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  1. Accuracy and the Laws of Credence.Richard Pettigrew - 2016 - New York, NY.: Oxford University Press UK.
    Richard Pettigrew offers an extended investigation into a particular way of justifying the rational principles that govern our credences. The main principles that he justifies are the central tenets of Bayesian epistemology, though many other related principles are discussed along the way. Pettigrew looks to decision theory in order to ground his argument. He treats an agent's credences as if they were a choice she makes between different options, gives an account of the purely epistemic utility enjoyed by different sets (...)
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  • Should subjective probabilities be sharp?Seamus Bradley & Katie Siobhan Steele - 2014 - Episteme 11 (3):277-289.
    There has been much recent interest in imprecise probabilities, models of belief that allow unsharp or fuzzy credence. There have also been some influential criticisms of this position. Here we argue, chiefly against Elga (2010), that subjective probabilities need not be sharp. The key question is whether the imprecise probabilist can make reasonable sequences of decisions. We argue that she can. We outline Elga's argument and clarify the assumptions he makes and the principles of rationality he is implicitly committed to. (...)
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  • Credal Dilemmas.Sarah Moss - 2014 - Noûs 48 (3):665-683.
    Recently many have argued that agents must sometimes have credences that are imprecise, represented by a set of probability measures. But opponents claim that fans of imprecise credences cannot provide a decision theory that protects agents who follow it from foregoing sure money. In particular, agents with imprecise credences appear doomed to act irrationally in diachronic cases, where they are called to make decisions at earlier and later times. I respond to this claim on behalf of imprecise credence fans. Once (...)
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  • Truth and probability.Frank Ramsey - 2010 - In Antony Eagle (ed.), Philosophy of Probability: Contemporary Readings. New York: Routledge. pp. 52-94.
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  • Dutch bookies and money pumps.Frederic Schick - 1986 - Journal of Philosophy 83 (2):112-119.
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  • (1 other version)A nonpragmatic vindication of probabilism.James M. Joyce - 1998 - Philosophy of Science 65 (4):575-603.
    The pragmatic character of the Dutch book argument makes it unsuitable as an "epistemic" justification for the fundamental probabilist dogma that rational partial beliefs must conform to the axioms of probability. To secure an appropriately epistemic justification for this conclusion, one must explain what it means for a system of partial beliefs to accurately represent the state of the world, and then show that partial beliefs that violate the laws of probability are invariably less accurate than they could be otherwise. (...)
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  • Truth and probability.Frank Ramsey - 1931 - In Braithwaite R. B. (ed.), The Foundations of Mathematics and Other Logical Essays. Routledge Kegan & Paul. pp. 156–98.
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  • Incoherence without Exploitability.Brian Hedden - 2011 - Noûs 47 (3):482-495.
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  • Foundations and Applications of Inductive Probability.Roger D. Rosenkrantz - 1981 - Ridgeview Press.
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  • (1 other version)Coherence and the axioms of confirmation.Abner Shimony - 1955 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 20 (1):1-28.
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  • Fair bets and inductive probabilities.John G. Kemeny - 1955 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 20 (3):263-273.
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  • Probabilistic coherence and proper scoring rules.Joel Predd, Robert Seiringer, Elliott Lieb, Daniel Osherson, H. Vincent Poor & Sanjeev Kulkarni - 2009 - IEEE Transactions on Information Theory 55 (10):4786-4792.
    We provide self-contained proof of a theorem relating probabilistic coherence of forecasts to their non-domination by rival forecasts with respect to any proper scoring rule. The theorem recapitulates insights achieved by other investigators, and clarifi es the connection of coherence and proper scoring rules to Bregman divergence.
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