Switch to: Citations

Add references

You must login to add references.
  1. Team Reasoning and Collective Intentionality.Björn Petersson - 2016 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 8 (2):199-218.
    Different versions of the idea that individualism about agency is the root of standard game theoretical puzzles have been defended by Regan 1980, Bacharach, Hurley, Sugden :165–181, 2003), and Tuomela 2013, among others. While collectivistic game theorists like Michael Bacharach provide formal frameworks designed to avert some of the standard dilemmas, philosophers of collective action like Raimo Tuomela aim at substantive accounts of collective action that may explain how agents overcoming such social dilemmas would be motivated. This paper focuses on (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   11 citations  
  • Collective Intentions And Team Agency.Natalie Gold & Robert Sugden - 2007 - Journal of Philosophy 104 (3):109-137.
    In the literature of collective intentions, the ‘we-intentions’ that lie behind cooperative actions are analysed in terms of individual mental states. The core forms of these analyses imply that all Nash equilibrium behaviour is the result of collective intentions, even though not all Nash equilibria are cooperative actions. Unsatisfactorily, the latter cases have to be excluded either by stipulation or by the addition of further, problematic conditions. We contend that the cooperative aspect of collective intentions is not a property of (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   96 citations  
  • Why Change the Subject? On Collective Epistemic Agency.András Szigeti - 2015 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 6 (4):843-864.
    This paper argues that group attitudes can be assessed in terms of standards of rationality and that group-level rationality need not be due to individual-level rationality. But it also argues that groups cannot be collective epistemic agents and are not collectively responsible for collective irrationality. I show that we do not need the concept of collective epistemic agency to explain how group-level irrationality can arise. Group-level irrationality arises because even rational individuals can fail to reason about how their attitudes will (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  • Three Kinds of Collective Attitudes.Christian List - 2014 - Erkenntnis 79 (S9):1601-1622.
    This paper offers a comparison of three different kinds of collective attitudes: aggregate, common, and corporate attitudes. They differ not only in their relationship to individual attitudes—e.g., whether they are “reducible” to individual attitudes—but also in the roles they play in relation to the collectives to which they are ascribed. The failure to distinguish them can lead to confusion, in informal talk as well as in the social sciences. So, the paper’s message is an appeal for disambiguation.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   25 citations  
  • Beliefs about beliefs: Representation and constraining function of wrong beliefs in young children's understanding of deception.H. Wimmer - 1983 - Cognition 13 (1):103-128.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   819 citations  
  • Are Individualist Accounts of Collective Responsibility Morally Deficient?Andras Szigeti - 2013 - In Anita Konzelmann Ziv & Hans Bernhard Schmid (eds.), Institutions, Emotions, and Group Agents. Dordrecht: Springer. pp. 329-342.
    Individualists hold that moral responsibility can be ascribed to single human beings only. An important collectivist objection is that individualism is morally deficient because it leaves a normative residue. Without attributing responsibility to collectives there remains a “deficit in the accounting books” (Pettit). This collectivist strategy often uses judgment aggregation paradoxes to show that the collective can be responsible when no individual is. I argue that we do not need collectivism to handle such cases because the individualist analysis leaves no (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  • Intentional joint agency: shared intention lite.Elisabeth Pacherie - 2013 - Synthese 190 (10):1817-1839.
    Philosophers have proposed accounts of shared intentions that aim at capturing what makes a joint action intentionally joint. On these accounts, having a shared intention typically presupposes cognitively and conceptually demanding theory of mind skills. Yet, young children engage in what appears to be intentional, cooperative joint action long before they master these skills. In this paper, I attempt to characterize a modest or ‘lite’ notion of shared intention, inspired by Michael Bacharach’s approach to team–agency theory in terms of framing, (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   60 citations  
  • Between Reason and Reflex: Response to Commentators. [REVIEW]T. S. Gendler - 2012 - Analysis 72 (4):799-811.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   12 citations  
  • Aliefs Don't Exist, Though Some of their Relatives Do. [REVIEW]Greg Currie & Anna Ichino - 2012 - Analysis 72 (4):788-798.
    Much of Tamar Gendler’s dense and engaging book argues for the emotional, cognitive and motivational power of imagination, which is presented as a central feature of human mental architecture. But in the final chapters Gendler argues that some of us have over-exploited this resource, too easily assuming that, if belief cannot explain a class of human behaviours, imagination will do the job. She gives a number of examples of problematic behaviours (‘Gendler cases’, as we shall say), which in her view (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   16 citations  
  • Joint attention in joint action.Anika Fiebich & Shaun Gallagher - 2013 - Philosophical Psychology 26 (4):571-87.
    In this paper, we investigate the role of intention and joint attention in joint actions. Depending on the shared intentions the agents have, we distinguish between joint path-goal actions and joint final-goal actions. We propose an instrumental account of basic joint action analogous to a concept of basic action and argue that intentional joint attention is a basic joint action. Furthermore, we discuss the functional role of intentional joint attention for successful cooperation in complex joint actions. Anika Fiebich is PhD (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   17 citations  
  • Early Developments in Joint Action.Celia A. Brownell - 2011 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 2 (2):193-211.
    Joint action, critical to human social interaction and communication, has garnered increasing scholarly attention in many areas of inquiry, yet its development remains little explored. This paper reviews research on the growth of joint action over the first 2 years of life to show how children become progressively more able to engage deliberately, autonomously, and flexibly in joint action with adults and peers. It is suggested that a key mechanism underlying the dramatic changes in joint action over the second year (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   30 citations  
  • (2 other versions)Biosemantics.Ruth Millikan - 1989 - Journal of Philosophy 86 (6):281--297.
    " Biosemantics " was the title of a paper on mental representation originally printed in The Journal of Philosophy in 1989. It contained a much abbreviated version of the work on mental representation in Language Thought and Other Biological Categories. There I had presented a naturalist theory of intentional signs generally, including linguistic representations, graphs, charts and diagrams, road sign symbols, animal communications, the "chemical signals" that regulate the function of glands, and so forth. But the term " biosemantics " (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   294 citations  
  • Collective intentionality and the social sciences.Deborah Perron Tollefsen - 2002 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 32 (1):25-50.
    In everyday discourse and in the context of social scientific research we often attribute intentional states to groups. Contemporary approaches to group intentionality have either dismissed these attributions as metaphorical or provided an analysis of our attributions in terms of the intentional states of individuals in the group.Insection1, the author argues that these approaches are problematic. In sections 2 and 3, the author defends the view that certain groups are literally intentional agents. In section 4, the author argues that there (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   70 citations  
  • Joint actions and group agents.Philip Pettit & David Schweikard - 2006 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 36 (1):18-39.
    University of Cologne, Germany Joint action and group agency have emerged as focuses of attention in recent social theory and philosophy but they have rarely been connected with one another. The argument of this article is that whereas joint action involves people acting together to achieve any sort of result, group agency requires them to act together for the achievement of one result in particular: the construction of a centre of attitude and agency that satisfies the usual constraints of consistency (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   113 citations  
  • Walking Together: A Paradigmatic Social Phenomenon.Margaret Gilbert - 1990 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 15 (1):1-14.
    The everyday concept of a social group is approached by examining the concept of going for a walk together, an example of doing something together, or "shared action". Two analyses requiring shared personal goals are rejected, since they fail to explain how people walking together have obligations and rights to appropriate behavior, and corresponding rights of rebuke. An alternative account is proposed: those who walk together must constitute the "plural subject" of a goal. The nature of plural subjecthood, the thesis (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   218 citations  
  • (2 other versions)Direction of Fit and Motivational Cognitivism.Sergio Tenenbaum - 2010 - In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 235-64.
    The idea of direction of fit has been found appealing by many philosophers. Anscombe’s famous examples have persuaded many of us that there must be some deep difference between belief and desire that is captured by the metaphor of direction of fit. Most of the aim of the paper is to try to get clear on which intuitions Anscombe’s example taps into. My view is that there is more than one intuition in play here, and I will try to show (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   23 citations  
  • Joint attention, collective knowledge, and the "we" perspective.Axel Seemann - 2007 - Social Epistemology 21 (3):217 – 230.
    In this paper, I am concerned with the practical aspect of joint attention. In particular, I ask what enables us to engage in joint activities, and go on to suggest that on a representational account of joint attention, this question cannot be satisfactorily answered. I explore John Campbell's "relational" approach and suggest that if one couples it with Peter Hobson's notion of "feeling perception", one may be in a position to account for the action-enabling aspect of joint engagements. This approach (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  • (1 other version)Shared intention.Michael E. Bratman - 1993 - Ethics 104 (1):97-113.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   280 citations  
  • (1 other version)Alief and Belief.Tamar Szabó Gendler - 2008 - Journal of Philosophy 105 (10):634-663.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   382 citations  
  • (3 other versions)Freedom of the will and the concept of a person.Harry G. Frankfurt - 1971 - Journal of Philosophy 68 (1):5-20.
    It is my view that one essential difference between persons and other creatures is to be found in the structure of a person's will. Besides wanting and choosing and being moved to do this or that, men may also want to have certain desires and motives. They are capable of wanting to be different, in their preferences and purposes, from what they are. Many animals appear to have the capacity for what I shall call "first-order desires" or "desires of the (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1498 citations  
  • (2 other versions)Direction of fit and motivational cognitivism.Sergio Tenenbaum - 2006 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 1:235-264.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   21 citations  
  • Young children enforce social norms selectively depending on the violator’s group affiliation.Marco Fh Schmidt, Hannes Rakoczy & Michael Tomasello - 2012 - Cognition 124 (3):325-333.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   45 citations  
  • Understanding and sharing intentions: The origins of cultural cognition.Michael Tomasello, Malinda Carpenter, Josep Call, Tanya Behne & Henrike Moll - 2005 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 28 (5):675-691.
    We propose that the crucial difference between human cognition and that of other species is the ability to participate with others in collaborative activities with shared goals and intentions: shared intentionality. Participation in such activities requires not only especially powerful forms of intention reading and cultural learning, but also a unique motivation to share psychological states with others and unique forms of cognitive representation for doing so. The result of participating in these activities is species-unique forms of cultural cognition and (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   514 citations  
  • Is group agency a social phenomenon?Carol Rovane - 2019 - Synthese 196 (12):4869-4898.
    It is generally assumed that group agency must be a social phenomenon because it involves interactions among many human beings. This assumption overlooks the real metaphysical nature of agency, which is both normative and voluntarist. Construed as a normative phenomenon, individual agency arises wherever there is a point of view from which deliberation and action proceed in accord with the requirements that define individual rationality. Such a point of view is never a metaphysical given, but is always a product of (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • In defense of a developmental dogma: children acquire propositional attitude folk psychology around age 4.Hannes Rakoczy - 2017 - Synthese 194 (3):689-707.
    When do children acquire a propositional attitude folk psychology or theory of mind? The orthodox answer to this central question of developmental ToM research had long been that around age 4 children begin to apply “belief” and other propositional attitude concepts. This orthodoxy has recently come under serious attack, though, from two sides: Scoffers complain that it over-estimates children’s early competence and claim that a proper understanding of propositional attitudes emerges only much later. Boosters criticize the orthodoxy for underestimating early (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   23 citations  
  • Empathy≠sharing: Perspectives from phenomenology and developmental psychology.Dan Zahavi & Philippe Rochat - 2015 - Consciousness and Cognition 36:543-553.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   39 citations  
  • Let’s pretend!: Children and joint action.Deborah Tollefsen - 2005 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 35 (1):75-97.
    According to many, joint intentional action must be understood in terms of joint intentions. Most accounts of joint intention appeal to a set of sophisticated individual intentional states. The author argues that standard accounts of joint intention exclude the possibility of joint action in young children because they presuppose that the participants have a robust theory of mind, something young children lack. But young children do engage in joint action. The author offers a revision of Michael Bratman’s analysis of joint (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   59 citations  
  • Varieties of Meaning: The 2002 Jean Nicod Lectures.Ruth Garrett Millikan - 2004 - MIT Press.
    How the various things that are said to have meaning—purpose, natural signs, linguistic signs, perceptions, and thoughts—are related to one another.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   287 citations  
  • You, Me, and We: The Sharing of Emotional Experiences.D. Zahavi - 2015 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 22 (1-2):84-101.
    When surveying recent philosophical work on the nature and status of collective intentionality and we-intentions, it is striking how much effort is spent on analysing the structure of joint action and on establishing whether or not the intention to, say, go for a walk or paint a house together is reducible to some form of I-intentionality. Much less work has been devoted to an analysis of shared affects and emotions. This is regrettable, not only because emotional sharing in all likelihood (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   77 citations  
  • Common Knowledge and Reductionism about Shared Agency.Olle Blomberg - 2016 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 94 (2):315-326.
    Most reductionist accounts of intentional joint action include a condition that it must be common knowledge between participants that they have certain intentions and beliefs that cause and coordinate the joint action. However, this condition has typically simply been taken for granted rather than argued for. The condition is not necessary for ensuring that participants are jointly responsible for the action in which each participates, nor for ensuring that each treats the others as partners rather than as social tools. It (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   28 citations  
  • Anti-empathy.Peter Goldie - 2011 - In Amy Coplan & Peter Goldie (eds.), Empathy: Philosophical and Psychological Perspectives. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press UK. pp. 302.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   50 citations  
  • The collectivist approach to collective moral responsibility.Seumas Miller & Pekka Makela - 2005 - Metaphilosophy 36 (5):634-651.
    In this article we critique the collectivist approach to collective moral responsibility. According to philosophers of a collectivist persuasion, a central notion of collective moral responsibility is moral responsibility assigned to a collective as a single entity. In our critique, we proceed by way of discussing the accounts and arguments of three prominent representatives of the collectivist approach with respect to collective responsibility: Margaret Gilbert, Russell Hardin, and Philip Pettit. Our aims are mainly critical; however, this should not be taken (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   36 citations  
  • Two kinds of we-reasoning.Raul Hakli, Kaarlo Miller & Raimo Tuomela - 2010 - Economics and Philosophy 26 (3):291-320.
    Page 1. Economics and Philosophy, 26 291--320 Copyright C Cambridge University Press doi: 10.1017 / S0266267110000386 TWO KINDS OF WE-REASONING RAUL HAKLI, KAARLO MILLER AND RAIMO TUOMELA University of Helsinki.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   45 citations  
  • Joint Action and Development.Stephen Andrew Butterfill - 2012 - Philosophical Quarterly 62 (246):23-47.
    Given the premise that joint action plays some role in explaining how humans come to understand minds, what could joint action be? Not what a leading account, Michael Bratman's, says it is. For on that account engaging in joint action involves sharing intentions and sharing intentions requires much of the understanding of minds whose development is supposed to be explained by appeal to joint action. This paper therefore offers an account of a different kind of joint action, an account compatible (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   57 citations  
  • Agentive experiences as pushmi-pullyu representations.Timothy Bayne - 2011 - In Jesús H. Aguilar, Andrei A. Buckareff & Keith Frankish (eds.), New waves in philosophy of action. New York: Palgrave-Macmillan. pp. 219--36.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  • Varieties of Meaning: The 2002 Jean Nicod Lectures.Ruth Garrett Millikan - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75 (3):674-681.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   81 citations  
  • Delusion and self-deception: Mapping the terrain.Tim Bayne & Jordi Fernández - 2008 - In Tim Bayne & Jordi Fernández (eds.), Delusion and Self-Deception: Affective and Motivational Influences on Belief Formation (Macquarie Monographs in Cognitive Science). Psychology Press. pp. 1-21.
    The papers in this volume are drawn from a workshop on delusion and self-deception, held at Macquarie University in November of 2004. Our aim was to bring together theorists working on delusions and self-deception with an eye towards identifying and fostering connections—at both empirical and conceptual levels—between these domains. As the contributions to this volume testify, there are multiple points of contact between delusion and self-deception. This introduction charts the conceptual space in which these points of contact can be located (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   20 citations  
  • (1 other version)Joint attention, communication, and mind.Naomi Eilan - 2005 - In Naomi Eilan, Christoph Hoerl, Teresa McCormack & Johannes Roessler (eds.), Joint Attention: Communication and Other Minds: Issues in Philosophy and Psychology. Oxford, GB: Oxford: Clarendon Press.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   34 citations