Switch to: Citations

References in:

Know-How and Gradability

Philosophical Review 126 (3):345-383 (2017)

Add references

You must login to add references.
  1. (1 other version)Knowledge‐How and Epistemic Luck.J. Adam Carter & Duncan Pritchard - 2013 - Noûs 49 (3):440-453.
    Reductive intellectualists hold that knowledge-how is a kind of knowledge-that. For this thesis to hold water, it is obviously important that knowledge-how and knowledge-that have the same epistemic properties. In particular, knowledge-how ought to be compatible with epistemic luck to the same extent as knowledge-that. It is argued, contra reductive intellectualism, that knowledge-how is compatible with a species of epistemic luck which is not compatible with knowledge-that, and thus it is claimed that knowledge-how and knowledge-that come apart.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   68 citations  
  • Word and Object.Willard Van Orman Quine - 1960 - Les Etudes Philosophiques 17 (2):278-279.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2836 citations  
  • (1 other version)Review of S cience Without Numbers: A Defense of Nominalism. [REVIEW]David Malament - 1982 - Journal of Philosophy 79 (9):523-534.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   66 citations  
  • Science without numbers, A Defence of Nominalism.Hartry Field - 1980 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 171 (4):502-503.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   167 citations  
  • (1 other version)The Concept of Mind.Gilbert Ryle - 1949 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 141:125-126.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2257 citations  
  • (1 other version)The Concept of Mind.Gilbert Ryle - 1950 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 1 (4):328-332.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1186 citations  
  • (1 other version)The Problems of Philosophy.Bertrand Russell - 1912 - Mind 21 (84):556-564.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   788 citations  
  • Knowledge and Practical Interests.Jason Stanley - 2006 - Critica 38 (114):98-107.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   636 citations  
  • A Theory of Practical Meaning.Carlotta Pavese - 2017 - Philosophical Topics 45 (2):65-96.
    This essay is divided into two parts. In the first part (§2), I introduce the idea of practical meaning by looking at a certain kind of procedural systems — the motor system — that play a central role in computational explanations of motor behavior. I argue that in order to give a satisfactory account of the content of the representations computed by motor systems (motor commands), we need to appeal to a distinctively practical kind of meaning. Defending the explanatory relevance (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   20 citations  
  • (1 other version)Mathematics without Numbers: Towards a Modal-Structural Interpretation.Bob Hale & Geoffrey Hellman - 1992 - Philosophical Review 101 (4):919.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   96 citations  
  • Color, context, and compositionality.Christopher Kennedy & Louise Mcnally - 2010 - Synthese 174 (1):79-98.
    Color adjectives have played a central role in work on language typology and variation, but there has been relatively little investigation of their meanings by researchers in formal semantics. This is surprising given the fact that color terms have been at the center of debates in the philosophy of language over foundational questions, in particular whether the idea of a compositional, truth-conditional theory of natural language semantics is even coherent. The challenge presented by color terms is articulated in detail in (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   49 citations  
  • (2 other versions)Knowing full well: the normativity of beliefs as performances.Ernest Sosa - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 142 (1):5-15.
    Belief is considered a kind of performance, which attains one level of success if it is true (or accurate), a second level if competent (or adroit), and a third if true because competent (or apt). Knowledge on one level (the animal level) is apt belief. The epistemic normativity constitutive of such knowledge is thus a kind of performance normativity. A problem is posed for this account by the fact that suspension of belief seems to fall under the same sort of (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   25 citations  
  • Practical Senses.Carlotta Pavese - 2015 - Philosophers' Imprint 15.
    In their theories of know how, proponents of Intellectualism routinely appeal to ‘practical modes of presentation’. But what are practical modes of presentation? And what makes them distinctively practical? In this essay, I develop a Fregean account of practical modes of presentation: I argue that there are such things as practical senses and I give a theory of what they are. One of the challenges facing the proponent of a distinctively Fregean construal of practical modes of presentation is to provide (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   95 citations  
  • (3 other versions)The Problems of Philosophy.Bertrand Russell - 1912 - Portland, OR: Home University Library.
    Bertrand Russell was one of the greatest logicians since Aristotle, and one of the most important philosophers of the past two hundred years. As we approach the 125th anniversary of the Nobel laureate's birth, his works continue to spark debate, resounding with unmatched timeliness and power. The Problems of Philosophy, one of the most popular works in Russell's prolific collection of writings, has become core reading in philosophy. Clear and accessible, this little book is an intelligible and stimulating guide to (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   414 citations  
  • Introduction to *Aboutness*.Stephen Yablo - 2014 - In Aboutness. Oxford: Princeton University Press. pp. 1-6.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   108 citations  
  • Aboutness.Stephen Yablo - 2014 - Oxford: Princeton University Press.
    Aboutness has been studied from any number of angles. Brentano made it the defining feature of the mental. Phenomenologists try to pin down the aboutness-features of particular mental states. Materialists sometimes claim to have grounded aboutness in natural regularities. Attempts have even been made, in library science and information theory, to operationalize the notion. But it has played no real role in philosophical semantics. This is surprising; sentences have aboutness-properties if anything does. Aboutness is the first book to examine through (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   246 citations  
  • 16. Utilitarianism and Bureaucracy: The Views of J. S. Mill.Alan Ryan - 2012 - In The Making of Modern Liberalism. Princeton University Press. pp. 326-345.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • Ryle's Knowing how and knowing how to act.Jennifer Hornsby - 2011 - In John Bengson & Marc A. Moffett (eds.), Knowing How: Essays on Knowledge, Mind, and Action. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press USA. pp. 80.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   35 citations  
  • Knowledge Ascription by Grammatical Construction.Laura A. Michaelis - 2011 - In John Bengson & Marc A. Moffett (eds.), Knowing How: Essays on Knowledge, Mind, and Action. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press USA. pp. 261.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   12 citations  
  • Knowing How.Kieran Setiya - 2012 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 112 (3pt3):285-307.
    Argues from the possibility of basic intentional action to a non-propositional theory of knowing how. The argument supports a broadly Anscombean conception of the will as a capacity for practical knowledge.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   71 citations  
  • Against intellectualism.Alva Noë - 2005 - Analysis 65 (4):278-290.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   168 citations  
  • Knowing How.Jason Stanley & Timothy Willlamson - 2001 - Journal of Philosophy 98 (8):411-444.
    Many philosophers believe that there is a fundamental distinction between knowing that something is the case and knowing how to do something. According to Gilbert Ryle, to whom the insight is credited, knowledge-how is an ability, which is in turn a complex of dispositions. Knowledge-that, on the other hand, is not an ability, or anything similar. Rather, knowledge-that is a relation between a thinker and a true proposition.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   493 citations  
  • (1 other version)Interrogatives and Adverbs of Quantification.Jeroen Groenendijk & Martin Stokhof - 1993 - In Katalin Bimbó & Andras Maté (eds.), Proceedings of the Fourth Symposium on Logic and Language. Budapest: Aran Publishers. pp. 1-29.
    This paper is about a topic in the semantics of interrogatives.1 In what follows a number of assumptions figure at the background which, though intuitively appealing, have not gone unchallenged, and it seems therefore only fair to draw the reader’s attention to them at the outset. The first assumption concerns a very global intuition about the kind of semantic objects that we associate with interrogatives. The intuition is that there is an intimate relationship between interrogatives and their answers: an interrogative (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   11 citations  
  • Success and Knowledge-How.Katherine Hawley - 2003 - American Philosophical Quarterly 40 (1):19 - 31.
    In this paper, I argue that there is a notion of 'counterfactual success' which stands to knowledge how as true belief stands to propositional knowledge. (I attempt to avoid the question of whether knowledge how is a type of propositional knowledge.).
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   138 citations  
  • Know How.Jason Stanley - 2011 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
    Chapter 1: Ryle on Knowing How Chapter 2: Knowledge-wh Chapter 3: PRO and the Representation of First-Person Thought Chapter 4: Ways of Thinking Chapter 5: Knowledge How Chapter 6: Ascribing Knowledge How Chapter 7: The Cognitive Science of Practical Knowledge Chapter 8: Knowledge Justified Preface A fact, as I shall use the term, is a true proposition. A proposition is the sort of thing that is capable of being believed or asserted. A proposition is also something that is characteristically the (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   120 citations  
  • Relevant implication.David Lewis - 1988 - Theoria 54 (3):161-174.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   147 citations  
  • Science Without Numbers: A Defence of Nominalism.Hartry H. Field - 1980 - Princeton, NJ, USA: Princeton University Press.
    Science Without Numbers caused a stir in 1980, with its bold nominalist approach to the philosophy of mathematics and science. It has been unavailable for twenty years and is now reissued in a revised edition with a substantial new preface presenting the author's current views and responses to the issues raised in subsequent debate.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   559 citations  
  • Mathematics Without Numbers: Towards a Modal-Structural Interpretation.Geoffrey Hellman - 1989 - Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.
    Develops a structuralist understanding of mathematics, as an alternative to set- or type-theoretic foundations, that respects classical mathematical truth while ...
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   263 citations  
  • (1 other version)Word and Object.Willard Van Orman Quine - 1960 - Cambridge, MA, USA: MIT Press.
    In the course of the discussion, Professor Quine pinpoints the difficulties involved in translation, brings to light the anomalies and conflicts implicit in our ...
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2637 citations  
  • Knowledge and practical interests.Jason Stanley - 2005 - New York: Oxford University Press.
    Jason Stanley presents a startling and provocative claim about knowledge: that whether or not someone knows a proposition at a given time is in part determined by his or her practical interests, i.e. by how much is at stake for that person at that time. In defending this thesis, Stanley introduces readers to a number of strategies for resolving philosophical paradox, making the book essential not just for specialists in epistemology but for all philosophers interested in philosophical methodology. Since a (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   749 citations  
  • (3 other versions)The problems of philosophy.Bertrand Russell - 1912 - New York: Barnes & Noble.
    Immensely intelligible, thought-provoking guide by Nobel prize-winner considers such topics as the distinction between appearance and reality, the existence and nature of matter, idealism, inductive logic, intuitive knowledge, many other subjects. For students and general readers, there is no finer introduction to philosophy than this informative, affordable and highly readable edition that is "concise, free from technical terms, and perfectly clear to the general reader with no prior knowledge of the subject."—The Booklist of the American Library Association.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   548 citations  
  • (1 other version)On Denoting.Bertrand Russell - 2005 - Mind 114 (456):873 - 887.
    By a `denoting phrase' I mean a phrase such as any one of the following: a man, some man, any man, every man, all men, the present King of England, the present King of France, the center of mass of the solar system at the first instant of the twentieth century, the revolution of the earth round the sun, the revolution of the sun round the earth. Thus a phrase is denoting solely in virtue of its form. We may distinguish (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   667 citations  
  • Variabilism.Samuel Cumming - 2008 - Philosophical Review 117 (4):525-554.
    Variabilism is the view that proper names (like pronouns) are semantically represented as variables. Referential names, like referential pronouns, are assigned their referents by a contextual variable assignment (Kaplan 1989). The reference parameter (like the world of evaluation) may also be shifted by operators in the representation language. Indeed verbs that create hyperintensional contexts, like ‘think’, are treated as operators that simultaneously shift the world and assignment parameters. By contrast, metaphysical modal operators shift the world of assessment only. Names, being (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   69 citations  
  • Analysis.Michael Beaney - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Analysis has always been at the heart of philosophical method, but it has been understood and practised in many different ways. Perhaps, in its broadest sense, it might be defined as a process of isolating or working back to what is more fundamental by means of which something, initially taken as given, can be explained or reconstructed. The explanation or reconstruction is often then exhibited in a corresponding process of synthesis. This allows great variation in specific method, however. The aim (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   54 citations  
  • (1 other version)There are no abstract objects.Cian Dorr - 2008 - In Theodore Sider, John Hawthorne & Dean W. Zimmerman (eds.), Contemporary debates in metaphysics. Malden, MA: Blackwell.
    I explicate and defend the claim that, fundamentally speaking, there are no numbers, sets, properties or relations. The clarification consists in some remarks on the relevant sense of ‘fundamentally speaking’ and the contrasting sense of ‘superficially speaking’. The defence consists in an attempt to rebut two arguments for the existence of such entities. The first is a version of the indispensability argument, which purports to show that certain mathematical entities are required for good scientific explanations. The second is a speculative (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   75 citations  
  • (1 other version)On Denoting.Bertrand Russell - 1905 - Mind 14 (56):479-493.
    By a `denoting phrase' I mean a phrase such as any one of the following: a man, some man, any man, every man, all men, the present King of England, the present King of France, the center of mass of the solar system at the first instant of the twentieth century, the revolution of the earth round the sun, the revolution of the sun round the earth. Thus a phrase is denoting solely in virtue of its form. We may distinguish (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1245 citations  
  • The folk on knowing how.John Bengson, Marc A. Moffett & Jennifer C. Wright - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 142 (3):387–401.
    It has been claimed that the attempt to analyze know-how in terms of propositional knowledge over-intellectualizes the mind. Exploiting the methods of so-called “experimental philosophy”, we show that the charge of over-intellectualization is baseless. Contra neo-Ryleans, who analyze know-how in terms of ability, the concrete-case judgments of ordinary folk are most consistent with the view that there exists a set of correct necessary and sufficient conditions for know-how that does not invoke ability, but rather a certain sort of propositional knowledge. (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   67 citations  
  • (2 other versions)Mathematical truth.Paul Benacerraf - 1973 - Journal of Philosophy 70 (19):661-679.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   697 citations  
  • (3 other versions)What experience teaches.David K. Lewis - 1990 - In William G. Lycan (ed.), Mind and cognition: a reader. Cambridge, Mass., USA: Blackwell. pp. 29--57.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   203 citations  
  • On the Semantics of Questions and the Pragmatics of Answers.Jeroen Groenendijk & Martin Stokhof - 1984 - In Fred Landman & Frank Veltman (eds.), Varieties of Formal Semantics: Proceedings of the Fourth Amsterdam Colloquium. Foris. pp. 143--170.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   231 citations  
  • (2 other versions)Knowing full well: The normativity of beliefs as performances.Ernest Sosa - 2015 - Disputatio. Philosophical Research Bulletin 4 (5):81--94.
    [ES] La creencia es considerada como una especie de expresión, que alcanza un nivel de éxito si es verdadera, un segundo nivel si es competente, y un tercero si es verdadera por ser competente. El conocimiento a un nivel es una creencia apta. La normatividad epistémica que constituye tal conocimiento es, de esta manera, una especie de normatividad de la expresión. Un problema surge para esta explicación del hecho de que la suspensión de la creencia parece caer bajo la misma (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   16 citations  
  • Skill in epistemology II: Skill and know how.Carlotta Pavese - 2016 - Philosophy Compass 11 (11):650-660.
    The prequel to this paper has discussed the relation between knowledge and skill and introduced the topic of the relationship between skill and know how. This sequel continues the discussion. First, I survey the recent debate on intellectualism about knowing how (§1-3). Then, I tackle the question as to whether intellectualism (and anti-intellectualism) about skill and intellectualism (and anti-intellectualism) about know how fall or stand together (§4-5).
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   38 citations  
  • The Transmission of Skill.Will Small - 2014 - Philosophical Topics 42 (1):85-111.
    The ideas (i) that skill is a form of knowledge and (ii) that it can be taught are commonplace in both ancient philosophy and everyday life. I argue that contemporary epistemology lacks the resources to adequately accommodate them. Intellectualist and anti-intellectualist accounts of knowledge how struggle to represent the transmission of skill via teaching and learning (§II), in part because each adopts a fundamentally individualistic approach to the acquisition of skill that focuses on individual practice and experience; consequently, learning from (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   17 citations  
  • Doing without believing: Intellectualism, knowledge-how, and belief-attribution.Michael Brownstein & Eliot Michaelson - 2016 - Synthese 193 (9):2815–2836.
    We consider a range of cases—both hypothetical and actual—in which agents apparently know how to \ but fail to believe that the way in which they in fact \ is a way for them to \. These “no-belief” cases present a prima facie problem for Intellectualism about knowledge-how. The problem is this: if knowledge-that entails belief, and if knowing how to \ just is knowing that some w is a way for one to \, then an agent cannot both know (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   28 citations  
  • Index.Stephen Yablo - 2014 - In Aboutness. Oxford: Princeton University Press. pp. 219-222.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   99 citations  
  • Problems with intellectualism.Ellen Fridland - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 165 (3):879-891.
    In his most recent book, Stanley (2011b) defends his Intellectualist account of knowledge how. In Know How, Stanley produces the details of a propositionalist theory of intelligent action and also responds to several objections that have been forwarded to this account in the last decade. In this paper, I will focus specifically on one claim that Stanley makes in chapter one of his book: I will focus on Stanley’s claim that automatic mechanisms can be used by the intellectualist in order (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   47 citations  
  • Knowing How Without Knowing That.Yuri Cath - 2011 - In John Bengson & Marc A. Moffett (eds.), Knowing How: Essays on Knowledge, Mind, and Action. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press USA. pp. 113.
    In this paper I develop three different arguments against the thesis that knowledge-how is a kind of knowledge-that. Knowledge-that is widely thought to be subject to an anti-luck condition, a justified or warranted belief condition, and a belief condition, respectively. The arguments I give suggest that if either of these standard assumptions is correct then knowledge-how is not a kind of knowledge-that. In closing I identify a possible alternative to the standard Rylean and intellectualist accounts of knowledge-how. This alternative view (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   65 citations  
  • Adverbs of quantification.David K. Lewis - 1975 - In Edward Louis Keenan (ed.), Formal semantics of natural language: papers from a colloquium sponsored by the King's College Research Centre, Cambridge. New York: Cambridge University Press. pp. 3--15.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   282 citations  
  • Good knowledge, bad knowledge: on two dogmas of epistemology.Stephen Cade Hetherington - 2001 - New York: Oxford University Press.
    What is knowledge? How hard is it for a person to have knowledge? Good Knowledge, Bad Knowledge confronts contemporary philosophical attempts to answer those classic questions, offering a theory of knowledge that is unique in conceiving of knowledge in a non-absolutist way.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   75 citations  
  • (2 other versions)Knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge by description.Bertrand Russell - 1911 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 11:108--28.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   398 citations