- Immodest inductive methods.David Lewis - 1971 - Philosophy of Science 38 (1):54-63.details
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(2 other versions)Why meaning (probably) isn't conceptual role.J. A. Fodor & E. LePore - 1993 - Philosophical Issues 3:15-35.details
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The question of realism.Kit Fine - 2001 - Philosophers' Imprint 1:1-30.details
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(2 other versions)Mathematical truth.Paul Benacerraf - 1973 - Journal of Philosophy 70 (19):661-679.details
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Logical pluralism.Jc Beall & Greg Restall - 2000 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 78 (4):475 – 493.details
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A Study of Concepts.Christopher Peacocke - 1992 - MIT Press.details
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(1 other version)The rule-following considerations.Paul Boghossian - 1989 - Mind 98 (392):507-49.details
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Wittgenstein on rules and private language: an elementary exposition.Saul A. Kripke - 1982 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.details
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(2 other versions)Why meaning (probably) isn't conceptual role.Jerry Fodor & Ernest Lepore - 1991 - Mind and Language 6 (4):328-43.details
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How to Disagree about How to Disagree.Adam Elga - 2010 - In Richard Feldman & Ted A. Warfield (eds.), Disagreement. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press. pp. 175-186.details
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Thinking How to Live.Allan Gibbard - 2004 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 66 (2):381-381.details
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Truth and Objectivity.Crispin Wright - 1992 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56 (4):883-890.details
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On the Plurality of Worlds.David Lewis - 1986 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 178 (3):388-390.details
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(3 other versions)Change in View: Principles of Reasoning.Gilbert Harman - 1986 - Studia Logica 48 (2):260-261.details
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(1 other version)The Runabout Inference-Ticket.A. N. Prior - 1960 - Analysis 21 (2):38-39.details
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Contemporary Theories of Knowledge.John Pollock - 1986 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 39 (1):131-140.details
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The Logical Basis of Metaphysics.Michael Dummett, Hilary Putnam & James Conant - 1994 - Philosophical Quarterly 44 (177):519-527.details
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(1 other version)Goldman's psychologism: Review of Epistemology and Cognition. [REVIEW]Paul Thagard - 1986 - Erkenntnis 34 (1):117-123.details
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(4 other versions)Probability and Evidence.Paul Horwich - 1985 - Erkenntnis 23 (2):213-219.details
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Blind reasoning.Paul A. Boghossian - 2003 - Supplement to the Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 77 (1):225-248.details
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Epistemological Challenges to Mathematical Platonism.Øystein Linnebo - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 129 (3):545-574.details
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(1 other version)Logic and Truth.Ken Akiba - 2000 - Journal of Philosophical Research 25:101-123.details
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(2 other versions)Why meaning (probably) isn't conceptual role.Jerry A. Fodor & Ernest Lepore - 2010 - In Darragh Byrne & Max Kölbel (eds.), Arguing about language. New York: Routledge. pp. 15 - 35.details
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Reflections on meaning.Paul Horwich - 2005 - New York : Oxford University Press,: Clarendon Press ;.details
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Wittgenstein's remarks on the foundations of mathematics. [REVIEW]G. Kreisel - 1958 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 9 (34):135-158.details
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(1 other version)Iis Platonism Epistemologically Bankrupt?Bob Hale - 1998 - In Matthias Schirn (ed.), The Philosophy of Mathematics Today: Papers From a Conference Held in Munich From June 28 to July 4,1993. Oxford, England: Clarendon Press.details
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Platonism and Anti-Platonism in Mathematics. [REVIEW]Matthew McGrath - 2001 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63 (1):239-242.details
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Platonism and Anti-Platonism in Mathematics.Mark Balaguer - 1998 - Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 8 (4):516-518.details
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How Are A Priori Truths Possible?1.Christopher Peacocke - 1993 - European Journal of Philosophy 1 (2):175-199.details
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Understanding and Inference.Timothy Williamson - 2003 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 77 (1):249-293.details
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Grounding Concepts: An Empirical Basis for Arithmetical Knowledge.Carrie Jenkins - 2008 - Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.details
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Modality, modal epistemology, and the metaphysics of consciousness.Christopher Hill - 2006 - In Shaun Nichols (ed.), The Architecture of the Imagination: New Essays on Pretence, Possibility, and Fiction. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press UK.details
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Meaning, understanding, and practice: philosophical essays.Barry Stroud - 2000 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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On the Plurality of Worlds.Allen Stairs - 1988 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 49 (2):333-352.details
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Contemporary Theories of Knowledge.Hilary Kornblith - 1988 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 49 (1):167-171.details
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Invariances: The Structure of the Objective World.Robert Nozick - 2001 - Philosophy 80 (311):145-151.details
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The Past.Christopher Peacocke - 1999 - In Being known. New York: Oxford University Press.details
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(1 other version)Platonism and Anti-Platonism in Mathematics.John P. Burgess - 2001 - Philosophical Review 110 (1):79.details
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Which Undecidable Sentences have Truth Values?H. Field - 1998 - In Harold Garth Dales & Gianluigi Oliveri (eds.), Truth in mathematics. New York: Oxford University Press, Usa.details
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(1 other version)What mathematical knowledge could be.Jerrold J. Katz - 1995 - Mind 104 (415):491-520.details
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Invariances: The Structure of the Objective World.Robert Hopkins - 2003 - Mind 112 (447):558-563.details
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(1 other version)Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language.Paul Horwich - 1984 - Philosophy of Science 51 (1):163-171.details
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Evolution and the Necessities of Thought.Barry Stroud - 2002 - In Stewart Candlish (ed.), Meaning, Understanding, and Practice. Oxford University Press.details
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Steps toward a mental predicate logic.Martin D. S. Braine - 1998 - Mental Logic.details
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1. the concept of apriority.Hartry Field - 2000 - In Paul Artin Boghossian & Christopher Peacocke (eds.), New Essays on the A Priori. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press. pp. 117.details
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(1 other version)The realm of reason.Christopher Peacocke - 2004 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Naturalized platonism versus platonized naturalism.Bernard Linsky & Edward N. Zalta - 1995 - Journal of Philosophy 92 (10):525-555.details
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(1 other version)Truth and Objectivity.Crispin Wright - 1992 - Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.details
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(2 other versions)Allan Gibbard, Thinking How to Live. [REVIEW]David O. Brink - 2007 - Philosophical Review 116 (2):267-272.details
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Which undecidable mathematical sentences have determinate truth values.Hartry Field - 1998 - In Harold Garth Dales & Gianluigi Oliveri (eds.), Truth in mathematics. New York: Oxford University Press, Usa. pp. 291--310.details
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