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  1. Truth and The Ambiguity of Negation.Teresa Marques - 2010 - In Erich Rast & Luiz Carlos Baptista (eds.), Meaning and Context. Peter Lang. pp. 2--235.
    This article has one aim, to reject the claim that negation is semantically ambiguous. The first section presents the putative incompatibility between truth-value gaps and the truth-schema; the second section presents the motivation for the ambiguity thesis; the third section summarizes arguments against the claim that natural language negation is semantically ambiguous; and the fourth section indicates the problems of an introduction of two distinct negation operators in natural language.
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  • ‘Thereby We Have Broken with the Old Logical Dualism’ – Reinach on Negative Judgement and Negation.Mark Textor - 2013 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 21 (3):570 - 590.
    Does (affirmative) judgement have a logical dual, negative judgement? Whether there is such a logical dualism was hotly debated at the beginning of the twentieth century. Frege argued in ?Negation? (1918/9) that logic can dispense with negative judgement. Frege's arguments shaped the views of later generations of analytic philosophers, but they will not have convinced such opponents as Brentano or Windelband. These philosophers believed in negative judgement for psychological, not logical, reasons. Reinach's ?On the Theory of Negative Judgement? (1911) spoke (...)
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  • Semantic defectiveness and the liar.Bradley Armour-Garb & James A. Woodbridge - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 164 (3):845-863.
    In this paper, we do two things. First, we provide some support for adopting a version of the meaningless strategy with respect to the liar paradox, and, second, we extend that strategy, by providing, albeit tentatively, a solution to that paradox—one that is semantic, rather than logical.
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  • Is 'no' a force-indicator? No!M. Textor - 2011 - Analysis 71 (3):448-456.
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  • The temporal prison.R. le Poidevin - 2011 - Analysis 71 (3):456-465.
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  • Logical Consequence.J. C. Beall, Greg Restall & Gil Sagi - 2019 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    A good argument is one whose conclusions follow from its premises; its conclusions are consequences of its premises. But in what sense do conclusions follow from premises? What is it for a conclusion to be a consequence of premises? Those questions, in many respects, are at the heart of logic (as a philosophical discipline). Consider the following argument: 1. If we charge high fees for university, only the rich will enroll. We charge high fees for university. Therefore, only the rich (...)
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  • Άδύνατον and material exclusion 1.Francesco Berto - 2008 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (2):165 – 190.
    Philosophical dialetheism, whose main exponent is Graham Priest, claims that some contradictions hold, are true, and it is rational to accept and assert them. Such a position is naturally portrayed as a challenge to the Law of Non-Contradiction (LNC). But all the classic formulations of the LNC are, in a sense, not questioned by a typical dialetheist, since she is (cheerfully) required to accept them by her own theory. The goal of this paper is to develop a formulation of the (...)
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  • (1 other version)Inferential Deflationism.Luca Incurvati & Julian J. Schlöder - forthcoming - The Philosophical Review.
    Deflationists about truth hold that the function of the truth predicate is to enable us to make certain assertions we could not otherwise make. Pragmatists claim that the utility of negation lies in its role in registering incompatibility. The pragmatist insight about negation has been successfully incorporated into bilateral theories of content, which take the meaning of negation to be inferentially explained in terms of the speech act of rejection. We implement the deflationist insight in a bilateral theory by taking (...)
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  • ‘True’ as Polysemous.Andy Yu - 2021 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 102 (4):542-569.
    In this paper, I propose that 'true’ is polysemous, and thus ambiguous. I suggest that the semantic paradoxes both motivates taking 'true’ to be polysemous and shows that the concept truth is indefinitely extensible. In doing so, I explain that 'true’ is polysemous between the meanings corresponding to the subconcepts of the concept truth generated by such indefinite extensibility. I conclude that the proposal provides satisfying solutions to the semantic paradoxes.
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  • Depicting Negation in Diagrammatic Logic: Legacy and Prospects.Fabien Schang & Amirouche Moktefi - 2008 - Diagrammatic Representation and Inference: Proceedings of the 5th International Conference Diagrams 2008 5223:236-241.
    Here are considered the conditions under which the method of diagrams is liable to include non-classical logics, among which the spatial representation of non-bivalent negation. This will be done with two intended purposes, namely: a review of the main concepts involved in the definition of logical negation; an explanation of the epistemological obstacles against the introduction of non-classical negations within diagrammatic logic.
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  • Two Indian dialectical logics: saptabhangi and catuskoti.Fabien Schang - 2010 - Journal of the Indian Council of Philosophical Research 27 (1):45-75.
    A rational interpretation is proposed for two ancient Indian logics: the Jaina saptabhaṅgī, and the Mādhyamika catuṣkoṭi. It is argued that the irrationality currently imputed to these logics relies upon some philosophical preconceptions inherited from Aristotelian metaphysics. This misunderstanding can be corrected in two steps: by recalling their assumptions about truth; by reconstructing their ensuing theory of judgment within a common conceptual framework.
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  • A 4-valued logic of strong conditional.Fabien Schang - 2018 - South American Journal of Logic 3 (1):59-86.
    How to say no less, no more about conditional than what is needed? From a logical analysis of necessary and sufficient conditions (Section 1), we argue that a stronger account of conditional can be obtained in two steps: firstly, by reminding its historical roots inside modal logic and set-theory (Section 2); secondly, by revising the meaning of logical values, thereby getting rid of the paradoxes of material implication whilst showing the bivalent roots of conditional as a speech-act based on affirmations (...)
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  • An Inferentialist Approach to Paraconsistency.James Trafford - 2014 - Abstracta 8 (1):55-73.
    This paper develops and motivates a paraconsistent approach to semantic paradox from within a modest inferentialist framework. I begin from the bilateralist theory developed by Greg Restall, which uses constraints on assertions and denials to motivate a multiple-conclusion sequent calculus for classical logic, and, via which, classical semantics can be determined. I then use the addition of a transparent truth-predicate to motivate an intermediate speech-act. On this approach, a liar-like sentence should be “weakly asserted”, involving a commitment to the sentence (...)
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  • Logical Investigations on Assertion and Denial.Massimiliano Carrara, Daniele Chiffi & Ciro De Florio - 2017 - Journal of Applied Logic 25:S1-S2.
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  • Some Preliminaries on Assertion and Denial.Massimiliano Carrara, Daniele Chiffi & Ciro De Florio - 2017 - Logique Et Analyse 239:203-207.
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  • Fragmented Truth.Andy Demfree Yu - 2016 - Dissertation, University of Oxford
    This thesis comprises three main chapters—each comprising one relatively standalone paper. The unifying theme is fragmentalism about truth, which is the view that the predicate “true” either expresses distinct concepts or expresses distinct properties. -/- In Chapter 1, I provide a formal development of alethic pluralism. Pluralism is the view that there are distinct truth properties associated with distinct domains of subject matter, where a truth property satisfies certain truth-characterizing principles. On behalf of pluralists, I propose an account of logic (...)
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  • (1 other version)Inferentialism.Florian Steinberger & Julien Murzi - 2017 - In Steinberger Florian & Murzi Julien (eds.), Blackwell Companion to Philosophy of Language. pp. 197-224.
    This article offers an overview of inferential role semantics. We aim to provide a map of the terrain as well as challenging some of the inferentialist’s standard commitments. We begin by introducing inferentialism and placing it into the wider context of contemporary philosophy of language. §2 focuses on what is standardly considered both the most important test case for and the most natural application of inferential role semantics: the case of the logical constants. We discuss some of the (alleged) benefits (...)
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  • Is ‘No’ a Force-Indicator? Yes, Sooner or Later!Fabien Schang & James Trafford - 2017 - Logica Universalis 11 (2):225-251.
    This paper discusses the philosophical and logical motivations for rejectivism, primarily by considering a dialogical approach to logic, which is formalized in a Question–Answer Semantics. We develop a generalized account of rejectivism through close consideration of Mark Textor's arguments against rejectivism that the negative expression ‘No’ is never used as an act of rejection and is equivalent with a negative sentence. In doing so, we also shed light upon well-known issues regarding the supposed non-embeddability and non-iterability of force indicators.
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  • There is no Logical Negation: True, False, Both, and Neither.Jc Beall - 2017 - Australasian Journal of Logic 14 (1):Article no. 1.
    In this paper I advance and defend a very simple position according to which logic is subclassical but is weaker than the leading subclassical-logic views have it.
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  • Classicality Lost: K3 and LP after the Fall.Matthias Jenny - 2016 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 6 (1):43-53.
    It is commonly held that the ascription of truth to a sentence is intersubstitutable with that very sentence. However, the simplest subclassical logics available to proponents of this view, namely K3 and LP, are hopelessly weak for many purposes. In this article, I argue that this is much more of a problem for proponents of LP than for proponents of K3. The strategies for recapturing classicality offered by proponents of LP are far less promising than those available to proponents of (...)
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  • (1 other version)No Title available: REVIEWS.Gian Aldo Antonelli - 1993 - Economics and Philosophy 9 (2):305-313.
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  • This is not an instance of (E).Teresa Marques - 2018 - Synthese 195 (3):1035–1063.
    Semantic paradoxes like the liar are notorious challenges to truth theories. A paradox can be phrased with minimal resources and minimal assumptions. It is not surprising, then, that the liar is also a challenge to minimalism about truth. Horwich (1990) deals swiftly with the paradox, after discriminating between other strategies for avoiding it without compromising minimalism. He dismisses the denial of classical logic, the denial that the concept of truth can coherently be applied to propositions, and the denial that the (...)
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  • DLEAC: A Dialetheic Logic with Exclusive Assumptions and Conclusions.Massimiliano Carrara & Enrico Martino - 2019 - Topoi 38 (2):379-388.
    This paper proposes a new dialetheic logic, a Dialetheic Logic with Exclusive Assumptions and Conclusions ), including classical logic as a particular case. In \, exclusivity is expressed via the speech acts of assuming and concluding. In the paper we adopt the semantics of the logic of paradox extended with a generalized notion of model and we modify its proof theory by refining the notions of assumption and conclusion. The paper starts with an explanation of the adopted philosophical perspective, then (...)
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  • Response to Heck.David Ripley - 2012 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 1 (4):254-257.
    In Heck, Richard Heck presents variants on the familiar liar paradox, intended to reveal limitations of theories of transparent truth. But all existing theories of transparent truth can respond to Heck's variants in just the same way they respond to the liar. These new variants thus put no new pressure on theories of transparent truth.
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  • Inter-model connectives and substructural logics.Igor Sedlár - 2014 - In Roberto Ciuni, Heinrich Wansing & Caroline Willkommen (eds.), Recent Trends in Philosophical Logic (Proceedings of Trends in Logic XI). Cham, Switzerland: Springer. pp. 195-209.
    The paper provides an alternative interpretation of ‘pair points’, discussed in Beall et al., "On the ternary relation and conditionality", J. of Philosophical Logic 41(3), 595-612. Pair points are seen as points viewed from two different ‘perspectives’ and the latter are explicated in terms of two independent valuations. The interpretation is developed into a semantics using pairs of Kripke models (‘pair models’). It is demonstrated that, if certain conditions are fulfilled, pair models are validity-preserving copies of positive substructural models. This (...)
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  • Logic: The Basics (2nd Edition).Jc Beall & Shay A. Logan - 2017 - Routledge.
    Logic: the Basics is an accessible introduction to the core philosophy topic of standard logic. Focussing on traditional Classical Logic the book deals with topics such as mathematical preliminaries, propositional logic, monadic quantified logic, polyadic quantified logic, and English and standard ‘symbolic transitions’. With exercises and sample answers throughout this thoroughly revised new edition not only comprehensively covers the core topics at introductory level but also gives the reader an idea of how they can take their knowledge further and the (...)
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  • (1 other version)A paradox of rejection.Thomas Brouwer - 2014 - Synthese 191 (18):4451-4464.
    Given any proposition, is it possible to have rationally acceptable attitudes towards it? Absent reasons to the contrary, one would probably think that this should be possible. In this paper I provide a reason to the contrary. There is a proposition such that, if one has any opinions about it at all, one will have a rationally unacceptable set of propositional attitudes—or if one doesn’t, one will end up being cognitively imperfect in some other manner. The proposition I am concerned (...)
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  • Absolute Contradiction, Dialetheism, and Revenge.Francesco Berto - 2014 - Review of Symbolic Logic 7 (2):193-207.
    Is there a notion of contradiction—let us call it, for dramatic effect, “absolute”—making all contradictions, so understood, unacceptable also for dialetheists? It is argued in this paper that there is, and that spelling it out brings some theoretical benefits. First it gives us a foothold on undisputed ground in the methodologically difficult debate on dialetheism. Second, we can use it to express, without begging questions, the disagreement between dialetheists and their rivals on the nature of truth. Third, dialetheism has an (...)
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  • Deep Inconsistency.Matti Eklund - 2002 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 80 (3):321-331.
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  • (1 other version)Beyond the Fregean myth: the value of logical values.Fabien Schang - 2010 - In Piotr Stalmaszczyk (ed.), Objects of Inquiry in Philosophy of Language and Linguistics. Ontos Verlag. pp. 245--260.
    One of the most prominent myths in analytic philosophy is the so- called “Fregean Axiom”, according to which the reference of a sentence is a truth value. In contrast to this referential semantics, a use-based formal semantics will be constructed in which the logical value of a sentence is not its putative referent but the information it conveys. Let us call by “Question Answer Semantics” (thereafter: QAS) the corresponding formal semantics: a non-Fregean many-valued logic, where the meaning of any sentence (...)
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  • Belief and Indeterminacy.Michael Caie - 2012 - Philosophical Review 121 (1):1-54.
    An attractive approach to the semantic paradoxes holds that cases of semantic pathology give rise to indeterminacy. What attitude should a rational agent have toward a proposition that it takes to be indeterminate in this sense? Orthodoxy holds that rationality requires that an agent disbelieve such a proposition. I argue that a rational agent should be such that it is indeterminate whether it believes the proposition in question. For rational agents, indeterminacy in the objects of their attitudes will filter up (...)
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  • Negation, Denial, and Rejection.David Ripley - 2011 - Philosophy Compass 6 (9):622-629.
    At least since [Frege, 1960] and [Geach, 1965], there has been some consensus about the relation between negation, the speech act of denial, and the attitude of rejection: a denial, the consensus has had it, is the assertion of a negation, and a rejection is a belief in a negation. Recently, though, there have been notable deviations from this orthodox view. Rejectivists have maintained that negation is to be explained in terms of denial or rejection, rather than vice versa. Some (...)
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  • Truth and reflection.Stephen Yablo - 1985 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 14 (3):297 - 349.
    Many topics have not been covered, in most cases because I don't know quite what to say about them. Would it be possible to add a decidability predicate to the language? What about stronger connectives, like exclusion negation or Lukasiewicz implication? Would an expanded language do better at expressing its own semantics? Would it contain new and more terrible paradoxes? Can the account be supplemented with a workable notion of inherent truth (see note 36)? In what sense does stage semantics (...)
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  • DLEAC and the Rejection Paradox.Massimiliano Carrara & Andrea Strollo - 2021 - Journal of Applied Logics 8 (2):377-396.
    In this paper we first develop a Dialetheic Logic with Exclusive Assumptions and Conclusions, DLEAC. We adopt the semantics of the logic of paradox (LP) extended with a notion of model suitable for DLEAC, and we modify its proof theory by refining the notions of assumption and conclusion, which are understood as speech acts. We introduce a new paradox – the rejectability paradox – first informally, then formally. We then provide its derivation in an extension of DLEAC contanining the rejectability (...)
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  • (1 other version)I—Ian Rumfitt: Truth and Meaning.Ian Rumfitt - 2014 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 88 (1):21-55.
    Should we explicate truth in terms of meaning, or meaning in terms of truth? Ramsey, Prior and Strawson all favoured the former approach: a statement is true if and only if things are as the speaker, in making the statement, states them to be; similarly, a belief is true if and only if things are as a thinker with that belief thereby believes them to be. I defend this explication of truth against a range of objections.Ramsey formalized this account of (...)
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  • (1 other version)Truth and Meaning.Ian Rumfitt - 2014 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 88 (1):21-55.
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  • Gaps and Gluts: Reply to Parsons.Graham Priest - 1995 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 25 (1):57 - 66.
    1 IntroductionNumerous solutions have been proposed to the semantic paradoxes. Two that are frequently singled out and compared are the following. The first is that according to which paradoxical sentences are neither true nor false — as it is sometimes put, they are semantic gaps. The second is that according to which paradoxical sentences are both true and false — as it is sometimes put, they are semantic gluts. Calling the first of these a solution is, in fact, somewhat misleading: (...)
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  • (1 other version)Inferential Deflationism.Luca Incurvati & Julian J. Schlöder - 2023 - Philosophical Review 132 (4):529-578.
    Deflationists about truth hold that the function of the truth predicate is to enable us to make certain assertions we could not otherwise make. Pragmatists claim that the utility of negation lies in its role in registering incompatibility. The pragmatist insight about negation has been successfully incorporated into bilateral theories of content, which take the meaning of negation to be inferentially explained in terms of the speech act of rejection. We implement the deflationist insight in a bilateral theory by taking (...)
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  • (1 other version)On Heck’s New Liar.Julien Murzi - 2012 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 1 (4):258-269.
    Richard Heck has recently drawn attention on a new version of the Liar Paradox, one which relies on logical resources that are so weak as to suggest that it may not admit of any ‘‘truly satisfying, consistent solution’’. I argue that this conclusion is too strong. Heck’s Liar reduces to absurdity principles that are already rejected by consistent paracomplete theories of truth, such as Kripke’s and Field’s. Moreover, the new Liar gives us no reasons to think that these principles cannot (...)
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  • True Contradictions.Terence Parsons - 1990 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 20 (3):335 - 353.
    In In Contradiction, Graham Priest shows, as clearly as anything like this can be shown, that it is coherent to maintain that some sentences can be both true and false at the same time. As a consequence, some contradictions are true, and an appreciation of this possibility advances our understanding of the nature of logic and language.
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  • Book Review: Scott Soames. Understanding Truth. [REVIEW]Robert C. Koons - 2000 - Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 41 (1):77-94.
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  • Comments on the acceptance and rejection of sentences in theology.Adam Olszewski - 2018 - Studies in Logic, Grammar and Rhetoric 54 (1):99-113.
    This work is interdisciplinary as it lies at the crossroads of three disciplines: philosophy, theology, and logic. The article attempts to discuss the way in which sentences (judgements) are accepted and rejected within theology. First, the role of the argument of authority in theology is discussed. Subsequently, the most important types of theorems with certain degrees of theological certainty were identified. Finally, censorship was presented as a means of rejecting theorems in theology. Finally, censorship was indicated as a model for (...)
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  • Classical Harmony and Separability.Julien Murzi - 2020 - Erkenntnis 85 (2):391-415.
    According to logical inferentialists, the meanings of logical expressions are fully determined by the rules for their correct use. Two key proof-theoretic requirements on admissible logical rules, harmony and separability, directly stem from this thesis—requirements, however, that standard single-conclusion and assertion-based formalizations of classical logic provably fail to satisfy :1035–1051, 2011). On the plausible assumption that our logical practice is both single-conclusion and assertion-based, it seemingly follows that classical logic, unlike intuitionistic logic, can’t be accounted for in inferentialist terms. In (...)
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  • The Extraordinary Impossibility of Sherlock Holmes.Ben Caplan - 2016 - Res Philosophica 93 (2):335-355.
    In an addendum to Naming and Necessity, Saul Kripke argues against his earlier view that Sherlock Holmes is a possible person. In this paper, I suggest a nonstandard interpretation of the addendum. A key feature of this non-standard interpretation is that it attempts to make sense of why Kripke would be rejecting the view that Sherlock Holmes is a possible person without asserting that it is not the case that Sherlock Holmes is a possible person.
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  • Shrieking against gluts: the solution to the 'just true' problem.Jc Beall - 2013 - Analysis 73 (3):438-445.
    This paper applies what I call the shrieking method (a refined version of an idea with roots in Priest's work) to one of – if not the – issues confronting glut-theoretic approaches to paradox (viz., the problem of ‘just true’ or, what comes to the same, ‘just false’). The paper serves as a challenge to formulate a problem of ‘just true’ that isn't solved by shrieking (as advanced in this paper), if such a problem be thought to exist.
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  • Denial and Disagreement.Julien Murzi & Massimiliano Carrara - 2015 - Topoi 34 (1):109-119.
    We cast doubts on the suggestion, recently made by Graham Priest, that glut theorists may express disagreement with the assertion of A by denying A. We show that, if denial is to serve as a means to express disagreement, it must be exclusive, in the sense of being correct only if what is denied is false only. Hence, it can’t be expressed in the glut theorist’s language, essentially for the same reasons why Boolean negation can’t be expressed in such a (...)
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  • Categoricity Problem for LP and K3.Selcuk Kaan Tabakci - 2024 - Studia Logica 112 (6):1373-1407.
    Even though the strong relationship between proof-theoretic and model-theoretic notions in one’s logical theory can be shown by soundness and completeness proofs, whether we can define the model-theoretic notions by means of the inferences in a proof system is not at all trivial. For instance, provable inferences in a proof system of classical logic in the logical framework do not determine its intended models as shown by Carnap (Formalization of logic, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1943), i.e., there are non-Boolean models (...)
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  • Supervaluation fixed-point logics of truth.Philip Kremer & Alasdair Urquhart - 2008 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 37 (5):407-440.
    Michael Kremer defines fixed-point logics of truth based on Saul Kripke’s fixed point semantics for languages expressing their own truth concepts. Kremer axiomatizes the strong Kleene fixed-point logic of truth and the weak Kleene fixed-point logic of truth, but leaves the axiomatizability question open for the supervaluation fixed-point logic of truth and its variants. We show that the principal supervaluation fixed point logic of truth, when thought of as consequence relation, is highly complex: it is not even analytic. We also (...)
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  • Negation, anti-realism, and the denial defence.Imogen Dickie - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 150 (2):161 - 185.
    Here is one argument against realism. (1) Realists are committed to the classical rules for negation. But (2) legitimate rules of inference must conserve evidence. And (3) the classical rules for negation do not conserve evidence. So (4) realism is wrong. Most realists reject 2. But it has recently been argued that if we allow denied sentences as premisses and conclusions in inferences we will be able to reject 3. And this new argument against 3 generates a new response to (...)
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  • Towards a polarized semantics for assertion and denial.Massimiliano Carrara, Daniele Chiffi & Ciro De Florio - forthcoming - Logic Journal of the IGPL.
    Recent logic and linguistic literature suggest that certain forms of denial cannot be reduced to a simple assertion of negation. In particular, the existence of mathematical and empirical conjectures offers a basis for refuting Frege’s thesis of equivalence between denial and assertion of negation. Following this line of thought we develop a formal framework with two primitive illocutionary operators for assertion and denial, where denial is not a simple negation of assertion. We introduce a semantics for the operators mentioned above. (...)
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