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There must be encapsulated nonconceptual content in vision.Vincent C. Müller - 2005 - In Athanassios Raftopoulos (ed.), Cognitive Penetrabiity of Perception: Attention, Strategies and Bottom-Up Constraints. New York: Nova Science. pp. 157-170.details
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Representation in digital systems.Vincent C. Müller - 2008 - In P. Brey, A. Briggle & K. Waelbers (eds.), Current Issues in Computing and Philosophy. IOS Press. pp. 116-121.details
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The Universal Computer. The Road from Leibniz to Turing.Martin Davis - 2001 - Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 7 (1):65-66.details
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The symbol grounding problem has been solved. so what's next.Luc Steels - 2008 - In Manuel de Vega, Arthur M. Glenberg & Arthur C. Graesser (eds.), Symbols and embodiment: debates on meaning and cognition. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 223--244.details
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Computers Ltd: What They Really Can't Do.David Harel - 2003 - Oxford University Press.details
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What Might Cognition Be, If Not Computation?Tim Van Gelder - 1995 - Journal of Philosophy 92 (7):345 - 381.details
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Functionalism at Forty.Paul M. Churchland - 2005 - Journal of Philosophy 102 (1):33-50.details
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(1 other version)Reason, truth, and history.Hilary Putnam - 1981 - New York: Cambridge University Press.details
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Solving the symbol grounding problem: a critical review of fifteen years of research.Mariarosaria Taddeo & Luciano Floridi - unknowndetails
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Computational modeling vs. computational explanation: Is everything a Turing machine, and does it matter to the philosophy of mind?Gualtiero Piccinini - 2007 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 85 (1):93 – 115.details
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A computational foundation for the study of cognition.David Chalmers - 2011 - Journal of Cognitive Science 12 (4):323-357.details
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Hypercomputation.B. Jack Copeland - 2002 - Minds and Machines 12 (4):461-502.details
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So how does the mind work?Steven Pinker - 2005 - Mind and Language 20 (1):1-38.details
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Reply to Steven Pinker So How Does the Mind Work?.Jerry Fodor - 2005 - Mind and Language 20 (1):25-32.details
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Artificial Intelligence: The Very Idea.John Haugeland - 1985 - Cambridge: MIT Press.details
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Computation without representation.Gualtiero Piccinini - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 137 (2):205-241.details
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Syntax, semantics, physics.John Haugeland - 2002 - In John Mark Bishop & John Preston (eds.), Views Into the Chinese Room: New Essays on Searle and Artificial Intelligence. London: Oxford University Press.details
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The broad conception of computation.Jack Copeland - 1997 - American Behavioral Scientist 40 (6):690-716.details
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The Mind Doesn’T Work That Way: The Scope and Limits of Computational Psychology.Jerry A. Fodor - 2000 - MIT Press.details
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Two concepts of "form" and the so-called computational theory of mind.John-Michael Kuczynski - 2006 - Philosophical Psychology 19 (6):795-821.details
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On the proper treatment of connectionism.Paul Smolensky - 1988 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 11 (1):1-23.details
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Is there a future for AI without representation?Vincent C. Müller - 2007 - Minds and Machines 17 (1):101-115.details
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(1 other version)The symbol grounding problem.Stevan Harnad - 1990 - Physica D 42:335-346.details
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Views Into the Chinese Room: New Essays on Searle and Artificial Intelligence.John Mark Bishop & John Preston (eds.) - 2002 - London: Oxford University Press.details
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Searle's misunderstandings of functionalism and strong AI.Georges Rey - 2002 - In John Mark Bishop & John Preston (eds.), Views Into the Chinese Room: New Essays on Searle and Artificial Intelligence. London: Oxford University Press. pp. 201--225.details
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(1 other version)Minds, brains, and programs.John Searle - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (3):417-57.details
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Nixin' goes to china.Larry Hauser - 2002 - In John Mark Bishop & John Preston (eds.), Views Into the Chinese Room: New Essays on Searle and Artificial Intelligence. London: Oxford University Press. pp. 123--143.details
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Defending realism on the proper ground.Athanassios Raftopoulos - 2006 - Philosophical Psychology 19 (1):47-77.details
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The phenomenal content of experience.Athanassios Raftopoulos & Vincent C. Müller - 2006 - Mind and Language 21 (2):187-219.details
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Nonconceptual demonstrative reference.Athanassius Raftopoulos & Vincent Muller - 2006 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 72 (2):251-285.details
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(1 other version)The Elm and the Expert: Mentalese and Its Semantics.Jerry A. Fodor - 1994 - MIT Press.details
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(1 other version)Having concepts: A brief refutation of the twentieth century.Jerry Fodor - 2004 - Mind and Language 19 (1):29-47.details
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Concepts: Where Cognitive Science Went Wrong.Jerry A. Fodor - 1998 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.details
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Skepticism about rules and intentionalilty.John R. Searle - 2002 - In Consciousness and Language. New York: Cambridge University Press.details
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Computation, external factors, and cognitive explanations.Amir Horowitz - 2007 - Philosophical Psychology 20 (1):65-80.details
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(1 other version)The mind-body problem.Jerry Fodor - 1981 - Scientific American 244 (1):114-25.details
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(1 other version)The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory (2nd edition).David J. Chalmers - 1996 - Oxford University Press.details
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(1 other version)The Mind-Body Problem.Jerry Fodor - 2003 - In John Heil (ed.), Philosophy of Mind: A Guide and Anthology. New York: Oxford University Press.details
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(1 other version)Minds, Brains, and Programs.John Searle - 2003 - In John Heil (ed.), Philosophy of Mind: A Guide and Anthology. New York: Oxford University Press.details
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(1 other version)Philosophy of Mind.Jaegwon Kim - 1996 - Philosophy 72 (280):317-320.details
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(1 other version)Reason, Truth and History.Hilary Putnam - 1981 - New York: Cambridge University Press.details
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(1 other version)The Elm and the Expert: Mentalese and its Semantics.Jerry A. Fodor - 1995 - MIT Press.details
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Two dogmas of computationalism.Oron Shagrir - 1997 - Minds and Machines 7 (3):321-44.details
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Godel, Escher, Bach: An Eternal Golden Braid.Douglas Richard Hofstadter - 1979 - Hassocks, England: Basic Books.details
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(1 other version)Reason, Truth and History.Kathleen Okruhlik - 1984 - Philosophy of Science 51 (4):692-694.details
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(2 other versions)Why there isn't a ready-made world.Hilary Putnam - 1982 - Synthese 51 (2):205--228.details
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