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Unconscious Evidence

Philosophical Issues 26 (1):243-262 (2016)

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  1. Inferentialism and Cognitive Penetration of Perception.Jack C. Lyons - 2016 - Episteme 13 (1):1-28.
    Cognitive penetration of perception is the idea that what we see is influenced by such states as beliefs, expectations, and so on. A perceptual belief that results from cognitive penetration may be less justified than a nonpenetrated one. Inferentialism is a kind of internalist view that tries to account for this by claiming that some experiences are epistemically evaluable, on the basis of why the perceiver has that experience, and the familiar canons of good inference provide the appropriate standards by (...)
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  • The Epistemological Import of Morphological Content.Jack C. Lyons - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 169 (3):537-547.
    Morphological content (MC) is content that is implicit in the standing structure of the cognitive system. Henderson and Horgan claim that MC plays a distinctive epistemological role unrecognized by traditional epistemic theories. I consider the possibilities that MC plays this role either in central cognition or in peripheral modules. I argue that the peripheral MC does not play an interesting epistemological role and that the central MC is already recognized by traditional theories.
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  • Experiential Evidence?Jack C. Lyons - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (4):1053-1079.
    Much of the intuitive appeal of evidentialism results from conflating two importantly different conceptions of evidence. This is most clear in the case of perceptual justification, where experience is able to provide evidence in one sense of the term, although not in the sense that the evidentialist requires. I argue this, in part, by relying on a reading of the Sellarsian dilemma that differs from the version standardly encountered in contemporary epistemology, one that is aimed initially at the epistemology of (...)
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  • The Coherence Theory of Empirical Knowledge.Laurence Bonjour - 1976 - Philosophical Studies 30 (5):281 - 312.
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  • What the Tortoise Said to Achilles.Lewis Carroll - 1895 - Mind 4 (14):278-280.
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  • Carving the Mind at its (Not Necessarily Modular) Joints.Jack C. Lyons - 2001 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 52 (2):277-302.
    The cognitive neuropsychological understanding of a cognitive system is roughly that of a ‘mental organ’, which is independent of other systems, specializes in some cognitive task, and exhibits a certain kind of internal cohesiveness. This is all quite vague, and I try to make it more precise. A more precise understanding of cognitive systems will make it possible to articulate in some detail an alternative to the Fodorian doctrine of modularity (since not all cognitive systems are modules), but it will (...)
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  • Individual Differences in Reasoning: Implications for the Rationality Debate.Keith E. Stanovich & Richard F. West - 2000 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 23 (5):645-665.
    Much research in the last two decades has demonstrated that human responses deviate from the performance deemed normative according to various models of decision making and rational judgment (e.g., the basic axioms of utility theory). This gap between the normative and the descriptive can be interpreted as indicating systematic irrationalities in human cognition. However, four alternative interpretations preserve the assumption that human behavior and cognition is largely rational. These posit that the gap is due to (1) performance errors, (2) computational (...)
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  • Connectionism, Eliminativism and the Future of Folk Psychology.William Ramsey, Stephen Stich & Joseph Garon - 1990 - Philosophical Perspectives 4:499-533.
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  • The Theory of Epistemic Rationality.Hilary Kornblith & Richard Foley - 1990 - Philosophical Review 99 (1):131.
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  • Reply to Block: Adaptation and the Upper Border of Perception.Tyler Burge - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 89 (3):573-583.
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  • In Defence of a Doxastic Account of Experience.Kathrin Glüer - 2009 - Mind and Language 24 (3):297-327.
    Today, many philosophers think that perceptual experiences are conscious mental states with representational content and phenomenal character. Subscribers to this view often go on to construe experience more precisely as a propositional attitude sui generis ascribing sensible properties to ordinary material objects. I argue that experience is better construed as a kind of belief ascribing 'phenomenal' properties to such objects. A belief theory of this kind deals as well with the traditional arguments against doxastic accounts as the sui generis view. (...)
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  • Seeing‐As in the Light of Vision Science.Ned Block - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 89 (1):560-572.
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  • Nonconceptua1 Content and the" Space of Reasons," RICHARD G. Heck Jr - 2000 - Philosophical Review 109 (4).
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  • More on Givenness and Explanatory Coherence.Wilfrid S. Sellars - 1979 - In Jonathan Dancy (ed.), Justification And Knowledge. Dordrecht: Reidel.
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  • Unencapsulated Modules and Perceptual Judgment.Jack C. Lyons - 2015 - In J. Zeimbekis & A. Raftopoulos (eds.), The Cognitive Penetrability of Perception: New Philosophical Perspectives. Oxford University Press. pp. 103-122.
    To what extent are cognitive capacities, especially perceptual capacities, informationally encapsulated and to what extent are they cognitively penetrable? And why does this matter? Two reasons we care about encapsulation/penetrability are: (a) encapsulation is sometimes held to be definitional of modularity, and (b) penetrability has epistemological implications independent of modularity. I argue that modularity does not require encapsulation; that modularity may have epistemological implications independently of encapsulation; and that the epistemological implications of the cognitive penetrability of perception are messier than (...)
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