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(1 other version)A Theory of Sentience.Austen Clark - 2000 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 63 (3):622-623.details
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The First Person Perspective and Other Essays.Sydney Shoemaker - 1996 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 59 (2):378-378.details
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Critical Notice.Michael Tye - 2000 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (1):245-247.details
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Truth and Objectivity.Crispin Wright - 1992 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56 (4):883-890.details
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(1 other version)Propositional Objects.W. V. Quine - 1968 - Critica 2 (5):3.details
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(1 other version)A Theory of Sentience.Austen Clark - 2000 - Philosophy 77 (299):135-138.details
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The Varieties of Reference.Gareth Evans & John Mcdowell - 1986 - Philosophy 61 (238):534-538.details
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Consciousness and Experience.William G. Lycan - 1996 - Philosophy 72 (282):602-604.details
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(2 other versions)Naturalizing the Mind.Fred Dretske - 1995 - Philosophy 72 (279):150-154.details
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(1 other version)Why Colours.Harold Langsam - 2000 - Philosophical Quarterly 50 (198):68-75.details
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(2 other versions)Review of Barry Maund: Colours: Their Nature and Representation. [REVIEW]Jonathan Westphal - 1997 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 48 (1):143-148.details
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(1 other version)Consciousness, Color and Content.Michael Tye - 2003 - Philosophical Quarterly 53 (213):619-621.details
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Colours: Their Nature and Representation.Barry Maund - 1995. xv + 247 p - Philosophical Quarterly 48 (191):243-245.details
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(1 other version)From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis.Frank Jackson - 1999 - Philosophical Quarterly 49 (197):539-542.details
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A Theory of Sentience.José Luis Bermúdez - 2002 - Mind 111 (443):653-657.details
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(2 other versions)Naturalizing the Mind.Fred Dretske - 1997 - Noûs 31 (4):528-537.details
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Reply to Lopes.Fred Dretske - 2000 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60 (2):455-459.details
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Colours: Their Nature and Representation.Barry Maund - 1995 - Cambridge University Press.details
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The Varieties of Reference.Louise M. Antony - 1987 - Philosophical Review 96 (2):275.details
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(2 other versions)Review of Barry Maund: Colours: Their Nature and Representation. [REVIEW]Barry Maund & Jonathan Westphal - 1997 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 48 (1):143-148.details
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Objectivity refigured: Pragmatism without verificationism.Mark Johnston - 1993 - In John Haldane & Crispin Wright (eds.), Reality, representation, and projection. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 85--130.details
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Values and Secondary Qualitie.John McDowell - 1985 - In Ted Honderich (ed.), Morality and Objectivity : A Tribute to J. L. Mackie. Boston: Routledge. pp. 110-129.details
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(2 other versions)On the Way Things Appear.Sydney Shoemaker - 2006 - In Tamar Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Perceptual experience. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 461--480.details
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On sense and reference.Gottlob Frege - 2010 - In Darragh Byrne & Max Kölbel (eds.), Arguing about language. New York: Routledge. pp. 36--56.details
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Index, context, and content.David K. Lewis - 1980 - In Stig Kanger & Sven Öhman (eds.), Philosophy and Grammar. Reidel. pp. 79-100.details
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Demonstratives: An Essay on the Semantics, Logic, Metaphysics and Epistemology of Demonstratives and other Indexicals.David Kaplan - 1989 - In Joseph Almog, John Perry & Howard Wettstein (eds.), Themes From Kaplan. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 481-563.details
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Do colours look like dispositions?Alex Byrne - 2001 - Philosophical Quarterly 51 (203):238--45.details
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Truth and objectivity.Crispin Wright - 1992 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.details
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(1 other version)Consciousness, color, and content.Michael Tye - 2003 - Philosophical Studies 113 (3):233-235.details
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Self-knowledge and "inner sense": Lecture I: The object perception model.Sydney Shoemaker - 1994 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 54 (2):249-269.details
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Frege on demonstratives.John Perry - 1977 - Philosophical Review 86 (4):474-497.details
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Moral value, response-dependence, and rigid designation.Brad Thompson - 2006 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 36 (1):71-94.details
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The Varieties of Reference.Gareth Evans - 1982 - Oxford: Oxford University Press. Edited by John Henry McDowell.details
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Realism and response-dependence.Philip Pettit - 1991 - Mind 100 (4):587-626.details
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The manifest: Chapter.Mark Johnston - manuscriptdetails
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The transparency of experience.Michael G. F. Martin - 2002 - Mind and Language 17 (4):376-425.details
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How to speak of the colors.Mark Johnston - 1992 - Philosophical Studies 68 (3):221-263.details
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(1 other version)Why colours do look like dispositions.Harold Langsam - 2000 - Philosophical Quarterly 50 (198):68-75.details
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(1 other version)Colors and reflectances.Alex Byrne & David R. Hilbert - 1997 - In Alex Byrne & David R. Hilbert (eds.), Readings on Color, Volume 1: The Philosophy of Color. Cambridge, MA, USA: MIT Press.details
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Color constancy and Russellian representationalism.Brad Thompson - 2006 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 84 (1):75-94.details
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(2 other versions)Perception and the fall from Eden.David J. Chalmers - 2006 - In Tamar Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Perceptual experience. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 49--125.details
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(1 other version)Visual qualia and visual content.Michael Tye - 1992 - In Paul F. Snowdon (ed.), The Contents of Experience. New York: Cambridge University Press. pp. 158--176.details
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(1 other version)The refutation of idealism.G. E. Moore - 1903 - Mind 12 (48):433-453.details
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(1 other version)On sense and intension.David J. Chalmers - 2002 - Philosophical Perspectives 16:135-82.details
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(1 other version)The components of content.David J. Chalmers - 2002 - In David John Chalmers (ed.), Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings. New York: Oxford University Press USA.details
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Representationalism and the conceivability of inverted spectra.Brad Thompson - 2008 - Synthese 160 (2):203-213.details
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(2 other versions)On a confusion about a function of consciousness.Ned Block - 1995 - Brain and Behavioral Sciences 18 (2):227-–247.details
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Sensory awareness is not a wide physical relation: An empirical argument against externalist intentionalism.Adam Pautz - 2006 - Noûs 40 (2):205-240.details
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