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Metaethics in context of engineering ethical and moral systems

In AAAI Spring Series Technical Reports. Palo Alto, CA, USA: AAAI Press (2016)

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  1. The Moral Problem.Michael Smith - 1994 - Blackwell.
    What is the Moral Problem? NORMATIVE ETHICS VS. META-ETHICS It is a common fact of everyday life that we appraise each others' behaviour and attitudes from ...
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  • Ethics, Inventing Right and Wrong.J. L. Mackie - 1977 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 43 (3):581-582.
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  • Ethics, Inventing Right and Wrong.J. L. Mackie - 1977 - Erkenntnis 18 (3):425-430.
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  • The Moral Problem.Nicholas L. Sturgeon & Michael Smith - 1999 - Philosophical Review 108 (1):94.
    Michael Smith’s moral problem is not about whether to betray one’s friends or one’s country. It is a metaethical problem about how to combine three tempting theses that look mutually inconsistent: moral cognitivism, appraiser internalism about moral judgments and motivation, and a “Humean” account of motivation. In Smith’s formulation, these become: 1. Moral judgements of the form, ‘It is right that I φ’ express a subject’s belief about an objective matter of fact, a fact about what it is right for (...)
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  • The Sources of Normativity.Christine Korsgaard - 1996 - Mind 106 (424):791-794.
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  • The Sources of Normativity.Christine M. Korsgaard - 1996 - Philosophical Quarterly 49 (196):384-394.
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  • Moral Realism and the Foundations of Ethics.David O. BRINK - 1989 - Ethics 101 (3):610-624.
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  • Moral Realism and the Foundations of Ethics.David O. BRINK - 1989 - Noûs 28 (1):122-127.
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  • Unfit for the Future: The Need for Moral Enhancement.Ingmar Persson & Julian Savulescu - 2012 - Oxford University Press UK.
    Unfit for the Future argues that the future of our species depends on radical enhancement of the moral aspects of our nature. Population growth and technological advances are threatening to undermine the conditions of worthwhile life on earth forever. We need to modify the biological bases of human motivation to deal with this challenge.
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  • Moral Explanations.Nicholas Sturgeon - 1997 - In James Rachels (ed.), Ethical Theory 1: The Question of Objectivity. Oxford University Press.
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  • Assertion.P. T. Geach - 1965 - Philosophical Review 74 (4):449-465.
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  • Wise Choices, Apt Feelings: A Theory of Normative Judgment.Allan Gibbard - 1990 - Harvard University Press.
    This book examines some of the deepest questions in philosophy: What is involved in judging a belief, action, or feeling to be rational?
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  • Nondescriptivist Cognitivism: Framework for a New Metaethic.Terry Horgan & Mark Timmons - 2000 - Philosophical Papers 29 (2):121-153.
    Abstract We propose a metaethical view that combines the cognitivist idea that moral judgments are genuine beliefs and moral utterances express genuine assertions with the idea that such beliefs and utterances are nondescriptive in their overall content. This sort of view has not been recognized among the standard metaethical options because it is generally assumed that all genuine beliefs and assertions must have descriptive content. We challenge this assumption and thereby open up conceptual space for a new kind of metaethical (...)
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  • Metaethics and Normative Commitment.James Dreier - 2002 - Philosophical Issues 12 (1):241-263.
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  • The Emotional Construction of Morals.Jesse Prinz - 2007 - Oxford University Press.
    Jesse Prinz argues that recent work in philosophy, neuroscience, and anthropology supports two radical hypotheses about the nature of morality: moral values are based on emotional responses, and these emotional responses are inculcated by culture, not hard-wired through natural selection. In the first half of the book, Jesse Prinz defends the hypothesis that morality has an emotional foundation. Evidence from brain imaging, social psychology, and psychopathology suggest that, when we judge something to be right or wrong, we are merely expressing (...)
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  • Consciousness Science: Real Progress and Lingering Misconceptions.Ned Block, David Carmel, Stephen M. Fleming, Robert W. Kentridge, Christof Koch, Victor A. F. Lamme, Hakwan Lau & David Rosenthal - 2014 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 18 (11):556-557.
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  • Meta-Ethics and Normative Commitment.James Dreier - 2002 - Philosophical Issues 12 (1):241-263.
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  • Mapping Moral Motivation.Eve Garrard & David McNaughton - 1998 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 1 (1):45-59.
    In this paper we defend a version of moral internalism and a cognitivist account of motivation against recent criticisms. The internalist thesis we espouse claims that, if an agent believes she has reason to A, then she is motivated to A. Discussion of counter-examples has been clouded by the absence of a clear account of the nature of motivation. While we can only begin to provide such an account in this paper, we do enough to show that our version of (...)
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  • Are Ethical Judgments Intrinsically Motivational? Lessons From "Acquired Sociopathy".Adina Roskies - 2003 - Philosophical Psychology 16 (1):51 – 66.
    Metaethical questions are typically held to be a priori , and therefore impervious to empirical evidence. Here I examine the metaethical claim that motive-internalism about belief , the position that moral beliefs are intrinsically motivating, is true. I argue that belief-internalists are faced with a dilemma. Either their formulation of internalism is so weak that it fails to be philosophically interesting, or it is a substantive claim but can be shown to be empirically false. I then provide evidence for the (...)
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  • Ecumenical Expressivism: Finessing Frege.Michael Ridge - 2006 - Ethics 116 (2):302-336.
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  • Wise Choices, Apt Feelings: A Theory of Normative Judgment.Arthur Ripstein & Allan Gibbard - 1992 - Philosophical Review 101 (4):934.
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  • Objectivity and Truth: You'd Better Believe It.Ronald Dworkin - 1996 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 25 (2):87-139.
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  • Externalist Moral Realism.David O. Brink - 1986 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 24 (S1):23-41.
    SOME THINK THAT MORAL REALISTS CANNOT RECOGNIZE THE PRACTICAL OR ACTION-GUIDING CHARACTER OF MORALITY AND SO REJECT MORAL REALISM. THIS FORM OF ANTI-REALISM DEPENDS UPON AN INTERNALIST MORAL PSYCHOLOGY. BUT AN EXTERNALIST MORAL PSYCHOLOGY IS MORE PLAUSIBLE AND ALLOWS THE REALIST A SENSIBLE EXPLANATION OF THE ACTION-GUIDING CHARACTER OF MORALITY. CONSIDERATION OF THE PRACTICAL CHARACTER OF MORALITY, THEREFORE, DOES NOT UNDERMINE AND, INDEED, SUPPORTS MORAL REALISM.
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  • Harman on Moral Explanations of Natural Facts.Nicholas L. Sturgeon - 1986 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 24 (S1):69-78.
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  • The Emotional Construction of Morals.Jesse Prinz - 2009 - Analysis 69 (4):701-704.
    The Emotional Construction of Morals is a book about moral judgements – the kinds of mental states we might express by sentences such as, ‘It's bad to flash your neighbors’, or ‘You ought not eat your pets’. There are three basic questions that get addressed: what are the psychological states that constitute such judgements? What kinds of properties do such judgements refer to? And, where do these judgements come from? The first question concerns moral psychology, the second metaethics and the (...)
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  • The Language of Morals.R. M. Hare - 1971 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 36 (1):180-181.
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  • The Myth of Morality.Richard Joyce - 2001 - Mind 113 (452):760-763.
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  • Is Metaethics Morally Neutral?Jeremy Fantl - 2006 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 87 (1):24–44.
    I argue, contra Dreier, Blackburn, and others, that there are no morally neutral metaethical positions. Every metaethical position commits you to the denial of some moral statement. So, for example, the metaethical position that there are no moral properties commits you to the denial of the moral conjunction of 1) it is right to interfere violently when someone is wrongly causing massive suffering and 2) it is wrong to interfere violently when only non-moral properties are at stake. The argument generalizes (...)
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  • Archimedean Metaethics Defended.Kenneth M. Ehrenberg - 2008 - Metaphilosophy 39 (4-5):508-529.
    Abstract: We sometimes say our moral claims are "objectively true," or are "right, even if nobody believes it." These additional claims are often taken to be staking out metaethical positions, representative of a certain kind of theorizing about morality that "steps outside" the practice in order to comment on its status. Ronald Dworkin has argued that skepticism about these claims so understood is not tenable because it is impossible to step outside such practices. I show that externally skeptical metaethical theory (...)
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