- (1 other version)On the Accuracy of Group Credences.Richard Pettigrew - 2019 - Oxford Studies in Epistemology 6.details
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Epistemic Decision Theory's Reckoning.Conor Mayo-Wilson & Gregory Wheeler - manuscriptdetails
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On the Expected Utility Objection to the Dutch Book Argument for Probabilism.Richard Pettigrew - 2021 - Noûs (1):23-38.details
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Updating for Externalists.J. Dmitri Gallow - 2021 - Noûs 55 (3):487-516.details
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Generalized Information Theory Meets Human Cognition: Introducing a Unified Framework to Model Uncertainty and Information Search.Vincenzo Crupi, Jonathan D. Nelson, Björn Meder, Gustavo Cevolani & Katya Tentori - 2018 - Cognitive Science 42 (5):1410-1456.details
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Learning and Value Change.J. Dmitri Gallow - 2019 - Philosophers' Imprint 19:1--22.details
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Epistemic Utility and the Normativity of Logic.Richard Pettigrew - 2017 - Logos and Episteme 8 (4):455-492.details
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Lockeans Maximize Expected Accuracy.Kevin Dorst - 2019 - Mind 128 (509):175-211.details
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A flaw in the Stich–Plantinga challenge to evolutionary reliabilism.Michael J. Deem - 2018 - Analysis 78 (2):216-225.details
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The normative status of logic.Florian Steinberger - 2017 - Stanford Enyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Agreement and Updating For Self-Locating Belief.Michael Caie - 2018 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 47 (3):513-547.details
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The Population Ethics of Belief: In Search of an Epistemic Theory X.Richard Pettigrew - 2018 - Noûs 52 (2):336-372.details
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The puzzle of the changing past.L. Barlassina & F. Del Prete - 2015 - Analysis 75 (1):59-67.details
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Three conceptions of explaining how possibly—and one reductive account.Johannes Persson - 2011 - In Henk W. De Regt, Stephan Hartmann & Samir Okasha (eds.), EPSA Philosophy of Science: Amsterdam 2009. Springer. pp. 275--286.details
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(1 other version)Interpretations of probability.Alan Hájek - 2007 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Infinite Opinion Sets and Relative Accuracy.Ilho Park & Jaemin Jung - 2023 - Journal of Philosophy 120 (6):285-313.details
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Accuracy Across Doxastic Attitudes: Recent Work on the Accuracy of Belief.Robert Weston Siscoe - 2022 - American Philosophical Quarterly 59 (2):201-217.details
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Accuracy, probabilism and Bayesian update in infinite domains.Alexander R. Pruss - 2022 - Synthese 200 (6):1-29.details
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Generalized Immodesty Principles in Epistemic Utility Theory.Alejandro Pérez Carballo - 2023 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 10 (31):874–907.details
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Accuracy and Probabilism in Infinite Domains.Michael Nielsen - 2023 - Mind 132 (526):402-427.details
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A Dilemma for Solomonoff Prediction.Sven Neth - 2023 - Philosophy of Science 90 (2):288-306.details
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Towards the Inevitability of Non-Classical Probability.Giacomo Molinari - 2023 - Review of Symbolic Logic 16 (4):1053-1079.details
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Downwards Propriety in Epistemic Utility Theory.Alejandro Pérez Carballo - 2023 - Mind 132 (525):30-62.details
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Symmetry and partial belief geometry.Stefan Lukits - 2021 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 11 (3):1-24.details
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Updating incoherent credences ‐ Extending the Dutch strategy argument for conditionalization.Glauber De Bona & Julia Staffel - 2021 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 105 (2):435-460.details
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On the Best Accuracy Arguments for Probabilism.Michael Nielsen - 2022 - Philosophy of Science 89 (3):621-630.details
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Accuracy-dominance and conditionalization.Michael Nielsen - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 178 (10):3217-3236.details
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Jamesian epistemology formalised: An explication of ‘the will to believe’.Richard Pettigrew - 2016 - Episteme 13 (3):253-268.details
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Measuring inaccuracy of uncertain doxastic states in many-valued logical systems.Pavel Janda - 2016 - Journal of Applied Logic 14:95-112.details
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Accuracy, Risk, and the Principle of Indifference.Richard Pettigrew - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 92 (1):35-59.details
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Why be coherent?Glauber De Bona & Julia Staffel - 2018 - Analysis 78 (3):405-415.details
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Epistemic Utility and Norms for Credences.Richard Pettigrew - 2013 - Philosophy Compass 8 (10):897-908.details
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Epistemic Utility Theory.Richard Pettigrew - 2010details
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An accuracy-based approach to quantum conditionalization.Alexander Meehan & Jer Alex Steeger - forthcoming - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science.details
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The material theory of induction.John D. Norton - 2021 - Calgary, Alberta, Canada: University of Calgary Press.details
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Radical Pooling and Imprecise Probabilities.Ignacio Ojea Quintana - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-28.details
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Justifying the Norms of Inductive Inference.Olav Benjamin Vassend - 2022 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 73 (1):135-160.details
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Advanced modalizing de dicto and de re.John Divers & John J. Parry - 2018 - Analysis 78 (3):415-425.details
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Ideal counterpart theorizing and the accuracy argument for probabilism.Clinton Castro & Olav Vassend - 2018 - Analysis 78 (2):207-216.details
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Updating: Learning versus supposing.Jiaying Zhao, Vincenzo Crupi, Katya Tentori, Branden Fitelson & Daniel Osherson - 2012 - Cognition 124 (3):373-378.details
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Formal Representations of Belief.Franz Huber - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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An Accuracy‐Dominance Argument for Conditionalization.R. A. Briggs & Richard Pettigrew - 2020 - Noûs 54 (1):162-181.details
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The Foundations of Epistemic Decision Theory.Jason Konek & Ben Levinstein - 2019 - Mind 128 (509):69-107.details
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Chance, Resiliency, and Humean Supervenience.Patryk Dziurosz-Serafinowicz - 2019 - Erkenntnis 84 (1):1-19.details
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Précis and replies to contributors for book symposium on accuracy and the laws of credence.Richard Pettigrew - 2017 - Episteme 14 (1):1-30.details
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Strictly Proper Scoring Rules.Juergen Landes - unknowndetails
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(1 other version)Accuracy, Conditionalization, and Probabilism.Peter J. Lewis & Don Fallis - manuscriptdetails
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What probability probably isn't.Colin Howson - 2015 - Analysis 75 (1):53-59.details
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Rational Probabilistic Incoherence.Michael Caie - 2013 - Philosophical Review 122 (4):527-575.details
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Aggregating incoherent agents who disagree.Richard Pettigrew - 2019 - Synthese 196 (7):2737-2776.details
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