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From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis.Frank Jackson - 1999 - Philosophical Quarterly 49 (197):539-542.details
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In Defense of Pure Reason: A Rationalist Account of a Priori Justification.Laurence BonJour - 1998 - Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.details
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The Philosophy of Philosophy.Timothy Williamson - 2007 - Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell.details
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Philosophy Without Intuitions.Herman Cappelen - 2012 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press UK.details
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Critique of Pure Reason.I. Kant - 1787/1998 - Philosophy 59 (230):555-557.details
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Expertise in Moral Reasoning? Order Effects on Moral Judgment in Professional Philosophers and Non-Philosophers.Eric Schwitzgebel & Fiery Cushman - 2012 - Mind and Language 27 (2):135-153.details
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Minimal Intuition.Ernest Sosa - 1998 - In Michael Raymond DePaul & William M. Ramsey (eds.), Rethinking Intuition: The Psychology of Intuition and its Role in Philosophical Inquiry. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. pp. 257-269.details
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Who's On First?Daniel C. Dennett - unknowndetails
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Acting contrary to our professed beliefs or the gulf between occurrent judgment and dispositional belief.Eric Schwitzgebel - 2010 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 91 (4):531-553.details
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Psychophysical and theoretical identifications.David K. Lewis - 1972 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (3):249-258.details
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Intuition and the Autonomy of Philosophy.George Bealer - 1998 - In Michael Raymond DePaul & William M. Ramsey (eds.), Rethinking Intuition: The Psychology of Intuition and its Role in Philosophical Inquiry. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. pp. 201-240.details
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Six Views of Embodied Cognition.Margaret Wilson - 2002 - Psychonomic Bulletin and Review 9 (4):625--636.details
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Psychology From an Empirical Standpoint.Franz Brentano - 1874 - Routledge.details
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Intuitions as evidence.Joel Pust - 2000 - New York: Garland.details
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Warrant and proper function.Alvin Plantinga - 1993 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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How to define theoretical terms.David Lewis - 1970 - Journal of Philosophy 67 (13):427-446.details
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The Epistemology of Thought Experiments: First Person versus Third Person Approaches.Kirk Ludwig - 2007 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 31 (1):128-159.details
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Failure to detect mismatches between intention and outcome in a simple decision task.Petter Johansson, Lars Hall, Sverker Sikstrom & Andreas Olsson - 2005 - Science 310 (5745):116-119.details
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Telling more than we can know: Verbal reports on mental processes.Richard E. Nisbett & Timothy D. Wilson - 1977 - Psychological Review 84 (3):231-59.details
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Who's on first? Heterophenomenology explained.Daniel C. Dennett - 2003 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 10 (9-10):19-30.details
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Human Inference: Strategies and Shortcomings of Social Judgment.Richard E. Nisbett & Lee Ross - 1980 - Englewood Cliffs, NJ, USA: Prentice-Hall.details
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Self-Deception Unmasked.Alfred R. Mele - 2001 - Princeton University Press.details
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Materialism and the psychological-continuity account of personal identity.Peter Van Inwagen - 1997 - Philosophical Perspectives 11:305-319.details
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Individualism and self-knowledge.Tyler Burge - 1988 - Journal of Philosophy 85 (November):649-63.details
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Apparent mental causation: Sources of the experience of will.Daniel M. Wegner & T. Wheatley - 1999 - American Psychologist 54:480-492.details
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A theory of phenomenal concepts.Michael Tye - 2003 - In Anthony O'Hear (ed.), Minds and Persons. Cambridge University Press. pp. 91-105.details
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Consciousness Explained.Daniel C. Dennett - 1991 - Penguin Books.details
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From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis.Frank Jackson - 1998 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory (2nd edition).David J. Chalmers - 1996 - Oxford University Press.details
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Phenomenal Structuralism.David J. Chalmers - 2012 - In David John Chalmers (ed.), Constructing the World. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 412-422.details
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Philosophical Naturalism.Hilary Kornblith - 2016 - In Herman Cappelen, Tamar Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophical Methodology. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press.details
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Individualism and Self-Knowledge.Tyler Burge - 2000 - In Sven Bernecker & Fred I. Dretske (eds.), Knowledge: readings in contemporary epistemology. New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Facing Up to the Hard Question of Consciousness.Daniel C. Dennett - 2018 - Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B Biological Sciences 373.details
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Explaining Variation within the Meta-Problem.E. Irvine - 2019 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 26 (9-10):115-123.details
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A Socio-Historical Take on the Meta-Problem of Consciousness.H. Lau & M. Michel - 2019 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 26 (9-10):136-147.details
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Chalmers' Meta-Problem.D. Rosenthal - 2019 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 26 (9-10):194-204.details
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From Sensor Variables to Phenomenal Facts.W. Schwarz - 2019 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 26 (9-10):217-227.details
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No Problem: Evidence that the Concept of Phenomenal Consciousness is Not Widespread.J. Sytsma & E. Ozdemir - 2019 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 26 (9-10):241-256.details
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From 'Consciousness' to 'I Think, I Feel, I Know': A Commentary on David Chalmers.A. Wierzbicka - 2019 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 26 (9-10):257-269.details
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Idealization and Problem Intuitions: Why No Possible Agent is Indisputably Ideal.Helen Yetter-Chappell - 2019 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 26 (9-10):270-279.details
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