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Risk and Rationality.Lara Buchak - 2013 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.details
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The Foundations of Causal Decision Theory.James M. Joyce - 1999 - Cambridge University Press.details
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(2 other versions)Troubles with functionalism.Ned Block - 1978 - Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 9:261-325.details
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After Physics.David Z. Albert - 2015 - Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.details
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Pleasure and the Good Life: Concerning the Nature Varieties and Plausibility of Hedonism.Fred Feldman - 2004 - Oxford, GB: Clarendon Press. Edited by Fred Feldman.details
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Counterpart theory and quantified modal logic.David Lewis - 1968 - Journal of Philosophy 65 (5):113-126.details
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(2 other versions)Troubles with Functionalism.Ned Block - 1993 - In Alvin I. Goldman (ed.), Readings in Philosophy and Cognitive Science. Cambridge: MIT Press. pp. 231.details
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A Fresh Start for the Objective-List Theory of Well-Being.Guy Fletcher - 2013 - Utilitas 25 (2):206-220.details
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What conditional probability could not be.Alan Hájek - 2003 - Synthese 137 (3):273--323.details
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Possible Worlds.John Divers - 2002 - Routledge.details
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Surreal Decisions.Eddy Keming Chen & Daniel Rubio - 2020 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 100 (1):54-74.details
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Why Boltzmann Brains Are Bad.Sean M. Carroll - 2017 - In Shamik Dasgupta, Brad Weslake & Ravit Dotan (eds.), Current Controversies in Philosophy of Science. London: Routledge. pp. 7-20.details
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Infinite Ethics.Nick Bostrom - 2011 - Analysis and Metaphysics 10:9–59.details
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Island Universes and the Analysis of Modality.Phillip Bricker - 2001 - In Gerhard Preyer & Frank Siebelt (eds.), Reality and Humean Supervenience: Essays on the Philosophy of David Lewis. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.details
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Waging War on Pascal’s Wager.Alan Hájek - 2003 - Philosophical Review 112 (1):27-56.details
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Infinite value and finitely additive value theory.Peter Vallentyne & Shelly Kagan - 1997 - Journal of Philosophy 94 (1):5-26.details
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Vexing expectations.Harris Nover & Alan Hájek - 2004 - Mind 113 (450):237-249.details
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Taking Stock of Infinite Value: Pascal’s Wager and Relative Utilities.Paul Bartha - 2007 - Synthese 154 (1):5-52.details
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Difference Minimizing Theory.Christopher J. G. Meacham - 2019 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 6.details
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Relative Expectation Theory.Mark Colyvan - 2008 - Journal of Philosophy 105 (1):37-44.details
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Causation in a timeless world.Sam Baron & Kristie Miller - 2014 - Synthese 191 (12):2867-2886.details
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Causation Sans Time.Sam Baron & Kristie Miller - 2015 - American Philosophical Quarterly 52 (1):27-40.details
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Making Ado Without Expectations.Mark Colyvan & Alan Hájek - 2016 - Mind 125 (499):829-857.details
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Isolation and Unification: The Realist Analysis of Possible Worlds.Phillip Bricker - 1996 - Philosophical Studies 84 (2-3):225 - 238.details
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Utilitarianism, decision theory and eternity.Frank Arntzenius - 2014 - Philosophical Perspectives 28 (1):31-58.details
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Infinite utility.James Cain - 1995 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 73 (3):401 – 404.details
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Decision theory without finite standard expected value.Luc Lauwers & Peter Vallentyne - 2016 - Economics and Philosophy 32 (3):383-407.details
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Utilitarianism and infinite utility.Peter Vallentyne - 1993 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 71 (2):212 – 217.details
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Utilitarian Eschatology.Mark T. Nelson - 1991 - American Philosophical Quarterly 28 (4):339-47.details
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Infinite utilitarianism: More is always better.Luc Lauwers & Peter Vallentyne - 2004 - Economics and Philosophy 20 (2):307-330.details
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Principal Values and Weak Expectations.K. Easwaran - 2014 - Mind 123 (490):517-531.details
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Decision Theory in Light of Newcomb’s Problem.Paul Horwich - 1985 - Philosophy of Science 52 (3):431-450.details
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Orderly Expectations.Jeremy Gwiazda - 2014 - Mind 123 (490):503-516.details
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A neglected family of aggregation problems in ethics.Krister Segerberg - 1976 - Noûs 10 (2):221-244.details
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With infinite utility, more needn't be better.Joel David Hamkins & Barbara Montero - 2000 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 78 (2):231 – 240.details
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The Problem of Endless Joy: Is Infinite Utility Too Much for Utilitarianism?M. T. Nelson & J. L. A. Garcia - 1994 - Utilitas 6 (2):183-192.details
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(3 other versions)The repugnant conclusion.Jesper Ryberg - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Space, Time, and (how they) Matter: a Discussion about some Metaphysical Insights Provided by our Best Fundamental Physical Theories.Valia Allori - 2016 - In G. C. Ghirardi & J. Statchel (eds.), Space, Time, and Frontiers of Human Understanding. Springer. pp. 95-107.details
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New inconsistencies in infinite utilitarianism: Is every world good, bad or neutral?Donniell Fishkind, Joel David Hamkins & Barbara Montero - 2002 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 80 (2):178 – 190.details
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