Switch to: Citations

Add references

You must login to add references.
  1. Paradox without Self-Reference.Stephen Yablo - 1993 - Analysis 53 (4):251-252.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   202 citations  
  • Indefinite extensibility.Timothy Williamson - 1999 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 55 (1):1-24.
    Of all the cases made against classical logic, Michael Dummett's is the most deeply considered. Issuing from a systematic and original conception of the discipline, it constitutes one of the most distinctive achievements of twentieth century British philosophy. Although Dummett builds on the work of Brouwer and Heyting, he provides the case against classical logic with a new, explicit and general foundation in the philosophy of language. Dummett's central arguments, widely celebrated if not widely endorsed, concern the implications of the (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   39 citations  
  • Truth Probability and Paradox: Studies in Philosophical Logic.Paul Teller - 1975 - Philosophical Review 84 (2):276.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   11 citations  
  • The semantic conception of truth and the foundations of semantics.Alfred Tarski - 1943 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 4 (3):341-376.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   545 citations  
  • Logic, Semantics, Metamathematics: Papers from 1923 to 1938.I. Grattan-Guinness - 1956 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 54 (1):281-282.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   42 citations  
  • Logico‐Linguistic Papers.P. F. Strawson & Michael Durrant - 1972 - Philosophical Books 13 (1):32-34.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  • Yes and no.I. Rumfitt - 2000 - Mind 109 (436):781-823.
    In what does the sense of a sentential connective consist? Like many others, I hold that its sense lies in rules that govern deductions. In the present paper, however, I argue that a classical logician should take the relevant deductions to be arguments involving affirmative or negative answers to yes-or-no questions that contain the connective. An intuitionistic logician will differ in concentrating exclusively upon affirmative answers. I conclude by arguing that a well known intuitionistic criticism of classical logic fails if (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   137 citations  
  • Plural signification and the Liar paradox.Stephen Read - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 145 (3):363-375.
    In recent years, speech-act theory has mooted the possibility that one utterance can signify a number of different things. This pluralist conception of signification lies at the heart of Thomas Bradwardine’s solution to the insolubles, logical puzzles such as the semantic paradoxes, presented in Oxford in the early 1320s. His leading assumption was that signification is closed under consequence, that is, that a proposition signifies everything which follows from what it signifies. Then any proposition signifying its own falsity, he showed, (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   14 citations  
  • Epimenides the cretan.A. N. Prior - 1958 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 23 (3):261-266.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   24 citations  
  • The liar paradox.Charles Parsons - 1974 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 3 (4):381 - 412.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   119 citations  
  • Assertion, denial, and the liar paradox.Terence Parsons - 1984 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 13 (2):137 - 152.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   69 citations  
  • Propositions without identity.Joseph Moore - 1999 - Noûs 33 (1):1-29.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   10 citations  
  • Outline of a theory of truth.Saul Kripke - 1975 - Journal of Philosophy 72 (19):690-716.
    A formal theory of truth, alternative to tarski's 'orthodox' theory, based on truth-value gaps, is presented. the theory is proposed as a fairly plausible model for natural language and as one which allows rigorous definitions to be given for various intuitive concepts, such as those of 'grounded' and 'paradoxical' sentences.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   879 citations  
  • Truth and understanding.James Higginbotham - 1992 - Philosophical Studies 65 (1-2):3 - 16.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   33 citations  
  • Fibonacci, Yablo, and the cassationist approach to paradox.Laurence Goldstein - 2006 - Mind 115 (460):867-890.
    A syntactically correct number-specification may fail to specify any number due to underspecification. For similar reasons, although each sentence in the Yablo sequence is syntactically perfect, none yields a statement with any truth-value. As is true of all members of the Liar family, the sentences in the Yablo sequence are so constructed that the specification of their truth-conditions is vacuous; the Yablo sentences fail to yield statements. The ‘revenge’ problem is easily defused. The solution to the semantical paradoxes offered here (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   18 citations  
  • The liar in context.Michael Glanzberg - 2001 - Philosophical Studies 103 (3):217 - 251.
    About twenty-five years ago, Charles Parsons published a paper that began by asking why we still discuss the Liar Paradox. Today, the question seems all the more apt. In the ensuing years we have seen not only Parsons’ work (1974), but seminal work of Saul Kripke (1975), and a huge number of other important papers. Too many to list. Surely, one of them must have solved it! In a way, most of them have. Most papers on the Liar Paradox offer (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   68 citations  
  • A contextual–hierarchical approach to truth and the liar paradox.Michael Glanzberg - 2004 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 33 (1):27-88.
    This paper presents an approach to truth and the Liar paradox which combines elements of context dependence and hierarchy. This approach is developed formally, using the techniques of model theory in admissible sets. Special attention is paid to showing how starting with some ideas about context drawn from linguistics and philosophy of language, we can see the Liar sentence to be context dependent. Once this context dependence is properly understood, it is argued, a hierarchical structure emerges which is neither ad (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   70 citations  
  • Against Stepping Back: A Critique of Contextualist Approaches to the Semantic Paradoxes.Christopher Gauker - 2006 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 35 (4):393-422.
    A number of philosophers have argued that the key to understanding the semantic paradoxes is to recognize that truth is essentially relative to context. All of these philosophers have been motivated by the idea that once a liar sentence has been uttered we can 'step back' and, from the point of view of a different context, judge that the liar sentence is true. This paper argues that this 'stepping back' idea is a mistake that results from failing to relativize truth (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   21 citations  
  • Objects of Thought.Kit Fine - 1973 - Philosophical Review 82 (3):392.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   91 citations  
  • Radical interpretation.Donald Davidson - 1973 - Dialectica 27 (1):314-328.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   374 citations  
  • Meaning, Quantification, Necessity: Themes in Philosophical Logic.Martin Davies - 1981 - Mind 92 (368):615-618.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   65 citations  
  • Index.Donald Davidson - 2005 - In Truth and predication. Cambridge, Mass.: pp. 173-180.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • VI.—The Nature of Believing.R. B. Braithwaite - 1933 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 33 (1):129-146.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   29 citations  
  • A Natural History of Negation.Jon Barwise & Laurence R. Horn - 1991 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 56 (3):1103.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   283 citations  
  • The Varieties of Reference.Louise M. Antony - 1987 - Philosophical Review 96 (2):275.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1136 citations  
  • On a family of paradoxes.Arthur Prior - 1960 - Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 2 (1):16-32.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   74 citations  
  • (7) law and causality.Frank Ramsey - 1961 - In John Langshaw Austin (ed.), Philosophical Papers. Oxford, England: Clarendon Press. pp. 140-163.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   46 citations  
  • Der wahrheitsbegriff in den formalisierten sprachen.Alfred Tarski - 1935 - Studia Philosophica 1:261--405.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   342 citations  
  • The structure and content of truth.Donald Davidson - 1990 - Journal of Philosophy 87 (6):279-328.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   316 citations  
  • Tractatus logico-philosophicus.Ludwig Wittgenstein - 1922 - Filosoficky Casopis 52:336-341.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1861 citations  
  • Uber Sinn und Bedeutung.Gottlob Frege - 1892 - Zeitschrift für Philosophie Und Philosophische Kritik 100 (1):25-50.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   742 citations