- In Defense of the Phenomenal Concept Strategy1.Katalin Balog - 2011 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 84 (1):1-23.details
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Dualist emergentism Martine. Nida-Rmelin - 2007 - In Brian P. McLaughlin & Jonathan D. Cohen (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Mind. Blackwell.details
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God, mind, and logical space: a revisionary approach to divinity.István Aranyosi - 2013 - New York, NY: Palgrave-Macmillan.details
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Consciousness and the feeling body.Julian Kiverstein - 2010 - Pragmatics and Cognition 18 (3):607-616.details
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Phenomenal concepts: Neither circular nor opaque. E. Diaz-Leon - 2016 - Philosophical Psychology 29 (8):1186-1199.details
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Mind in a Humean World.Jens Harbecke - 2011 - Metaphysica 12 (2):213-229.details
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Are Phenomenal Concepts Perspectival?Andreas Elpidorou - 2012 - Southwest Philosophy Review 28 (1):43-53.details
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Imagining as a Guide to Possibility.Peter Kung - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (3):620-663.details
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Filozofija uma: pregled suvremenih rasprava o umu i tijelu (Eng. Philosophy of mind: a survey of contemporary debates on the mind-body problem).Marko Jurjako & Luca Malatesti - 2022 - Rijeka: University of Rijeka, Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences.details
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Taking referentialism seriously: A response to the modal argument.Brendan O'sullivan - 2010 - Theoria 76 (1):54-67.details
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Closing (or at least narrowing) the explanatory gap.Katalin Farkas - 2022 - In Peter R. Anstey & David Braddon-Mitchell (eds.), Armstrong's Materialist Theory of Mind. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 125-142.details
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Hard, Harder, Hardest.Katalin Balog - 2019 - In Arthur Sullivan (ed.), Sensations, Thoughts, and Language: Essays in Honor of Brian Loar. New York, NY: Routledge. pp. 265-289.details
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The Knowledge Argument is an Argument about Knowledge.Tim Crane - 2019 - In Sam Coleman (ed.), The Knowledge Argument. New York: Cambridge University Press.details
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Artificial consciousness: from impossibility to multiplicity.Chuanfei Chin - 2017 - In Vincent C. Müller (ed.), Philosophy and theory of artificial intelligence 2017. Berlin: Springer. pp. 3-18.details
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Reasons and Causes in Psychiatry: Ideas from Donald Davidson’s Work.Elisabetta Lalumera - 2018 - In Annalisa Coliva, Paolo Leonardi & Sebastiano Moruzzi (eds.), Eva Picardi on Language, Analysis and History. Londra, Regno Unito: Palgrave. pp. 281-296.details
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Getting Feelings into Emotional Experiences in the Right Way.Peter Goldie - 2009 - Emotion Review 1 (3):232-239.details
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Philosophical Investigation Series: Selected Texts on Metaphysics, Language and Mind / Série Investigação Filosófica: Textos Selecionados de Metafísica, Linguagem e Mente.Rodrigo Cid & Pedro Merlussi (eds.) - 2020 - Pelotas: Editora da UFPel / NEPFIL Online.details
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Consciousness and the Philosophy of Signs: How Peircean Semiotics Combines Phenomenal Qualia and Practical Effects.Marc Champagne - 2018 - Cham: Springer.details
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Giving Dualism its Due.William G. Lycan - 2009 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87 (4):551-563.details
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Emergentism and supervenience physicalism.Robert J. Howell - 2009 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87 (1):83 – 98.details
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Exclusion in Morality.Lei Zhong - 2016 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 93 (2):275-290.details
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Physicalism and the burden of parsimony.Giacomo Zanotti - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):11109-11132.details
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Consciousness, Neuroscience, and Physicalism: Pessimism About Optimistic Induction.Giacomo Zanotti - 2023 - Acta Analytica 38 (2):283-297.details
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Circularity in the conditional analysis of phenomenal concepts.Helen Yetter-Chappell - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 165 (2):553-572.details
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Dualism all the way down: why there is no paradox of phenomenal judgment.Helen Yetter-Chappell - 2022 - Synthese 200 (2):1-24.details
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Mind-Body Meets Metaethics: A Moral Concept Strategy.Helen Yetter-Chappell & Richard Yetter Chappell - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 165 (3):865-878.details
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Demystifying Emergence.David Yates - 2016 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 3:809-841.details
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A Posteriori Physicalism and the Discrimination of Properties.Philip Woodward - 2018 - Acta Analytica 33 (1):121-143.details
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The Hard Problem Isn’t Getting any Easier: Thoughts on Chalmers’ “Meta-Problem”.Ben White - 2020 - Philosophia 49:495-506.details
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Reduction Without Elimination: Mental Disorders as Causally Efficacious Properties.Gottfried Vosgerau & Patrice Soom - 2018 - Minds and Machines 28 (2):311-330.details
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Causal Exclusion without Causal Sufficiency.Bram Vaassen - 2021 - Synthese 198:10341-10353.details
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Categoricalism, dispositionalism, and the epistemology of properties.Matthew Tugby - 2014 - Synthese 191 (6):1-16.details
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Explaining causal closure.Justin Tiehen - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (9):2405-2425.details
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Causation in Physics and in Physicalism.Justin Tiehen - 2022 - Acta Analytica 37 (4):471-488.details
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Powerful qualities, the conceivability argument and the nature of the physical.Henry Taylor - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (8):1895-1910.details
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Physicalism and Phenomenal Concepts: Bringing Ontology and Philosophy of Mind Together.John Henry Taylor - 2013 - Philosophia 41 (4):1283-1297.details
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In Defence of Powerful Qualities.John H. Taylor - 2013 - Metaphysica 14 (1):93-107.details
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Two conceptions of subjective experience.Justin Sytsma & Edouard Machery - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 151 (2):299-327.details
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The Evolutionary Origins of Consciousness.Takayuki Suzuki - 2022 - Annals of the Japan Association for Philosophy of Science 31:55-73.details
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Phenomenal Concepts.Pär Sundström - 2011 - Philosophy Compass 6 (4):267-281.details
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On Imagism About Phenomenal Thought.Pär Sundström - 2011 - Philosophical Review 120 (1):43-95.details
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Is the mystery an illusion? Papineau on the problem of consciousness.Pär Sundström - 2008 - Synthese 163 (2):133-143.details
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Colour and Consciousness: Untying the Metaphysical Knot.Pär Sundström - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 136 (2):123 - 165.details
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Liberal phenomenal concepts.Benjamin D. Storer - 2020 - Philosophical Explorations 23 (2):95-111.details
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Intuition-Driven Navigation of the Hard Problem of Consciousness.Krzysztof Sękowski & Wiktor Rorot - 2022 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 13 (1):239-255.details
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Vagueness and zombies: why ‘phenomenally conscious’ has no borderline cases.Jonathan A. Simon - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (8):2105-2123.details
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What does It Mean to be a Mechanism? Stephen Morse, Non-reductivism, and Mental Causation.Katrina L. Sifferd - 2014 - Criminal Law and Philosophy:1-17.details
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In favor of (plain) phenomenology.Charles Siewert - 2007 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 6 (1-2):201-220.details
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The multiple-computations theorem and the physics of singling out a computation.Orly Shenker & Meir Hemmo - 2022 - The Monist 105 (1):175-193.details
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Causal Overdetermination and Modal Compatibilism.Kevin W. Sharpe - 2015 - Philosophia 43 (4):1111-1131.details
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