- (1 other version)Disagreement.Richard Feldman & Ted A. Warfield (eds.) - 2010 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.details
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Luck, Rationality, and Explanation.Joshua Schechter - manuscriptdetails
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Rational Self-Doubt and the Failure of Closure.Joshua Schechter - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 163 (2):428-452.details
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The Reliability Challenge and the Epistemology of Logic.Joshua Schechter - 2010 - Philosophical Perspectives 24 (1):437-464.details
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¿Puedo reconocer a un par distante? Una consecuencia del desacuerdo profundo entre pares epistémicos.Ignacio Madroñal - 2023 - Filosofia Unisinos 24 (2):1-14.details
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Lewis on immodest inductive models.Stephen Spielman - 1972 - Philosophy of Science 39 (3):375-377.details
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Inductive immodesty and lawlikeness.Juhani Pietarinen - 1974 - Philosophy of Science 41 (2):196-198.details
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How to Disagree about How to Disagree.Adam Elga - 2010 - In Richard Feldman & Ted A. Warfield (eds.), Disagreement. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press. pp. 175-186.details
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On the Nature and Relationship of Individual and Collective Justification.Simon Graf - 2024 - Dissertation, University of Leedsdetails
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A Stochastic Model of Mathematics and Science.David H. Wolpert & David B. Kinney - 2024 - Foundations of Physics 54 (2):1-67.details
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Inquiry beyond knowledge.Bob Beddor - 2023 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 109 (1):330-356.details
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Generalized Immodesty Principles in Epistemic Utility Theory.Alejandro Pérez Carballo - 2023 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 10 (31):874–907.details
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Friends with the Good: Moral Relativism and Moral Progress.Eduardo Pérez-Navarro - 2023 - Philosophical Quarterly 74 (3):886-899.details
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(1 other version)Bridge Principles and Epistemic Norms.Claire Https://Orcidorg Field & Bruno Jacinto - 2022 - Erkenntnis:1-53.details
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Debunking Debunked? : Challenges, Prospects, and the Threat of Self-Defeat.Conrad Bakka - 2023 - Dissertation, Stockholm Universitydetails
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Proper scoring rules in epistemic decision theory.Maomei Wang - 2020 - Dissertation, Lingnan Universitydetails
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Immodesty and permissivism.Marc-Kevin Daoust & David Montminy - 2022 - Synthese 200 (4):1-21.details
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Imperfection, Accuracy, and Structural Rationality.Marc-Kevin Daoust - 2024 - Erkenntnis 89 (3):1095-1116.details
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Optimizing Individual and Collective Reliability: A Puzzle.Marc-Kevin Daoust - 2022 - Social Epistemology 36 (4):516-531.details
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Seek the Joints! Avoid the Gruesome! Fidelity as an Epistemic Value.Peter Finocchiaro - 2023 - Episteme 20 (2):393-409.details
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Structural Rationality and the Property of Coherence.Marc-Kevin Daoust - 2023 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 104 (1):170-194.details
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Logical Form and the Limits of Thought.Manish Oza - 2020 - Dissertation, University of Torontodetails
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Learning from Scientific Disagreement.Bruno Borge & Nicolás Lo Guercio - 2021 - Theoria: Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia 36 (3):375-398.details
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Can Arbitrary Beliefs be Rational?Mattias Skipper - 2023 - Episteme 20 (2):377-392.details
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Epistemic Consequentialism, Veritism, and Scoring Rules.Marc-Kevin Daoust & Charles Côté-Bouchard - 2023 - Erkenntnis 88 (4):1741-1765.details
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Permissivism and the Truth Connection.Michele Palmira - 2023 - Erkenntnis 88 (2):641-656.details
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Should agents be immodest?Marc-Kevin Daoust - 2020 - Analytic Philosophy 62 (3):235-251.details
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How to endorse conciliationism.Will Fleisher - 2021 - Synthese 198 (10):9913-9939.details
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Unacknowledged Permissivism.Julia Jael Smith - 2020 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 101 (1):158-183.details
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Epistemic Existentialism.Laura Frances Callahan - 2021 - Episteme 18 (4):539-554.details
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Precise Credences.Michael Titelbaum - 2019 - In Richard Pettigrew & Jonathan Weisberg (eds.), The Open Handbook of Formal Epistemology. PhilPapers Foundation. pp. 1-55.details
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(1 other version)Basic disagreements among epistemic Peers.Nicolás Lo Guercio - 2018 - Ideas Y Valores 67 (168):81-99.details
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Are There Indefeasible Epistemic Rules?Darren Bradley - 2019 - Philosophers' Imprint 19.details
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Should we be dogmatically conciliatory?Clayton Littlejohn - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (5):1381-1398.details
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Peer Disagreement and the Bridge Principle.Marc-Kevin Daoust - 2021 - Topoi 40 (5):1213-1223.details
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How Supererogation Can Save Intrapersonal Permissivism.Han Li - 2019 - American Philosophical Quarterly 56 (2):171-186.details
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Evidence and fallibility.Joshua DiPaolo - 2019 - Episteme 16 (1):39-55.details
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Second best epistemology: fallibility and normativity.Joshua DiPaolo - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (8):2043-2066.details
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The Self-Undermining Arguments from Disagreement.Eric Sampson - 2019 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 14:23-46.details
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The trouble with having standards.Han Li - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (5):1225-1245.details
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Logical Partisanhood.Jack Woods - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (5):1203-1224.details
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Rationality as the Capacity for Understanding.Karl Schafer - 2019 - Noûs 53 (3):639-663.details
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Fallibility and Normativity.DiPaolo Joshua - 2016 - Dissertation, University of Massachusetts - Amherstdetails
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When Rational Reasoners Reason Differently.Michael G. Titelbaum & Matthew Kopec - 2019details
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Epistemic Value and the Jamesian Goals.Sophie Horowitz - 2018 - In Kristoffer Ahlstrom-Vij & Jeff Dunn (eds.), Epistemic Consequentialism. Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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Irrelevant Influences.Katia Vavova - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research:134-152.details
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(1 other version)On the Supposed Dilemma of Conciliationism.Stefan Reining - 2015 - Episteme:1-24.details
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For Bayesians, Rational Modesty Requires Imprecision.Brian Weatherson - 2015 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 2.details
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Uniqueness and Metaepistemology.Daniel Greco & Brian Hedden - 2016 - Journal of Philosophy 113 (8):365-395.details
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Epistemic Modesty Defended.David Christensen - 2013 - In David Phiroze Christensen & Jennifer Lackey (eds.), The Epistemology of Disagreement: New Essays. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 77.details
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