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Knowledge and practical interests.Jason Stanley - 2005 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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The foundations of arithmetic: a logico-mathematical enquiry into the concept of number.Gottlob Frege - 1959 - Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press. Edited by J. L. Austin.details
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The Theaetetus of Plato.Miles BURNYEAT - 1990 - Philosophy 66 (258):540-541.details
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On the Plurality of Worlds.David Lewis - 1986 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 178 (3):388-390.details
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Frege’s Puzzle (2nd edition).Nathan U. Salmon - 1986 - Atascadero, CA: Ridgeview Publishing Company.details
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Languages and language.David K. Lewis - 2010 - In Darragh Byrne & Max Kölbel (eds.), Arguing about language. New York: Routledge. pp. 3-35.details
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Peer disagreement and higher order evidence.Thomas Kelly - 2011 - In Alvin I. Goldman & Dennis Whitcomb (eds.), Social Epistemology: Essential Readings. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 183--217.details
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Relevant implication.David Lewis - 1988 - Theoria 54 (3):161-174.details
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Knowledge and Belief: An Introduction to the Logic of the Two Notions.Jaakko Hintikka - 1962 - Studia Logica 16:119-122.details
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Inquiry.Robert C. Stalnaker - 1984 - Cambridge University Press.details
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Knowledge and its limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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On What Matters: Two-Volume Set.Derek Parfit - 2011 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Reasons and Persons.Derek Parfit - 1984 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.details
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Truth.P. F. Strawson - 2005-01-01 - In José Medina & David Wood (eds.), Truth. Blackwell.details
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The Folly of Trying to Define Truth.Donald Davidson - 2005-01-01 - In José Medina & David Wood (eds.), Truth. Blackwell.details
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Deflationist Views of Meaning and Content.Hartry Field - 2005-01-01 - In José Medina & David Wood (eds.), Truth. Blackwell.details
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Truth and Progress.Rorty Richard - 1998 - Philosophical Papers 3:122-137.details
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Peer Disagreement and Higher Order Evidence.Thomas Kelly - 2010 - In Richard Feldman & Ted A. Warfield (eds.), Disagreement. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.details
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Disputing about Taste.Andy Egan - 2010 - In Richard Feldman & Ted A. Warfield (eds.), Disagreement. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press. pp. 247-286.details
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Jeffrey C. King.Context Dependent Quantifiers & Donkey Anaphora - 2004 - In M. Ezcurdia, R. Stainton & C. Viger (eds.), New Essays in the Philosophy of Language and Mind. University of Calgary Press. pp. 97.details
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V. attitude ascriptions and context dependence.Context Dependence - 1997 - In Dunja Jutronic (ed.), The Maribor Papers in Naturalized Semantics. Maribor. pp. 243.details
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Ethics.G. E. Moore - 1912 - New York [etc.]: Oxford University Press.details
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The Assessment Sensitivity of Knowledge Attributions.John MacFarlane - 2005 - In Tamar Szabó Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Oxford Studies in Epistemology. Oxford University Press. pp. 197--234.details
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Double Time References: Speech-act Reports as a Modalitites in an Indeterminist Setting.Nuel D. Belnap - 1998 - In Marcus Kracht, Maarten de Rijke, Heinrich Wansing & Michael Zakharyaschev (eds.), Advances in Modal Logic. CSLI Publications. pp. 37-58.details
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Double Time References: Speech-act Reports as a Modalitites in an Indeterminist Setting.Nuel D. Belnap - 1998 - In Marcus Kracht, Maarten de Rijke, Heinrich Wansing & Michael Zakharyaschev (eds.), Advances in Modal Logic. CSLI Publications. pp. 37-58.details
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The concept of truth in formalized languages.Alfred Tarski - 1956 - In Logic, semantics, metamathematics. Oxford,: Clarendon Press. pp. 152--278.details
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Does tense logic rest on a mistake?Gareth Evans - 1985 - In Collected papers. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 343-363.details
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Time and modality.Arthur N. Prior - 1955 - Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press.details
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Time and Modality: Being the John Locke Lectures for 1955-6 Delivered in the University of Oxford.Arthur Norman Prior - 1957 - Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.details
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Knowledge and belief.Jaakko Hintikka - 1962 - Ithaca, N.Y.,: Cornell University Press.details
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Fact, Fiction, and Forecast.Nelson Goodman - 1965 - Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.details
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Past, present and future.Arthur N. Prior - 1967 - Oxford,: Clarendon P..details
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Wise Choices, Apt Feelings: A Theory of Normative Judgement.Allan Gibbard - 1992 - Cambridge, Mass.:details
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The Theaetetus of Plato.Miles Burnyeat - 1990 - Hackett Publishing Company.details
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Papers on Time and Tense.Arthur Norman Prior - 1968 - Oxford, England: Oxford University Press UK. Edited by Per F. V. Hasle.details
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Free Choice Disjunction and Epistemic Possibility.Thomas Ede Zimmermann - 2000 - Natural Language Semantics 8 (4):255-290.details
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Against relativism. [REVIEW]Aaron Z. Zimmerman - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 133 (3):313-348.details
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Epistemic Modals.Seth Yalcin - 2007 - Mind 116 (464):983-1026.details
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Fear of relativism? [REVIEW]Crispin Wright - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 141 (3):379 - 390.details
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Précis of Vagueness.Timothy Williamson - 1997 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 57 (4):921-928.details
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Meaning and Deflationary Truth.Michael Williams - 1999 - Journal of Philosophy 96 (11):545.details
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Knowledge and Its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2005 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (2):452-458.details
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Knowing and asserting.Timothy Williamson - 1996 - Philosophical Review 105 (4):489-523.details
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Relativisrn is Absolutely False.Jamie T. Whyte - 1993 - Cogito 7 (2):112-118.details
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Relativisrn is Absolutely False.Jamie T. Whyte - 1993 - Cogito 7 (2):112-118.details
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On a proposed refutation of relativism.F. C. White - 1986 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 64 (3):331 – 334.details
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Knowledge and Belief: An Introduction to the Logic of the Two Notions.Alan R. White - 1965 - Philosophical Quarterly 15 (60):268.details
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The aim of belief.Ralph Wedgwood - 2002 - Philosophical Perspectives 16:267-97.details
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Real Conditionals. [REVIEW]Brian Weatherson - 2002 - Philosophical Review 111 (4):609-611.details
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