Review of Westerlund, F.. Heidegger and the Problem of Phenomena. London: Bloomsbury.

Автор статті розглядає умови і принципи майбутнього українського перекладу «Буття і часу» М. Гайдеґера. Спочатку він визначає принципи слушного перекладу взагалі, а потім висловлює свої міркування щодо перекладу «Буття і часу» на цих принципах. Головний принцип слушного перекладу окреслений як еквівалентність перекладу. У статті йому протиставлено принцип адекватности перекладу. Для роз’яснення умов еквівалентности перекладу «Буття і часу» автор звертається до деяких основних понять цього твору. Серед іншого в статті обґрунтовується те, чому Гайдеґерове поняття Dasein слід перекладати як «єство», а поняття (...) Angst – як «тривогу». (shrink)

In this study, we wanted to show that plunging into the depths of modern consciousness allows us to discover a new fundamental measurement of consciousness associated with compaction of time. More precisely, we seek to identify the possibility of compaction of time in the consciousness under certain conditions, by analogy with how time is fundamentally transformed in space. We are trying to understand how, through modern existential and phenomenological as well as natural science methods, primarily on the way of interpreting (...) Heidegger’s destruction, one can rethink the essence of the fundamental dimension of consciousness related to institutionalization of time. In other words, the analysis results offer an opportunity to state that the new dimension reveals another fundamental property of consciousness. In this dimension, not only time is split, which had an objective effect on the classic understanding of the world view. The intention of time is also split, which manifests itself in transretention, transcendention and transprotention. (shrink)

It is clear that we have to do something in our time concerning global warming yet before we can actually change the world, we must first understand our world. According to Heidegger, technology itself is not good or bad, but the problem is, that technological thinking (calculative thinking) has become the only form of thinking. Heidegger saw that the essence of technology nowadays is enframing – Ge-stell, which means that everything in nature is ‘standing-reserve’ (Bestand). Enframing (as apparatus) is one (...) way of uncovering, which for Heidegger meant truth. Truth can appear in many ways and the danger is that this truth of representational-calculative thinking becomes the only truth. We claim that the calculative way of thinking must be changed and we posit that Gelassenheit (slow thinking, releasement, letting-go) is the remedy. It does not mean some kind of mysticism or irrationality. The notion of Gelassenheit includes the idea of to let learn. We as teachers and educators have to learn how to think outside of the technological ‘Ge-stell’ and start thinking and acting in radically new ways. Like Arne Naes and Michael Zimmerman we connect the overcoming of technological ‘Ge-stell’ with so called deep ecology. We have to ‘learn to think’ and act within the deep ecology. We call for an educational ecological imperative. Every teacher and educationalist has to think what they can do (not as private person but as professionals) in order to prevent the coming eco-catastrophe. (shrink)

Review of Westerlund, F.. Heidegger and the Problem of Phenomena. London: Bloomsbury.

Review of: Sorin Baiasu and Alberto Vanzo, Kant and the Continental Tradition: Sensibility, Nature and Religion. Milton, Routledge, 2020, 255 pp. 978- 1138503748.

Heidegger’s reading of Plato is variable and multifaceted, giving way to different and, at times, opposing interpretations of Plato’s work. To give an example that is relevant to the following pape...

Wittgenstein’s and Heidegger’s objections against the possibility of a science of aesthetics were influential on different sides of the analytic/continental divide. Heidegger’s anti-scientism leads him to an alētheic view of artworks which precedes and exceeds any possible aesthetic reduction. Wittgenstein also rejects the relevance of causal explanations, psychological or physiological, to aesthetic questions. The main aim of this paper is to compare Heidegger with Wittgenstein, showing that: there are significant parallels to be drawn between Wittgenstein’s and Heidegger’s anti-scientism about aesthetics, (...) and that their anti-scientism leads both towards partly divergent criticisms of what I will call ‘aestheticism’. The divergence is mainly due to a broader metaphilosophical disagreement concerning appeals to ordinary language. Thus situating the two philosophers’ positions facilitates a possible critical dialogue between analytic and continental approaches in aesthetics. (shrink)

Volume 28, Issue 3, July 2020, Page 313-316.

Martin Heidegger devotes extensive discussion to medieval philosophers, particularly to their treatment of Truth and Being. On both these topics, Heidegger accuses them of forgetting the question of Being and of being responsible for subjugating truth to the modern crusade for certainty: ‘truth is denied its own mode of being’ and is subordinated ‘to an intellect that judges correctly’. Though there are some studies that discuss Heidegger’s debt to and criticism of medieval thought, particularly that of Thomas Aquinas, there is (...) no constructive reply to his assertions. As a result, Heidegger’s critique had an unprecedented effect on the credibility of medieval philosophy, whereby great portions of the philosophical community dismiss it altogether as an illegitimate Onto‐Theology. It is the aim of this study to offer a constructive reply that will fundamentally grapple with these allegations. By constructive reply we mean not only a reply that avoids the problems Heidegger raises regarding existence, essence and truth, but more importantly, one that uses Heidegger’s criticism in order to present a more insightful account of these notions. The present study is composed of two parts where the second serves as a sort of addendum. The first part, the core of this study, is an attempt to develop an understanding of the distinction between essence and existence that, on the one hand, accords with Heidegger’s criticism while on the other hand advances our understanding of how we think and understand reality. After presenting Heidegger’s depiction of Aquinas’s distinction between essence and existence (esse) as a real distinction, the study will present several views propounded by scholars of Aquinas regarding the status of this distinction. It will be argued that it is not clear whether the distinction is real, formal or conceptual, and that different types of distinction are applied in different places, particularly in regard to the phantasm that Aquinas considers essential to the human act of thinking. The second part diverges from the first part and focuses on Heidegger’s criticism of Aquinas’s conception of truth as adequation, i.e., what it is that grounds the possibility of truth as adequation. This divergence is necessary in order to present a full metaphysical response to Heidegger’s criticism. Since the aim of the present study is to argue that Aquinas’s philosophical system can contend with Heidegger’s criticism, a partial reply would greatly diminish its effectiveness. (shrink)

This article is dedicated to 130th Anniversary of German thinker Martin Heidegger. The main goal of the article is to develop Ukrainian reception of Heidegger’s philosophical heritage. The author considers the particularities of Heidegger’s understanding of thinking in the context of Dasein’s fundamental ontology. Thus, thinking is understood as being in a "tradition without tradition"; this, in turn, means the immediacy of thinking, which will never be past, never become a memory or a system of memories (beliefs). The element of (...) thinking is the element of spontaneity, that is, of voluntaries: it is impossible to "develop" thinking or "teach" to think meaningfully, because it is a voluntary affair. The voluntary cause of meaningful thinking reveals the truth (unconcealedness) of being. The author considers the scenario of falling now-being into its non-existent existence, interpreting it in Heidegger's terminology as a state of "forgetting of being". This status is updated if it is transformed into a "techno-technological" object, which must act on certain algorithms and provide "development" or "progress" metrics. The author develops the thesis that Dasein’s fundamental ontology of Heidegger reveals its condition as being-between. Being-between is not anthropological, but ontological category. The world of Dasein is everydayness between the birth and the death. The very being-between of Dasein induces its meaningful thinking. Following Heidegger, the author states that Dasein, that is lost in being-between, becomes centered (by subject) which pointlessly deploys power under the being. Therefore, in this context of Heidegger’s understanding of thinking the author also interprets the causes of such pointless existence of Dasein and its consequences. According to the author, now-being can save only reflection. (shrink)

The article explores specificities of thematization of science and scientific rationality in Martin Heidegger’s fundamental ontology. This analysis focuses on the concept of scienticity, character- istic for Heidegger’s “early” line of thought, as well as continuation and divergence of exposition of “science” and the nature of “theoretical attitude” as the subject of interpretation of transcen- dental phenomenology of E. Husserl. This research places an emphasis on particularity of Hei- degger’s explication of existential concept of science as opposed to prevailing logico-epistemolog- (...) ical philosophy of science, and foundation of thematization of scientific “subject matters” and theoretical attitude upon the universe of ontological understanding of being of entities (regional ontologies). It also focuses on Heidegger’s assertion of fundamental ontological projection in a status of a peculiar “science of knowledge”, which gives ground for a priori pre-conditions of specific sciences. Separate attention is paid to a specifically Heideggerian approach to explication of the rooting of initial scientific orientation in the sphere of pre-scientific experience, which ar- ticulates itself in so called “fundamental concepts”, as well as positioning of contemplative ‘present-at-hand’ paradigm of theoretical knowledge as a derivative modus of a primary use of ‘ready-to-handness’ as a phenomenological founding basis of everydayness’ experience. The author came to the attention that scientific knowledge is a project Dasein. It is within the framework of self-design that Dasein thematizes what happens to another region of being that is the subject of scientific knowledge. In other words, making things available in researching, applying themes, provided that the design allowed late as the systematic development of the most modern buildings, such as is done in the world, and possibly everyday greeting improvised performance. (shrink)

In this article, I respond to important questions raised by Gallagher and Jacobson in the field of cognitive science about face-to-face interactions in Heidegger’s account of ‘intersubjectivity’ in Being and Time. They have criticized his account for a lack of attention to primary intersubjectivity, or immediate, face-to-face interactions; he favours, they argue, embodied interactions via objects. I argue that the same assumption underlies their argument as did earlier critiques of a lack of an account of the body in Heidegger ; (...) namely that because the body is not explicitly discussed in Being and Time, embodiment, rather than stressing the immediacy of experience, is insufficiently acknowledged in his emphasis on ‘being-in-the-world’. Through placing Gallagher and Jacobson’s accounts of intersubjectivity and the body alongside Heidegger’s accounts of Mitsein and Leib, this article shows Heidegger’s radical position on the body as immersed in a holistic environment, and its reverberations on his account of intersubjectivity. I argue that Dasein’s embodied engagement in the world is always one of immediacy and that the body of the other is perceived as ‘tied into’ its context, as well. In so doing, I offer an Heideggerian account of ecstatic involvement which moves away from the distinction between primary and secondary intersubjectivity toward an immediate engagement with objects and people always already ‘tied into’ a context; an account that, through the concept of Fürsorge, includes shifts of attention between objects and people that allow for the ethical distinctions Gallagher and Jacobson are looking for. (shrink)

Question about the essence of thought itself may be formulated in two ways: is it a manifestation of the existential presence or a habit to considerate a Universe as a representation of its rational core? Among various methods of inquiry of essential nature of thought, I would emphasize a Martin Heidegger’s approach, which was represented in his late papers. I mean, widely accepted in oriental culture but almost forgotten in European intellectual tradition approach which considers thought as luminous and light-bearing (...) logos – the fundamental origin and principle of the Universe. The problem of logos appearance in primordial chaos and discovery of the thought origins, on Heidegger’s opinion, becomes the crucial matter of his “fundamental ontology”. Heidegger is confident that the problem of transformation of primordial chaos into well-ordered Universe was the most significant topic which the ancient philosophers were focused on. My research, represented in this article, discovers European philosopher’s acceptation and reception of the ancient interpretation of primordial thought as a “divine light”. My conclusion is that all classical European philosophical ontological theories may be considered as the different varieties of interpretation of the primordial luminous thinking itself and became a simulation of the primordial nature of thought. Another conclusion is, that origins of mentioned above ancient philosophical inquiries on the divine-light essence of primordial thinking, may be found in earlier, than Heidegger thinks, texts composed by Homer, Hesiod, and perhaps even in the religious philosophical texts of the Orient heritage, created before the sixth century BC. (shrink)

Purpose. The purpose of research consists in that: having plunged into depths of primitive consciousness, to reveal contradiction of the European thought in Ancient Greek thought and show resources of mythological thinking on the way of overcoming of these contradictions. Methodology. All methodological installations, using possibilities, borderlines and effects of non-classical consciousness, have appeared insufficiently effective for adequate understanding of essence of the person. The generalised method, which is used by us, leans on deep resources of high-energy consciousness and on (...) decoding of possibilities of anthropological time that it presumes to open new horizons of human existence. Originality.Addressing to modern representations about the changed conditions of consciousness, we have tried to see the historically generated discursive practices of understanding reality by the consciousness. Thus, using the consistently conducted destruction we are aimed at reaching the first sources of consciousness and revealing the deep historical mechanisms of temporal consciousnesses formation. Conclusions. It is shown that the use of the basic ideas of Ancient Greek thought leads scientific consciousness to deadlocks of contradictions, which were consistently revealed during subsequent history of philosophy and culture. The analysis of ancient mythological texts allows concluding, that the Greek thought is not a source of modern scientific thought. That is to understand the scientific thought one should address to the more ancient archaic thinking. Thus, to overcome the contradictions of modern scientific and philosophical thought it is necessary to search new alternative sources of understanding of the historical reality, first of all, connected with deepening into ancient thought. (shrink)