This chapter establishes the concept of a “symbolic system of representation“ to make clear how it is possible that humans use not only the language-based system of representation for cognitive contents but also a many layered non-linguistic system, a system which we probably share with other species. A symbolic system of representation denotes a general concept of a performance of which our language is only one single case, but which nevertheless is most easily explained through the case of language. A (...) system of representation should enable us to form and manipulate an idea of a state of affairs or of an event without having the appropriate intuition of it. We usually think that we do this only using linguistic expressions, but this is not the whole truth. Language is one system of representation, but we can in principle conceive of other systems of representation with the same performance. Husserl’s theory of meaning already reveals this possibility. A phenomenological analysis reveals that a non-linguistic system of representation is in fact still functioning in our own consciousness. We simultaneously use different means of representation, the most prominent of which are language, gestures, feelings and scenic images. It is especially fruitful to investigate the scenic mode of daydreaming as a central form of non-linguistic thinking. Through a close comparison of alternative systems of representation, the systematic difference of usual semantics in normal language systems based on convention and the more natural similarity semantics of some non-linguistic systems of representation is revealed. (shrink)

Equality1 gives rise to challenging questions which are not altogether easy to answer. Is it a relation? A relation between objects, or between names or signs of objects? In my Begriffsschrift I assumed the latter. The reasons which seem to favour this are the following: a = a and a = b are obviously statements of differing cognitive value; a = a holds a priori and, according to Kant, is to be labeled analytic, while statements of the form a = (...) b often contain very valuable extensions of our knowledge and cannot always be established a priori. The discovery that the rising sun is not new every morning, but always the same, was one of the most fertile astronomical discoveries. Even to-day the identification of a small planet or a comet is not always a matter of course. Now if we were to regard equality as a relation between that which the names ‘a’ and ‘b’ designate, it would seem that a = b could not differ from a = a (i.e. provided a = b is true). A relation would thereby be expressed of a thing to itself, and indeed one in which each thing stands to itself but to no other thing. What is intended to be said by a = b seems to be that the signs or names ‘a’ and ‘b’ designate the same thing, so that those signs themselves would be under discussion; a relation between them would be asserted. But this relation would hold between the names or signs only in so far as they named or designated something. It would be mediated by the connexion of each of the two signs with the same designated thing. But this is arbitrary. Nobody can be forbidden to use any arbitrarily producible event or object as a sign for something. In that case the sentence a = b would no longer refer to the subject matter, but only to its mode of designation; we would express no proper knowledge by its means. But in many cases this is just what we want to do. If the sign ‘a’ is distinguished from the sign ‘b’ only as object (here, by means of its shape), not as sign (i.e. not by the manner in which it designates something), the cognitive value of a = a becomes essentially equal to that of a = b, provided a = b is true.. (shrink)

Darstellung des Noema in 12 Thesen.\nverwendete Textstellen: Ideen 1: S. 203, 22-23; S. 204, 20-21; S. 357, 19-20: Handlungen sind zielgerichtet. Dabei bedarf eines keines physischen Objekts. Husserl setzt and diese Stelle das Noema. Somit wird auch zielgerichtetes Handeln aufgrund einer Halluzination m{ö}glich, Zielgerichtet zu sein bedeutet ein Noema zu haben.\n1. Follesdal´sche These: Noema ist eine intensionale Entit{ä}t, eine Generalisierung des Begriffs Sinn/Bedeutung.\n2. These: Das Noema hat zwei Bestandteile, a) der noematische Sinn, der allen thetischen Handlungen (erinnern, sich vorstellen usw.) (...) gem{ä}{ß} desselben Objekts mit denselben Eigenschaften in derselben Gerichtetheit gemeinsam ist und b) die Gegebenheitsweise (hat auch Sinncharakter), die sich unterscheidet in Handlungen mit verschiedenem thetischen Charakter.\n3. These: Der noematische Sinn ergibt sich aus der Art und Weise, wie Bewu{ß}tsein zum Objekt in Relation steht.\n!! 4. These: Das Noema einer Handlung ist nicht das Objekt dieser Handlung\n5. These: Das Objekt einer Handlung ist eine Funktion des noematischen Sinns, d.h. mit einem bestimmten Noema kann nur ein Objekt korrespondieren.\n6. These: Jedoch k{ö}nnen mit einem bestimmten Objekt verschiedene Noemata korrespondieren. (z.B. kann ein Objekt das Ziel verschiedener thetischer Handlunge sein, etwa erinnern, wahrnehmen, daher:)\n6. These a): Mit einem bestimmten Objekt korrespondieren verschiedene noematische Sinne.\n7. These: Jede Handlung besteht aus nur einem Noema. Sie wird durch dieses Noema charakterisiert. (Umgekehrt trifft dies nicht zu.)\n8. These: Noemata sind abstrakte Entit{ä}ten. (Sinne sind nicht real. Sie sind bezogen auf Handlungen in tempor{ä}ren Intervallen.)\n9. These: Noemata werden nicht durch unsere Sinnesorgane wahrgenommen.\n10. These: Noemata gelangen durch ph{ä}nomenologische Reflektion ins Bewu{ß}tsein.\n11. These: Eine ph{ä}nomenologische Reflektion kann iterativ geschehen (ann{ä}herungsweise; in Schritte gegliedert). Dies ist so, weil schon die Korrespondenz zwischen Sinn und Objekt wieder ein Objekt ergibt. Es folgt ein unendlicher Regress.\nPhysische Objekte sind transzendent in dem Sinne, dass sie unendlich viele Noemata haben. Sinn kann sie nie ersch{ö}pfend erfassen.\nNoemata k{ö}nnen andererseits ein physisches Objekt repr{ä}sentieren in der Form, dass mehr intendiert wird als gesehen wird. So denkt man sich etwa bei einem Stuhl, von dem man nur zwei Beine sieht, die beiden {ü}brigen hinzu.\n12. These: Diese Muster der Vorherbestimmung bilden zusammen mit den Gegebenheitsweisen das Noema (s. These 2). (shrink)

This study aims to corroborate Merleau-Ponty’s interpretations of fundamental ideas from Saussure’s linguistics by linking them to works that were independently elaborated by Jan Mukařovský, Czech structuralist aesthetician and literary theorist. I provide a comparative analysis of the two authors’ theories of language and their interpretations of thought as fundamentally determined by language. On this basis, I investigate how they conceive linguistic innovation and its translation into changes in the constituted language and other social codes and institutions. I explain how (...) they elaborate on Saussure’s idea of language as a system of oppositions by interpreting cultural innovation as a systematic variation of pre-established social norms and, similarly, linguistic innovation as gesturing within language. Connectedly, I show how Mukařovský’s works help clarify Merleau-Ponty’s focus on the gestural dimension of language. By discussing the two thinkers’ arguments in favour of linguistic innovation, I explore what could be called phenomenological limits of structuralism. (shrink)

It is well-known that Husserl denies bodily behaviour as expressive in the I. Logical Investigation but he dramatically changes his view and holds that bodily behaviour is essentially expressive in...

Husserl’s phenomenology of imagination embraces a cluster of different theories and approaches regarding the multi-faced phenomenon of imaginative experience. In this paper I consider one aspect that seems to be crucial to the understanding of a particular form of imagination that Husserl names pure phantasy. I argue that the phenomenon of Ego-splitting discloses the best way to elucidate the peculiarity of pure phantasy with respect to other forms of representative acts and to any simple form of act modification. First, I (...) unravel the phenomenological distinctions which, respectively, oppose phantasy to perception, on the one hand, and phantasy to other forms of the so-called “intuitive re-presentations”. Second, I introduce the difference between presentative and representative acts, arguing that this cannot help us to single out the defining feature of phantasy experiences. The third section draws again an important distinction between pure phantasy and neutrality modification, which allows me to finally determine an internal trait of phantasy experiences, which Husserl refers to as the “Ego-splitting”. In this way, I hope to contribute to a refined characterization of Husserl’s phenomenology of imagination. (shrink)

The title question should be construed as an epistemological and not ontological one. Omitting the difficult problems of the ontology of intentionality we will ask, if all, what is needed to explain the phenomenon of meaningful use of words, could be found “in our private head” interpreted as a sphere of specific privileged access, the sphere that is in the relevant epistemological sense subjective, private or non public. There are many “mentalistic” theories of meaning that force us to the answer: (...) “yes”. According to these theories our words are meaningful in virtue of some intentions of the speaker. And our intentions consist in having some mental states that should be in the relevant sense subjective or private. (Searle, Chisholm) But there are also the philosophers (Kripke, Putnam) who claim to have the evidence to the contrary. They argue that the meanings of our words could not be “in the head”, because of two important reasons. (i) Very often we don’t know exactly the meanings of the words that we use meaningfully. Furthermore, our “semantical self-knowledge” is principally corrigible by other people, and hence our access to the meanings we use could be by no means privileged. And secondly (ii) we can imagine a situation in which two subjects with the same mental intention use the same word with the very different meanings. We will investigate our question on the ground of the Ingarden’s philosophy. As we will see, his answer turns out to be in an interesting sense: “yes and no”. (shrink)

This volume commemorates the centenary of Logical Investigations by subjecting the work to a comprehensive critical analysis. It contains new contributions by leading scholars addressing some of the most central analyses to be found in the book.

EVERY speaker of a language knows a bewildering variety of linguistic facts, and will come to know many more. It is knowledge that connects sound and meaning. Questions about the nature of this knowledge cannot be separated from fundamental questions about the nature of language. The conception of language we should adopt depends on the part it plays in explaining our knowledge of language. This chapter explores options in accounting for language, and our knowledge of language, and defends the view (...) that individuals’ languages are constituted by the standing knowledge they carry from one speech situation to another. (shrink)

In this article, I will argue that while Marion’s criticism of Heidegger’s project of fundamental ontology is in many ways sound, Marion remains bound to the conceptual opposition that existential phenomenology has successfully overcome. Namely, I will argue that Marion remains dependent upon the transcendental dilemma according to which we must rely on the strict differentiation between explanans and explanandum. Marion sees no way of departing from Heidegger’s project other than reversing the order of explanation and switching the places of (...) the explanans and explanandum, which means that phenomena start appearing as explanans. I will demonstrate how existential phenomenology has overcome this conceptual dilemma, and then I will argue that we could make a much better account of saturated phenomena, if we ground our insights in the idea of being-in-the-world. (shrink)

This essay asks how we can explain why, in contrast with Western responses, a large number of Chinese citizens from all walks of life appear to have little sympathy with the spate of recent cases of dissidents having fallen foul of government regulations pertaining to public political criticism. The answer proposed in the essay is that there are cultural obstacles to the emergence of political dialogue in China beyond the well-canvassed official strictures on political critique. The essay addresses two of (...) these obstacles under the headings of the Confucian meta-rule of obedience and normative nominalism, argued to be characteristic of traditional Chinese conceptions of language. The reasons why these two cultural features are able to contribute so effectively to the retardation of political dialogicity in China, this essay claims, are to be sought in their deep roots in Chinese thought and the political unconscious of China to this day. (shrink)