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Moral Disagreement and Epistemic Advantages

Ben Sherman

Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 8 (3):1-20 (2015)

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(4 other versions)The Structure of Scientific Revolutions.Thomas Samuel Kuhn - 1962 - Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Edited by Otto Neurath.details A scientific community cannot practice its trade without some set of received beliefs. These beliefs form the foundation of the "educational initiation that prepares and licenses the student for professional practice". The nature of the "rigorous and rigid" preparation helps ensure that the received beliefs are firmly fixed in the student's mind. Scientists take great pains to defend the assumption that scientists know what the world is like...To this end, "normal science" will often suppress novelties which undermine its foundations. Research (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 2709 citations
Epistemological puzzles about disagreement.Richard Feldman - 2006 - In Stephen Cade Hetherington (ed.), Epistemology futures. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 216-236.details My conclusion will be that, more often than we might have thought, suspension of judgment is the epistemically proper attitude. It follows that in such cases we lack reasonable belief and so, at least on standard conceptions, knowledge. This is a kind of contingent real-world skepticism that has not received the attention it deserves. I hope that this paper will help to bring this issue to life. Download Export citation Bookmark 288 citations
(1 other version)Epistemology of disagreement: The good news.David Christensen - 2007 - Philosophical Review 116 (2):187-217.details How should one react when one has a belief, but knows that other people—who have roughly the same evidence as one has, and seem roughly as likely to react to it correctly—disagree? This paper argues that the disagreement of other competent inquirers often requires one to be much less confident in one’s opinions than one would otherwise be. Download Export citation Bookmark 602 citations
Moorean Facts and Belief Revision, or Can the Skeptic Win?Thomas Kelly - 2005 - Philosophical Perspectives 19 (1):179-209.details A Moorean fact, in the words of the late David Lewis, is ‘one of those things that we know better than we know the premises of any philosophical argument to the contrary’. Lewis opens his seminal paper ‘Elusive Knowledge’ with the following declaration. Download Export citation Bookmark 48 citations
Coherence and Models for Moral Theorizing.Geoffrey Sayre-McCord - 1985 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 66 (1-2):170-190.details Download Export citation Bookmark 9 citations

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