.details
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Reports from Twin Earth: Both deep structure and appearance determine the reference of natural kind terms.Jussi Haukioja, Mons Nyquist & Jussi Jylkkä - 2020 - Mind and Language 36 (3):377-403.details
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Objectivity and Perspectival Content.Max Kölbel - 2019 - Erkenntnis 87 (1):137-159.details
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What is Special about De Se Attitudes?Stephan Torre & Clas Weber - 2021 - In Heimir Geirsson & Stephen Biggs (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Linguistic Reference. New York: Routledge. pp. 464-481.details
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Carnap's Second Aufbau and David Lewis's Aufbau.David J. Chalmers - 2020 - In Denis Fisette, Guillaume Fréchette & Friedrich Stadler (eds.), Franz Brentano and Austrian Philosophy: Vienna Circle Institute Yearbook Volume 24.details
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Phenomenal Experience and the Thesis of Revelation.Michelle Liu - 2019 - In Dena Shottenkirk, Manuel Curado & Steven S. Gouveia (eds.), Perception, Cognition and Aesthetics. New York: Routledge. pp. 227-251.details
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Do ‘Objectivist’ Features of Moral Discourse and Thinking Support Moral Objectivism?Gunnar Björnsson - 2012 - The Journal of Ethics 16 (4):367-393.details
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A metarepresentational theory of intentional identity.Alexander Sandgren - 2019 - Synthese 196 (9):3677-3695.details
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Imagination and Convention.Diana Mazzarella - 2017 - Analysis 77 (2):449-457.details
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A Defense of Russellian Descriptivism.Brandt H. van der Gaast - unknowndetails
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Ramseyan humility: the response from revelation and panpsychism.Raamy Majeed - 2017 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 47 (1):75-96.details
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Cruel Intensions: An Essay on Intentional Identity and Intentional Attitudes.Alexander Sandgren - 2016 - Dissertation, The Australian National Universitydetails
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Colour Physicalism, Naïve Realism, and the Argument from Structure.Mazviita Chirimuuta - 2015 - Minds and Machines 25 (2):193-212.details
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Turning up the volume on the property view of sound.Pendaran Roberts - 2017 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 60 (4):337-357.details
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What Vagueness Consists In.Matti Eklund - 2005 - Philosophical Studies 125 (1):27-60.details
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Dispositions.James M. Bucknell - 2015 - Dissertation, Univeristy of New South Walesdetails
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Against Harmony.Ian Rumfitt - 1995 - In B. Hale & Crispin Wright (eds.), Blackwell Companion to the Philosophy of Language. Blackwell.details
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Why Colour Primitivism?Hagit Benbaji - 2016 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 94 (2):243-265.details
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Colour Physicalism, Naïve Realism, and the Argument from Structure.Keith Allen - 2015 - Minds and Machines 25 (2):193-212.details
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Deep Inconsistency.Matti Eklund - 2002 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 80 (3):321-331.details
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Can the Pessimistic Induction be Saved from Semantic Anti-Realism about Scientific Theory?Greg Frost-Arnold - 2014 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 65 (3):521-548.details
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Metaphysical Vagueness and Metaphysical Indeterminacy.Matti Eklund - 2013 - Metaphysica 14 (2):165-179.details
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Against Magnetism.Wolfgang Schwarz - 2014 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 92 (1):17-36.details
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Centrality and marginalisation.Brian Weatherson - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 171 (3):517-533.details
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Epistemic Two-Dimensionalism and Arguments from Epistemic Misclassification.Edward Elliott, Kelvin McQueen & Clas Weber - 2013 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (2):375-389.details
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The Role of Naturalness in Lewis's Theory of Meaning.Brian Weatherson - 2013 - Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy 1 (10).details
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Colour in a Physical World: A Problem due to Visual Noise.John Morrison - 2012 - Mind 121 (482):333-373.details
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Colour and Consciousness: Untying the Metaphysical Knot.Pär Sundström - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 136 (2):123 - 165.details
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Two-dimensional semantics.Laura Schroeter - 2010 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Metaontology.Matti Eklund - 2006 - Philosophy Compass 1 (3):317-334.details
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Three strands in Kripke's argument against the identity theory.Jesper Kallestrup - 2008 - Philosophy Compass 3 (6):1255-1280.details
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Clarifying the problem of color realism.Barry Maund - 2003 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (1):40-41.details
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Hue magnitudes and revelation.John Kulvicki - 2003 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (1):36-37.details
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Why not color physicalism without color absolutism?Zoltán Jakab & Brian P. McLaughlin - 2003 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (1):34-35.details
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Imprecise color constancy versus color realism.Brian V. Funt - 2003 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (1):29-30.details
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Rigidity for predicates and the trivialization problem.Dan López de Sa - 2008 - Philosophers' Imprint 8:1-13.details
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What are Thick Concepts?Matti Eklund - 2011 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 41 (1):25-49.details
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Fiction, indifference, and ontology.Matti Eklund - 2005 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (3):557–579.details
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Fitting color into the physical world.Peter W. Ross - 2010 - Philosophical Psychology 23 (5):575-599.details
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The Internal and the External in Linguistic Explanation.Brian Epstein - 2008 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 8 (22):77-111.details
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Physicalism.Daniel Stoljar - 2015 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Can the physicalist explain colour structure in terms of colour experience?1.Adam Pautz - 2006 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 84 (4):535 – 564.details
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