- (1 other version)John Buridan on self-reference: chapter eight of Buridan's Sophismata.Jean Buridan (ed.) - 1982 - New York: Cambridge University Press.details
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Evidentialism.Richard Feldman & Earl Conee - 1985 - Philosophical Studies 48 (1):15 - 34.details
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(1 other version)Epistemic permissiveness.Roger White - 2005 - Philosophical Perspectives 19 (1):445–459.details
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Anti-expertise, instability, and rational choice.Roy Sorensen - 1987 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 65 (3):301 – 315.details
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On a Moorean solution to instability puzzles.Frederick W. Kroon - 1990 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 68 (4):455 – 461.details
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Evidence, pragmatics, and justification.Jeremy Fantl & Matthew McGrath - 2002 - Philosophical Review 111 (1):67-94.details
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Against an epistemic dilemma.Earl Conee - 1994 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 72 (4):475 – 481.details
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What We Epistemically Owe To Each Other.Rima Basu - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (4):915–931.details
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Enkrasia or evidentialism? Learning to love mismatch.Maria Lasonen-Aarnio - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (3):597-632.details
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Knowledge as a Non‐Normative Relation.Kurt Sylvan - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 97 (1):190-222.details
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Epistemic freedom revisited.Gregory Antill - 2020 - Synthese 197 (2):793-815.details
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The Structure of Justification.Sven Rosenkranz - 2018 - Mind 127 (506):629-629.details
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Explaining enkratic asymmetries: knowledge-first style.Paul Silva - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (11):2907-2930.details
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(3 other versions)Knowledge and Its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2005 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (2):452-458.details
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(3 other versions)Knowledge and Its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Philosophy 76 (297):460-464.details
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Epistemic Merit, Intrinsic and Instrumental.Roderick Firth - 1981 - Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 55 (1):5–23.details
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(3 other versions)Knowledge and Its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2003 - Philosophical Quarterly 53 (210):105-116.details
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The Rejection of Epistemic Consequentialism.Selim Berker - 2013 - Philosophical Issues 23 (1):363-387.details
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(1 other version)The Importance of Being Rational.Errol Lord - 2018 - Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.details
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Another Argument Against Uniqueness.Thomas Raleigh - 2015 - Philosophical Quarterly 67 (267):327-346.details
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Doxastic permissiveness and the promise of truth.J. Drake - 2017 - Synthese 194 (12):4897-4912.details
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Nothing but the Evidential Considerations?Nathaniel P. Sharadin - 2016 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 94 (2):343-361.details
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The Conflict of Evidence and Coherence.Alex Worsnip - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 96 (1):3-44.details
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Pragmatic Reasons for Belief.Andrew Reisner - 2018 - In Daniel Star (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity. New York, NY, United States of America: Oxford University Press.details
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Defeatism Defeated.Max Baker-Hytch & Matthew A. Benton - 2015 - Philosophical Perspectives 29 (1):40-66.details
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How and Why Knowledge is First.Clayton Littlejohn - 2017 - In J. Adam Carter, Emma C. Gordon & Benjamin W. Jarvis (eds.), Knowledge First: Approaches in Epistemology and Mind. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 19-45.details
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Knowledge First.Timothy Williamson - 2013 - In Matthias Steup & John Turri (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology. Chichester, West Sussex, UK: Blackwell. pp. 1-10.details
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Higher‐Order Evidence and the Limits of Defeat.Maria Lasonen-Aarnio - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (2):314-345.details
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Epistemic Decision Theory.Hilary Greaves - 2013 - Mind 122 (488):915-952.details
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Belief, credence, and norms.Lara Buchak - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 169 (2):1-27.details
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(1 other version)The Importance of Being Rational.Errol Lord - 2013 - Dissertation, Princeton Universitydetails
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A Puzzle about withholding.John Turri - 2012 - Philosophical Quarterly 62 (247):355-364.details
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Utilitarianism And Rationality.Earl Conee - 1982 - Analysis 42 (January):55-59.details
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``Evidence and Reasons for Belief".Richard Foley - 1991 - Analysis 51 (2):98-102.details
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The paradox of belief instability and a revision theory of belief.Byeong D. Lee - 1998 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 79 (4):314-328.details
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Ideal rationality and hand waving.Reed Richter - 1990 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 68 (2):147 – 156.details
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Evident, but rationally unacceptable.Earl Conee - 1987 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 65 (3):316 – 326.details
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Epistemic Rules.Paul A. Boghossian - 2008 - Journal of Philosophy 105 (9):472-500.details
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