This celebrated work is the keystone of the thought of the Frankfurt School. It is a wide-ranging philosophical and psychological critique of the Western categories of reason and nature, from Homer to Nietzsche.

Editorial preface to the fourth edition and modified translation -- The text of the Philosophische Untersuchungen -- Philosophische untersuchungen = Philosophical investigations -- Philosophie der psychologie, ein fragment = Philosophy of psychology, a fragment.

In my dissertation, Nietzsche as Critic and Captive of Enlightenment, I explore Nietzsche's often virulent critique of the Enlightenment tradition. In particular I examine his attack on the kind of subjectivity implied by Cartesian rationalism. I also look at his challenges to the politics of Rousseau and the ethics of Kant. I then investigate the ways in which he critiques the nineteenth century inheritors of Enlightened thought. Here I look at his attack on the liberalism of John Stuart Mill, as (...) well as his criticism of the scientific thought of Charles Darwin and Herbert Spencer. My dissertation concludes with an examination of Nietzsche's Overman; I argue that although Nietzsche made vigorous efforts to escape the influence of Enlightenment, the concept of the Overman forced him to retain certain important elements of Enlightened thought. These include a utopian faith in human progress and an idea of human subjectivity which has profound affinities with the Enlightenment's impulse to autonomy. (shrink)

In Dangerous Minds, Ronald Beiner traces the deeper philosophical roots of such far-right ideologues as Richard Spencer, Aleksandr Dugin, and Steve Bannon, to the writings of Nietzsche and Heidegger—and specifically to the aspects of their thought that express revulsion for the liberal-democratic view of life.

This essay is written on the following premises and argues for them. “Enlightenment” is a word or signifier, and not a single or unifiable phenomenon which it consistently signifies. There is no single or unifiable phenomenon describable as “the Enlightenment,” but it is the definite article rather than the noun which is to be avoided. In studying the intellectual history of the late seventeenth century and the eighteenth, we encounter a variety of statements made, and assumptions proposed, to which the (...) term “Enlightenment” may usefully be applied, but the meanings of the term shift as we apply it. The things are connected, but not continuous; they cannot be reduced to a single narrative; and we find ourselves using the word “Enlightenment” in a family of ways and talking about a family of phenomena, resembling and related to one another in a variety of ways that permit of various generalizations about them. We are not, however, committed to a single root meaning of the word “Enlightenment,” and we do not need to reduce the phenomena of which we treat to a single process or entity to be termed “the” Enlightenment. It is a reification that we wish to avoid, but the structure of our language is such that this is difficult, and we will find ourselves talking of “the French” or “the Scottish,” “the Newtonian” or the “the Arminian” Enlightenments, and hoping that by employing qualifying adjectives we may constantly remind ourselves that the keyword “Enlightenment” is ours to use and should not master us. (shrink)

Isaiah Berlin was recognized as Britain's most distinguished historian of ideas. Berlin is particularly associated with the concept of the 'Counter-Enlightenment', comprising those thinkers who in Berlin's view reacted against the Enlightenment's naïve rationalism, scientism and progressivism. Berlin's 'Counter-Enlightenment' has received critical attention, but no-one has yet analysed the understanding of the Enlightenment on which it rests. Isaiah Berlin and the Enlightenment explores the development of Berlin's conception of the Enlightenment, noting its curious narrowness, its ambivalence, and its indebtedness to (...) a specific German intellectual tradition. Contributors to the book examine his comments on individual writers, showing how they were inflected by his questionable assumptions, and arguing that some of the writers he assigned to the 'Counter-Enlightenment' have closer affinities to the Enlightenment than he recognized. By locating Berlin in the history of Enlightenment studies, this book also makes a contribution to defining the historical place of his work and to evaluating his intellectual legacy. (shrink)