- 24 Reflections on Infinite Utility and Deliberation in Pascal’s Wager.Alan Hájek - 2024 - In Mirosław Szatkowski (ed.), Ontology of Divinity. De Gruyter. pp. 493-510.details
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Probability and Inductive Logic.Antony Eagle - manuscriptdetails
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Ontology of Divinity.Mirosław Szatkowski (ed.) - 2024 - De Gruyter.details
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When the (Bayesian) ideal is not ideal.Danilo Fraga Dantas - 2023 - Logos and Episteme 15 (3):271-298.details
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Why Ideal Epistemology?Jennifer Rose Carr - 2021 - Mind 131 (524):1131-1162.details
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How to Believe Long Conjunctions of Beliefs: Probability, Quasi-Dogmatism and Contextualism.Stefano Bonzio, Gustavo Cevolani & Tommaso Flaminio - 2021 - Erkenntnis 88 (3):965-990.details
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Avoiding Dutch Books despite inconsistent credences.Alexander R. Pruss - 2020 - Synthese 198 (12):11265-11289.details
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Frank Ramsey.Fraser MacBride, Mathieu Marion, Maria Jose Frapolli, Dorothy Edgington, Edward J. R. Elliott, Sebastian Lutz & Jeffrey Paris - 2019 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Conditional Probabilities.Kenny Easwaran - 2019 - In Richard Pettigrew & Jonathan Weisberg (eds.), The Open Handbook of Formal Epistemology. PhilPapers Foundation. pp. 131-198.details
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Full & Partial Belief.Konstantin Genin - 2019 - In Richard Pettigrew & Jonathan Weisberg (eds.), The Open Handbook of Formal Epistemology. PhilPapers Foundation. pp. 437-498.details
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Precise Credences.Michael Titelbaum - 2019 - In Richard Pettigrew & Jonathan Weisberg (eds.), The Open Handbook of Formal Epistemology. PhilPapers Foundation. pp. 1-55.details
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(1 other version)Infinitesimal Probabilities.Sylvia Wenmackers - 2019 - In Richard Pettigrew & Jonathan Weisberg (eds.), The Open Handbook of Formal Epistemology. PhilPapers Foundation. pp. 199-265.details
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(1 other version)A dutch book theorem and converse dutch book theorem for Kolmogorov conditionalization.Michael Rescorla - 2018 - Review of Symbolic Logic 11 (4):705-735.details
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On the Expected Utility Objection to the Dutch Book Argument for Probabilism.Richard Pettigrew - 2021 - Noûs (1):23-38.details
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Deliberation welcomes prediction.Alan Hájek - 2016 - Episteme 13 (4):507-528.details
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(1 other version)Arguments for–or against–Probabilism?Alan Hájek - 2008 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 59 (4):793-819.details
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Dutch Books and nonclassical probability spaces.Leszek Wroński & Michał Tomasz Godziszewski - 2017 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 7 (2):267-284.details
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Making Ado Without Expectations.Mark Colyvan & Alan Hájek - 2016 - Mind 125 (499):829-857.details
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A New Way to Block a Dutch Book Argument, or The Stubborn Non-probabilist.Leszek Wronski - manuscriptdetails
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Philosophy as conceptual engineering: Inductive logic in Rudolf Carnap's scientific philosophy.Christopher F. French - 2015 - Dissertation, University of British Columbiadetails
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Foundations of Probability.Rachael Briggs - 2015 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 44 (6):625-640.details
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Accuracy, Risk, and the Principle of Indifference.Richard Pettigrew - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 92 (1):35-59.details
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The main two arguments for probabilism are flawed.Luigi Secchi - 2014 - Synthese 191 (3):287-295.details
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Regularity reformulated.Weng Hong Tang - 2012 - Episteme 9 (4):329-343.details
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Regularity and Hyperreal Credences.Kenny Easwaran - 2014 - Philosophical Review 123 (1):1-41.details
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Dutch book arguments.Susan Vineberg - 2011 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Bayesian Epistemology.William Talbott - 2006 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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(1 other version)Interpretations of probability.Alan Hájek - 2007 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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What conditional probability could not be.Alan Hájek - 2003 - Synthese 137 (3):273--323.details
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Probability and conditionals.Robert C. Stalnaker - 1970 - Philosophy of Science 37 (1):64-80.details
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Nagel's translation of teleological statements: A critique.Vivien B. Shelanski - 1973 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 24 (4):397-401.details
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(2 other versions)Decision theory as philosophy.Mark Kaplan - 1983 - Philosophy of Science 50 (4):549-577.details
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Carnap and de finetti on bets and the probability of singular events: The dutch book argument reconsidered.Klaus Heilig - 1978 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 29 (4):325-346.details
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Bayesian Epistemology.Stephan Hartmann & Jan Sprenger - 2010 - In Sven Bernecker & Duncan Pritchard (eds.), The Routledge Companion to Epistemology. New York: Routledge. pp. 609-620.details
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Decision Theory without Luminosity.Yoaav Isaacs & Benjamin A. Levinstein - 2023 - Mind 133 (530):346-376.details
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Non-Measurability, Imprecise Credences, and Imprecise Chances.Yoaav Isaacs, Alan Hájek & John Hawthorne - 2021 - Mind 131 (523):892-916.details
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Shrinking three arguments for conditionalization.Sophie Horowitz - 2021 - Philosophical Perspectives 35 (1):303-319.details
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(1 other version)Symmetry arguments against regular probability: A reply to recent objections.Matthew W. Parker - 2019 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 9 (1):1-21.details
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Subjective Probability and its Dynamics.Alan Hajek & Julia Staffel - 2021 - In Markus Knauff & Wolfgang Spohn (eds.), The Handbook of Rationality. London: MIT Press.details
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(1 other version)Waging War on Pascal's Wager.Alan Hájek - 2003 - Philosophical Review 112 (1):27-56.details
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Fitch’s Paradox and Probabilistic Antirealism.Igor Douven - 2007 - Studia Logica 86 (2):149-182.details
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What conceptual spaces can do for Carnap's late inductive logic.Marta Sznajder - 2016 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 56:62-71.details
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Non-additive degrees of belief.Rolf Haenni - 2009 - In Franz Huber & Christoph Schmidt-Petri (eds.), Degrees of belief. London: Springer. pp. 121--159.details
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(1 other version)Arguments For—Or Against—Probabilism?Alan Hájek - 2009 - In Franz Huber & Christoph Schmidt-Petri (eds.), Degrees of belief. London: Springer. pp. 229--251.details
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Zum einfachheitsprinzip in der wahrscheinlichkeitsrechnung.von Hans Hermes - 1958 - Dialectica 12 (3‐4):317-331.details
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More trouble for regular probabilitites.Matthew W. Parker - 2012details
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Updating, supposing, and maxent.Brian Skyrms - 1987 - Theory and Decision 22 (3):225-246.details
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Pragmatic Probability.Newton C. A. Da Costa - 1986 - Erkenntnis 25 (2):141 - 162.details
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Probability, logic, and probability logic.Alan Hójek - 2001 - In Lou Goble (ed.), The Blackwell Guide to Philosophical Logic. Malden, Mass.: Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 362--384.details
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Hidden Assumptions in the Dutch Book Argument.C. Waidacher - 1997 - Theory and Decision 43 (3):293-312.details
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