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Deflationary Normative Pluralism.Evan Tiffany - 2007 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Supplementary Volume 33 (sup1):231-262.details
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Deflationary normative pluralism.Evan Tiffany - 2007 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 37 (5):pp. 231-262.details
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Ethics and Intuitions.Peter Singer - 2005 - The Journal of Ethics 9 (3-4):331-352.details
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Potential congruence.Samuel Scheffler - 2008 - In Paul Bloomfield (ed.), Morality and Self-Interest. New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Human morality.Samuel Scheffler - 1992 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Précis of Human Morality.Samuel Scheffler - 1995 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 55 (4):939-940.details
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Reasons and Persons.Derek Parfit - 1984 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.details
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Just plain "ought''.Owen McLeod - 2001 - The Journal of Ethics 5 (4):269-291.details
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Morality, self-interest, and two kinds of prudential practical rationality.John Lemos - 2006 - Philosophia 34 (1):85-93.details
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Classical and sour forms of virtue.Joel J. Kupperman - 2008 - In Paul Bloomfield (ed.), Morality and Self-Interest. New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Morals by agreement.David P. Gauthier - 1986 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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How Outlandish Can Imaginary Cases Be?Jakob Elster - 2011 - Journal of Applied Philosophy 28 (3):241-258.details
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The Ring of Gyges: Overridingness and the Unity of Reason.David Copp - 1997 - Social Philosophy and Policy 14 (1):86-106.details
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Toward a pluralist and teleological theory of normativity.David Copp - 2009 - Philosophical Issues 19 (1):21-37.details
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Incommensurability, incomparability, and practical reason.Ruth Chang (ed.) - 1997 - Cambridge, MA, USA: Harvard.details
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‘All Things Considered’.Ruth Chang - 2004 - Philosophical Perspectives 18 (1):1–22.details
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Prudence.Phillip Bricker - 1980 - Journal of Philosophy 77 (7):381-401.details
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Why it's bad to be bad.Paul Bloomfield - 2008 - In Morality and Self-Interest. New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Toward a pluralist and teleological theory of normativity.David Copp - 2009 - In Ernest Sosa & Enrique Villanueva (eds.), Metaethics. Boston: Wiley Periodicals.details
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Introduction.Ruth Chang - 1997 - In Incommensurability, incomparability, and practical reason. Cambridge, MA, USA: Harvard. pp. 1-34.details
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Morality and Self-Interest.Paul Bloomfield (ed.) - 2008 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Paul Bloomfield.Diana Meyers, Joel Kupperman, Margaret Gilbert, Sonia Michel & Walter Sinnott-Armstrong - 2008 - In Paul Bloomfield (ed.), Morality and Self-Interest. New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Too Much Morality.Stephen Finlay - 2008 - In Paul Bloomfield (ed.), Morality and Self-Interest. New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Rationality Through Reasoning.John Broome (ed.) - 2013 - Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell.details
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On What Matters: Two-Volume Set.Derek Parfit - 2011 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Value, Comparability, and Choice.Donald Regan - 1997 - In Ruth Chang (ed.), Incommensurability, incomparability, and practical reason. Cambridge, MA, USA: Harvard.details
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Two Dualisms of Practical Reason1.Dale Dorsey - 2013 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 8:114.details
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On Virtue Ethics.Rosalind Hursthouse - 1999 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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Morality in a Natural World: Selected Essays in Metaethics.David Copp - 2007 - New York: Cambridge University Press.details
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The Methods of Ethics.Henry Sidgwick - 1907 - Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia 30 (4):401-401.details
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