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  1. Wigner’s Puzzle on Applicability of Mathematics: On What Table to Assemble It?Cătălin Bărboianu - 2020 - Axiomathes 30 (4):423-452.
    Attempts at solving what has been labeled as Eugene Wigner’s puzzle of applicability of mathematics are still far from arriving at an acceptable solution. The accounts developed to explain the “miracle” of applied mathematics vary in nature, foundation, and solution, from denying the existence of a genuine problem to designing structural theories based on mathematical formalism. Despite this variation, all investigations treated the problem in a unitary way with respect to the target, pointing to one or two ‘why’ or ‘how’ (...)
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  • Formal Semantics and Applied Mathematics: An Inferential Account.Ryan M. Nefdt - 2020 - Journal of Logic, Language and Information 29 (2):221-253.
    In this paper, I utilise the growing literature on scientific modelling to investigate the nature of formal semantics from the perspective of the philosophy of science. Specifically, I incorporate the inferential framework proposed by Bueno and Colyvan : 345–374, 2011) in the philosophy of applied mathematics to offer an account of how formal semantics explains and models its data. This view produces a picture of formal semantic models as involving an embedded process of inference and representation applying indirectly to linguistic (...)
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  • Can Metaphysical Structuralism Solve the Plurality Problem?Sophie R. Allen - 2018 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 26 (5):722-746.
    ABSTRACTMetaphysics has a problem with plurality: in many areas of discourse, there are too many good theories, rather than just one. This embarrassment of riches is a particular problem for metaphysical realists who want metaphysics to tell us the way the world is and for whom one theory is the correct one. A recent suggestion is that we can treat the different theories as being functionally or explanatorily equivalent to each other, even though they differ in content. The aim of (...)
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  • Hilbertian Structuralism and the Frege-Hilbert Controversy†.Fiona T. Doherty - 2019 - Philosophia Mathematica 27 (3):335-361.
    ABSTRACT This paper reveals David Hilbert’s position in the philosophy of mathematics, circa 1900, to be a form of non-eliminative structuralism, predating his formalism. I argue that Hilbert withstands the pressing objections put to him by Frege in the course of the Frege-Hilbert controversy in virtue of this early structuralist approach. To demonstrate that this historical position deserves contemporary attention I show that Hilbertian structuralism avoids a recent wave of objections against non-eliminative structuralists to the effect that they cannot distinguish (...)
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  • Pure Possibilities and Some Striking Scientific Discoveries.Amihud Gilead - 2014 - Foundations of Chemistry 16 (2):149-163.
    Regardless or independent of any actuality or actualization and exempt from spatiotemporal and causal conditions, each individual possibility is pure. Actualism excludes the existence of individual pure possibilities, altogether or at least as existing independently of actual reality. In this paper, I demonstrate, on the grounds of my possibilist metaphysics—panenmentalism—how some of the most fascinating scientific discoveries in chemistry could not have been accomplished without relying on pure possibilities and the ways in which they relate to each other . The (...)
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  • Indispensability and Explanation: An Overview and Introduction.Daniele Molinini, Fabrice Pataut & Andrea Sereni - 2016 - Synthese 193 (2):317-332.
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  • Conversational Exculpature.Daniel Hoek - 2018 - Philosophical Review 127 (2):151-196.
    Conversational exculpature is a pragmatic process whereby information is subtracted from, rather than added to, what the speaker literally says. This pragmatic content subtraction explains why we can say “Rob is six feet tall” without implying that Rob is between 5'0.99" and 6'0.01" tall, and why we can say “Ellen has a hat like the one Sherlock Holmes always wears” without implying Holmes exists or has a hat. This article presents a simple formalism for understanding this pragmatic mechanism, specifying how, (...)
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  • Shechtman’s Three Question Marks: Possibility, Impossibility, and Quasicrystals. [REVIEW]Amihud Gilead - 2013 - Foundations of Chemistry 15 (2):209-224.
    The revolutionary discovery of actual quasicrystals, thanks to Dan Shechtman’s stamina, is a golden opportunity to analyze once again the role that pure (“theoretical”) possibilities and saving them plays in scientific progress. Some theoreticians, primarily Alan Mackay, contributed to saving pure possibilities of quasicrystalline structures and to opening materials science for them. My analysis rests upon an original modal metaphysics—panenmentalism—which I introduced and have been developing since 1999, quite independently of any familiarity with modern crystallography, and which deals with saving (...)
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  • Set-Theoretic Pluralism and the Benacerraf Problem.Justin Clarke-Doane - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (7):2013-2030.
    Set-theoretic pluralism is an increasingly influential position in the philosophy of set theory (Balaguer [1998], Linksy and Zalta [1995], Hamkins [2012]). There is considerable room for debate about how best to formulate set-theoretic pluralism, and even about whether the view is coherent. But there is widespread agreement as to what there is to recommend the view (given that it can be formulated coherently). Unlike set-theoretic universalism, set-theoretic pluralism affords an answer to Benacerraf’s epistemological challenge. The purpose of this paper is (...)
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  • Frege, Dedekind, and the Modern Epistemology of Arithmetic.Markus Pantsar - 2016 - Acta Analytica 31 (3):297-318.
    In early analytic philosophy, one of the most central questions concerned the status of arithmetical objects. Frege argued against the popular conception that we arrive at natural numbers with a psychological process of abstraction. Instead, he wanted to show that arithmetical truths can be derived from the truths of logic, thus eliminating all psychological components. Meanwhile, Dedekind and Peano developed axiomatic systems of arithmetic. The differences between the logicist and axiomatic approaches turned out to be philosophical as well as mathematical. (...)
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  • Platonism and Aristotelianism in Mathematics.Richard Pettigrew - 2008 - Philosophia Mathematica 16 (3):310-332.
    Philosophers of mathematics agree that the only interpretation of arithmetic that takes that discourse at 'face value' is one on which the expressions 'N', '0', '1', '+', and 'x' are treated as proper names. I argue that the interpretation on which these expressions are treated as akin to free variables has an equal claim to be the default interpretation of arithmetic. I show that no purely syntactic test can distinguish proper names from free variables, and I observe that any semantic (...)
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  • Two Types of Abstraction for Structuralism.Øystein Linnebo & Richard Pettigrew - 2014 - Philosophical Quarterly 64 (255):267-283.
    If numbers were identified with any of their standard set-theoretic realizations, then they would have various non-arithmetical properties that mathematicians are reluctant to ascribe to them. Dedekind and later structuralists conclude that we should refrain from ascribing to numbers such ‘foreign’ properties. We first rehearse why it is hard to provide an acceptable formulation of this conclusion. Then we investigate some forms of abstraction meant to purge mathematical objects of all ‘foreign’ properties. One form is inspired by Frege; the other (...)
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  • Why is the Universe of Sets Not a Set?Zeynep Soysal - 2017 - Synthese:1-23.
    According to the iterative conception of sets, standardly formalized by ZFC, there is no set of all sets. But why is there no set of all sets? A simple-minded, though unpopular, “minimal” explanation for why there is no set of all sets is that the supposition that there is contradicts some axioms of ZFC. In this paper, I first explain the core complaint against the minimal explanation, and then argue against the two main alternative answers to the guiding question. I (...)
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  • Objectivity and Reliability.Justin Clarke-Doane - 2017 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 47 (6):841-855.
    Scanlon’s Being Realistic about Reasons (BRR) is a beautiful book – sleek, sophisticated, and programmatic. One of its key aims is to demystify knowledge of normative and mathematical truths. In this article, I develop an epistemological problem that Scanlon fails to explicitly address. I argue that his “metaphysical pluralism” can be understood as a response to that problem. However, it resolves the problem only if it undercuts the objectivity of normative and mathematical inquiry.
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  • Numerical Cognition and Mathematical Realism.Helen De Cruz - 2016 - Philosophers' Imprint 16.
    Humans and other animals have an evolved ability to detect discrete magnitudes in their environment. Does this observation support evolutionary debunking arguments against mathematical realism, as has been recently argued by Clarke-Doane, or does it bolster mathematical realism, as authors such as Joyce and Sinnott-Armstrong have assumed? To find out, we need to pay closer attention to the features of evolved numerical cognition. I provide a detailed examination of the functional properties of evolved numerical cognition, and propose that they prima (...)
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  • Spacetime, Ontology, and Structural Realism.Edward Slowik - 2005 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 19 (2):147 – 166.
    This essay explores the possibility of constructing a structural realist interpretation of spacetime theories that can resolve the ontological debate between substantivalists and relationists. Drawing on various structuralist approaches in the philosophy of mathematics, as well as on the theoretical complexities of general relativity, our investigation will reveal that a structuralist approach can be beneficial to the spacetime theorist as a means of deflating some of the ontological disputes regarding similarly structured spacetimes.
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  • The ‘Space’ at the Intersection of Platonism and Nominalism.Edward Slowik - 2015 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 46 (2):393-408.
    This essay explores the use of platonist and nominalist concepts, derived from the philosophy of mathematics and metaphysics, as a means of elucidating the debate on spacetime ontology and the spatial structures endorsed by scientific realists. Although the disputes associated with platonism and nominalism often mirror the complexities involved with substantivalism and relationism, it will be argued that a more refined three-part distinction among platonist/nominalist categories can nonetheless provide unique insights into the core assumptions that underlie spatial ontologies, but it (...)
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  • Geometry and Generality in Frege's Philosophy of Arithmetic.Jamie Tappenden - 1995 - Synthese 102 (3):319 - 361.
    This paper develops some respects in which the philosophy of mathematics can fruitfully be informed by mathematical practice, through examining Frege's Grundlagen in its historical setting. The first sections of the paper are devoted to elaborating some aspects of nineteenth century mathematics which informed Frege's early work. (These events are of considerable philosophical significance even apart from the connection with Frege.) In the middle sections, some minor themes of Grundlagen are developed: the relationship Frege envisions between arithmetic and geometry and (...)
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  • Know-How and Gradability.Carlotta Pavese - 2017 - Philosophical Review 126 (3):345-383.
    Orthodoxy has it that knowledge is absolute—that is, it cannot come in degrees. On the other hand, there seems to be strong evidence for the gradability of know-how. Ascriptions of know-how are gradable, as when we say that one knows in part how to do something, or that one knows how to do something better than somebody else. When coupled with absolutism, the gradability of ascriptions of know-how can be used to mount a powerful argument against intellectualism about know-how—the view (...)
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  • What is Categorical Structuralism?Geoffrey Hellman - 2006 - In Johan van Benthem, Gerhard Heinzman, M. Rebushi & H. Visser (eds.), The Age of Alternative Logics. Springer. pp. 151--161.
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  • Hilary Putnam on the Philosophy of Logic and Mathematics.José Miguel Sagüillo - 2018 - Theoria : An International Journal for Theory, History and Fundations of Science 33 (2):183-200.
    I discuss Putnam’s conception of logical truth as grounded in his picture of mathematical practice and ontology. i begin by comparing Putnam’s 1971 Philosophy of Logic with Quine’s homonymous book. Next, Putnam’s changing views on modality are surveyed, moving from the modal pre-formal to the de-modalized formal characterization of logical validity. Section three suggests a complementary view of Platonism and modalism underlying different stages of a dynamic mathematical practice. The final section argues for the pervasive platonistic conception of the working (...)
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  • Sets and Supersets.Toby Meadows - 2016 - Synthese 193 (6):1875-1907.
    It is a commonplace of set theory to say that there is no set of all well-orderings nor a set of all sets. We are implored to accept this due to the threat of paradox and the ensuing descent into unintelligibility. In the absence of promising alternatives, we tend to take up a conservative stance and tow the line: there is no universe. In this paper, I am going to challenge this claim by taking seriously the idea that we can (...)
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  • Non-Ontological Structuralism†.Michael Resnik - 2019 - Philosophia Mathematica 27 (3):303-315.
    ABSTRACT Historical structuralist views have been ontological. They either deny that there are any mathematical objects or they maintain that mathematical objects are structures or positions in them. Non-ontological structuralism offers no account of the nature of mathematical objects. My own structuralism has evolved from an early sui generis version to a non-ontological version that embraces Quine’s doctrine of ontological relativity. In this paper I further develop and explain this view.
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  • Modal Structuralism and Theism.Silvia Jonas - forthcoming - In Fiona Ellis (ed.), New Models of Religious Understanding. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    Drawing an analogy between modal structuralism about mathematics and theism, I o er a structuralist account that implicitly de nes theism in terms of three basic relations: logical and metaphysical priority, and epis- temic superiority. On this view, statements like `God is omniscient' have a hypothetical and a categorical component. The hypothetical component provides a translation pattern according to which statements in theistic language are converted into statements of second-order modal logic. The categorical component asserts the logical possibility of the (...)
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  • Of Numbers and Electrons.Cian Dorr - 2010 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 110 (2pt2):133-181.
    According to a tradition stemming from Quine and Putnam, we have the same broadly inductive reason for believing in numbers as we have for believing in electrons: certain theories that entail that there are numbers are better, qua explanations of our evidence, than any theories that do not. This paper investigates how modal theories of the form ‘Possibly, the concrete world is just as it in fact is and T’ and ‘Necessarily, if standard mathematics is true and the concrete world (...)
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  • Quine, Putnam, and the ‘Quine–Putnam’ Indispensability Argument.David Liggins - 2008 - Erkenntnis 68 (1):113 - 127.
    Much recent discussion in the philosophy of mathematics has concerned the indispensability argument—an argument which aims to establish the existence of abstract mathematical objects through appealing to the role that mathematics plays in empirical science. The indispensability argument is standardly attributed to W. V. Quine and Hilary Putnam. In this paper, I show that this attribution is mistaken. Quine's argument for the existence of abstract mathematical objects differs from the argument which many philosophers of mathematics ascribe to him. Contrary to (...)
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  • Nominalism, Trivialism, Logicism.Agustín Rayo - 2015 - Philosophia Mathematica 23 (1):nku013.
    This paper extracts some of the main theses in the philosophy of mathematics from my book, The Construction of Logical Space. I show that there are important limits to the availability of nominalistic paraphrase functions for mathematical languages, and suggest a way around the problem by developing a method for specifying nominalistic contents without corresponding nominalistic paraphrases. Although much of the material in this paper is drawn from the book — and from an earlier paper — I hope the present (...)
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  • Ficcionalismo matemático y si-entoncismo russelliano¿ dos caras de la misma moneda?Wilfredo Quezada Pulido - 2004 - Revista de Filosofía (Madrid) 29 (2):73-97.
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  • Critical Studies/Book Reviews.O. Linnebo - 2003 - Philosophia Mathematica 11 (1):92-104.
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  • Ontological Independence as the Mark of the Real. Jody Azzouni. Deflating Existential Consequence: A Case for Nominalism. New York: Oxford University Press, 2004. Pp. Viii + 241. ISBN 0-19-515988-8. [REVIEW]Mark Colyvan - 2005 - Philosophia Mathematica 13 (2):216-225.
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  • Philosophy of the Matrix.A. C. Paseau - 2017 - Philosophia Mathematica 25 (2):246-267.
    A mathematical matrix is usually defined as a two-dimensional array of scalars. And yet, as I explain, matrices are not in fact two-dimensional arrays. So are we to conclude that matrices do not exist? I show how to resolve the puzzle, for both contemporary and older mathematics. The solution generalises to the interpretation of all mathematical discourse. The paper as a whole attempts to reinforce mathematical structuralism by reflecting on how best to interpret mathematics.
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  • How Not to Enhance the Indispensability Argument.Russell Marcus - 2014 - Philosophia Mathematica 22 (3):345-360.
    The new explanatory or enhanced indispensability argument alleges that our mathematical beliefs are justified by their indispensable appearances in scientific explanations. This argument differs from the standard indispensability argument which focuses on the uses of mathematics in scientific theories. I argue that the new argument depends for its plausibility on an equivocation between two senses of explanation. On one sense the new argument is an oblique restatement of the standard argument. On the other sense, it is vulnerable to an instrumentalist (...)
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  • Mechanistic Explanation and Explanatory Proofs in Mathematics.Joachim Frans & Erik Weber - 2014 - Philosophia Mathematica 22 (2):231-248.
    Although there is a consensus among philosophers of mathematics and mathematicians that mathematical explanations exist, only a few authors have proposed accounts of explanation in mathematics. These accounts fit into the unificationist or top-down approach to explanation. We argue that these models can be complemented by a bottom-up approach to explanation in mathematics. We introduce the mechanistic model of explanation in science and discuss the possibility of using this model in mathematics, arguing that using it does not presuppose a Platonist (...)
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  • How Not To Use the Church-Turing Thesis Against Platonism.R. Urbaniak - 2011 - Philosophia Mathematica 19 (1):74-89.
    Olszewski claims that the Church-Turing thesis can be used in an argument against platonism in philosophy of mathematics. The key step of his argument employs an example of a supposedly effectively computable but not Turing-computable function. I argue that the process he describes is not an effective computation, and that the argument relies on the illegitimate conflation of effective computability with there being a way to find out . ‘Ah, but,’ you say, ‘what’s the use of its being right twice (...)
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  • Extending Hartry Field's Instrumental Account of Applied Mathematics to Statistical Mechanics.Glen Meyer - 2009 - Philosophia Mathematica 17 (3):273-312.
    A serious flaw in Hartry Field’s instrumental account of applied mathematics, namely that Field must overestimate the extent to which many of the structures of our mathematical theories are reflected in the physical world, underlies much of the criticism of this account. After reviewing some of this criticism, I illustrate through an examination of the prospects for extending Field’s account to classical equilibrium statistical mechanics how this flaw will prevent any significant extension of this account beyond field theories. I note (...)
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  • Structuralism and Representation Theorems.George Weaver - 1998 - Philosophia Mathematica 6 (3):257-271.
    Much of the inspiration for structuralist approaches to mathematics can be found in the late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century program of characterizing various mathematical systems upto isomorphism. From the perspective of this program, differences between isomorphic systems are irrelevant. It is argued that a different view of the import of the differences between isomorphic systems can be obtained from the perspective of contemporary discussions of representation theorems and that from this perspective both the identification of isomorphic systems and the reduction (...)
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  • Space, Number and Structure: A Tale of Two Debates.Stewart Shapiro - 1996 - Philosophia Mathematica 4 (2):148-173.
    Around the turn of the century, Poincare and Hilbert each published an account of geometry that took the discipline to be an implicit definition of its concepts. The terms ‘point’, ‘line’, and ‘plane’ can be applied to any system of objects that satisfies the axioms. Each mathematician found spirited opposition from a different logicist—Russell against Poincare' and Frege against Hilbert— who maintained the dying view that geometry essentially concerns space or spatial intuition. The debates illustrate the emerging idea of mathematics (...)
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  • Troubles with Indispensability: Applying Pure Mathematics in Physical Theory.Peressini Anthony - 1997 - Philosophia Mathematica 5 (3):210-227.
    Much of the current thought concerning mathematical ontology in volves in some way the Quine/Putnam indispensability argument. The indispensability approach needs to be more thoroughly specified, however, before substantive progress can be made in assessing it. To this end I examine in some detail the ways in which pure mathematics is applied to physical theory; such considerations give rise to three specific issues with which the indispensability approach must come to grips.
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  • Sets, Wholes, and Limited Pluralitiest.Stephen Pollard - 1996 - Philosophia Mathematica 4 (1):42-58.
    This essay defends the following two claims: (1) liraitation-of-size reasoning yields enough sets to meet the needs of most mathematicians; (2) set formation and mereological fusion share enough logical features to justify placing both in the genus composition (even when the components of a set are taken to be its members rather than its subsets).
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  • Who Needs Mereology?Stephen Pollard - 1997 - Philosophia Mathematica 5 (1):65-70.
    This note examines the mereological component of Geoffrey Hellman's most recent version of modal structuralism. There are plausible forms of agnosticism that benefit only a little from Hellman's mereological turn.
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  • Structuralism's Unpaid Epistemological Debts.Bob Hale - 1996 - Philosophia Mathematica 4 (2):124--47.
    One kind of structuralism holds that mathematics is about structures, conceived as a type of abstract entity. Another denies that it is about any distinctively mathematical entities at all—even abstract structures; rather it gives purely general information about what holds of any collection of entities conforming to the axioms of the theory. Of these, pure structuralism is most plausibly taken to enjoy significant advantages over platonism. But in what appears to be its most plausible—modalised—version, even restricted to elementary arithmetic, it (...)
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  • Hartry Field. Science Without Numbers: A Defense of Nominalism 2nd Ed. [REVIEW]Geoffrey Hellman & Mary Leng - 2019 - Philosophia Mathematica 27 (1):139-148.
    FieldHartry. Science Without Numbers: A Defense of Nominalism 2nd ed.Oxford University Press, 2016. ISBN 978-0-19-877792-2. Pp. vi + 56 + vi + 111.
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  • Naturalism, Truth and Beauty in Mathematics.Matthew E. Moore - 2007 - Philosophia Mathematica 15 (2):141-165.
    Can a scientific naturalist be a mathematical realist? I review some arguments, derived largely from the writings of Penelope Maddy, for a negative answer. The rejoinder from the realist side is that the irrealist cannot explain, as well as the realist can, why a naturalist should grant the mathematician the degree of methodological autonomy that the irrealist's own arguments require. Thus a naturalist, as such, has at least as much reason to embrace mathematical realism as to embrace irrealism.
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  • Does Category Theory Provide a Framework for Mathematical Structuralism?Geoffrey Hellman - 2003 - Philosophia Mathematica 11 (2):129-157.
    Category theory and topos theory have been seen as providing a structuralist framework for mathematics autonomous vis-a-vis set theory. It is argued here that these theories require a background logic of relations and substantive assumptions addressing mathematical existence of categories themselves. We propose a synthesis of Bell's many-topoi view and modal-structuralism. Surprisingly, a combination of mereology and plural quantification suffices to describe hypothetical large domains, recovering the Grothendieck method of universes. Both topos theory and set theory can be carried out (...)
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  • A Constructivist Perspective on Physics.Peter Fletcher - 2002 - Philosophia Mathematica 10 (1):26-42.
    This paper examines the problem of extending the programme of mathematical constructivism to applied mathematics. I am not concerned with the question of whether conventional mathematical physics makes essential use of the principle of excluded middle, but rather with the more fundamental question of whether the concept of physical infinity is constructively intelligible. I consider two kinds of physical infinity: a countably infinite constellation of stars and the infinitely divisible space-time continuum. I argue (contrary to Hellman) that these do not. (...)
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  • Putnam, Context, and Ontology.Steven Gross - 2004 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 34 (4):507 - 553.
    When a debate seems intractable, with little agreement as to how one might proceed towards a resolution, it is understandable that philosophers should consider whether something might be amiss with the debate itself. Famously in the last century, philosophers of various stripes explored in various ways the possibility that at least certain philosophical debates are in some manner deficient in sense. Such moves are no longer so much in vogue. For one thing, the particular ways they have been made have (...)
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  • The Objectivity of Mathematics.Stewart Shapiro - 2007 - Synthese 156 (2):337-381.
    The purpose of this paper is to apply Crispin Wright’s criteria and various axes of objectivity to mathematics. I test the criteria and the objectivity of mathematics against each other. Along the way, various issues concerning general logic and epistemology are encountered.
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  • Against the Iterative Conception of Set.Edward Ferrier - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (10):2681-2703.
    According to the iterative conception of set, each set is a collection of sets formed prior to it. The notion of priority here plays an essential role in explanations of why contradiction-inducing sets, such as the Russell set, do not exist. Consequently, these explanations are successful only to the extent that a satisfactory priority relation is made out. I argue that attempts to do this have fallen short: understanding priority in a straightforwardly constructivist sense threatens the coherence of the empty (...)
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  • Modal Science.Timothy Williamson - 2016 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 46 (4-5):453-492.
    This paper explains and defends the idea that metaphysical necessity is the strongest kind of objective necessity. Plausible closure conditions on the family of objective modalities are shown to entail that the logic of metaphysical necessity is S5. Evidence is provided that some objective modalities are studied in the natural sciences. In particular, the modal assumptions implicit in physical applications of dynamical systems theory are made explicit by using such systems to define models of a modal temporal logic. Those assumptions (...)
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  • Quine and Ontology.Oswaldo Chateaubriand - 2003 - Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 7 (1-2):41-74.
    Ontology played a very large role in Quine’s philosophy and was one of his major preoccupations from the early 30’s to the end of his life. His work on ontology provided a basic framework for most of the discussions of ontology in analytic philosophy in the second half of the Twentieth Century. There are three main themes that Quine developed in his work. The first is ontological commitment: What are the existential commitments of a theory? The second is ontological reduction: (...)
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