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Frege on demonstratives

Philosophical Review 86 (4):474-497 (1977)

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  1. Senses for senses.Brad Thompson - 2009 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87 (1):99 – 117.
    If two subjects have phenomenally identical experiences, there is an important sense in which the way the world appears to them is precisely the same. But how are we to understand this notion of 'ways of appearing'? Most philosophers who have acknowledged the existence of phenomenal content have held that the way something appears is simply a matter of the properties something appears to have. On this view, the way something appears is simply the way something appears to be . (...)
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  • The A-Theory of Time, The B-Theory of Time, and ‘Taking Tense Seriously’.Dean W. Zimmerman - 2005 - Dialectica 59 (4):401-457.
    The paper has two parts: First, I describe a relatively popular thesis in the philosophy of propositional attitudes, worthy of the name ‘taking tense seriously’; and I distinguish it from a family of views in the metaphysics of time, namely, the A-theories (or what are sometimes called ‘tensed theories of time’). Once the distinction is in focus, a skeptical worry arises. Some A-theorists maintain that the difference between past, present, and future, is to be drawn in terms of what exists: (...)
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  • Taking Frege's name in vain.James Zaiss - 1993 - Erkenntnis 39 (2):167 - 190.
    A widely held view about Fregean Sense has it that the determination of a sign's referent by the sign's sense is achieved viasatisfaction: the sense specifies a condition (or set of conditions) and the referent is that entity, if any, which uniquely satisfies that (set of) condition(s). This is usually held in conjunction with the claim that the sense is existentially and qualitatively independent of the referent: if the referent did not exist, or did not uniquely satisfy the sense, the (...)
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  • Frege, Perry, and Demonstratives.Palle Yourgrau - 1982 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 12 (4):725 - 752.
    'You ask me about the idiosyncrasies of philosophers? There is their lack of historical sense, their hatred of even the idea of becoming, their Egyptianism. They think they are doing a thing honour when they dehistoricize it, sub specie aeternitatis — when they make a mummy of it.'Nietzsche, Twilight of the Idols.
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  • Dissolving type‐b physicalism.Helen Yetter-Chappell - 2017 - Philosophical Perspectives 31 (1):469-498.
    The majority of physicalists are type-B physicalists – believing that the phenomenal-physical truths are only knowable a posteriori. This paper aims to show why this view is misguided. The strategy is to design an agent who (1) has full general physical knowledge, (2) has phenomenal concepts, and yet (3) is wired such that she would be in a position to immediately work out the phenomenal-physical truths. I argue that this derivation yields a priori knowledge. The possibility of such a creature (...)
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  • Epistemic Modality De Re.Seth Yalcin - 2015 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 2:475-527.
    Focusing on cases which involve binding into epistemic modals with definite descriptions and quantifiers, I raise some new problems for standard approaches to all of these expressions. The difficulties are resolved in a semantic framework that is dynamic in character. I close with a new class of problems about de re readings within the scope of modals.
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  • Sentence-relativity and the necessary a posteriori.Kai-Yee Wong - 1996 - Philosophical Studies 83 (1):53 - 91.
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  • "A Priority" and Ways of Grasping a Proposition.Kai-Yee Wong - 1991 - Philosophical Studies 62 (2):151 - 164.
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  • Frege, hilbert, and the conceptual structure of model theory.William Demopoulos - 1994 - History and Philosophy of Logic 15 (2):211-225.
    This paper attempts to confine the preconceptions that prevented Frege from appreciating Hilbert?s Grundlagen der Geometrie to two: (i) Frege?s reliance on what, following Wilfrid Hodges, I call a Frege?Peano language, and (ii) Frege?s view that the sense of an expression wholly determines its reference.I argue that these two preconceptions prevented Frege from achieving the conceptual structure of model theory, whereas Hilbert, at least in his practice, was quite close to the model?theoretic point of view.Moreover, the issues that divided Frege (...)
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  • The semantic significance of the referential-attributive distinction.Howard K. Wettstein - 1983 - Philosophical Studies 44 (2):187--96.
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  • Frege on the Individuation of Thoughts.Leora Weitzman - 1997 - Dialogue 36 (3):563-574.
    It is easy to think of Frege as having offered two unintentionally discordant criteria for the identity of senses—one tied to the truth conditions of sentences, and one meant to capture relations of cognitive discriminability. This reading, however, is doubly mistaken; the discord between these two ways of thinking of senses has a Fregean resolution, but neither the resolution nor either of the original two pictures affords a genuine criterion for the identity of senses.
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  • Demonstrative sense and rigidity.Vojislav Bozickovic - 1993 - Philosophical Papers 22 (2):123-133.
    It is often thought that endowing a demonstrative with a Fregean sense leaves no room for maintaining that it is also a rigid designator. In addition, some philosophers claim that indexicals - surely the paradigms of singular reference - pose a serious threat to the Fregean sense/ reference approach as they do not comply with the view that singular terms have Fregean senses. In this paper I argue that neither of these is true.
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  • Thought Sharing, Communication, and Perspectives about the Self.Víctor M. Verdejo - 2018 - Dialectica 72 (4):487-507.
    Many scholars are ready to accept that first person thought involves a special way w such that, for any thinker x, only x can access the first person way w of thinking about x. Standard articulations of this Frege-inspired view involve a rejection of the strict shareability of first person thought. I argue that this rejection eventually forces us to renounce an intuitively plausible characterisation of communication, and specifically, disagreement. This result invites us to explore alternative articulations which, still within (...)
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  • On the self-ascription of deafferented bodily action.Víctor M. Verdejo - 2023 - Philosophical Explorations 26 (3):324-342.
    Subjects suffering from extreme peripheral deafferentation can recruit vision to perform a significant range of basic physical actions with limbs they can’t proprioceptively feel. Self-ascriptions of deafferented action – just as deafferented action itself – fundamentally depend, therefore, on visual information of limb position and movement. But what’s the significance of this result for the concept of self patently at work in these self-ascriptions? In this paper, I argue that these cases show that bodily awareness grounding employment of the self-concept (...)
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  • In Defence of the Shareability of Fregean Self-Thought.Víctor M. Verdejo - 2019 - Acta Analytica 34 (3):281-299.
    Consider the Unshareability View, namely, the view that first person thought or self-thought—thought as typically expressed via the first person pronoun—is not shareable from subject to subject. In this article, I show that a significant number of Fregean and non-Fregean commentators of Frege have taken the Unshareability View to be the default Fregean position, rehearse Frege’s chief claims about self-thought and suggest that their combination entails the Unshareability View only on the assumption that there is a one-to-one correspondence between way (...)
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  • Explaining Public Action.Víctor M. Verdejo - 2020 - Topoi 39 (2):475-485.
    Actions are uncontroversially public. However, the prevailing model of explanation in the debate about the de se seems to conflict with this fact by proposing agent-specific explanations that yield agent-specific types of action—i.e. types of action that no two agents can instantiate. Remarkably, this point affects both proponents and critics of the de se. In this paper, I present this kind of problem, characterise the proper level of analysis for action explanation compatible with the publicity of action—i.e. the agent-bound level—and (...)
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  • De Se Content and Action Generalisation.Víctor M. Verdejo - 2017 - Philosophical Papers 46 (2):315-344.
    Ever since John Perry's developments in the late 70s, it is customary among philosophers to take de se contents as essentially tied to the explanation of action. The target explanation appeals to a subject-specific notion of de se content capable of capturing behavioural differences in central cases. But a subject-specific de se content leads us, I argue, to a subject-specific notion of intentional action that prevents basic forms of generalisation. Although this might be seen as a welcome revision of our (...)
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  • Questioning to resolve decision problems.Robert van Rooy - 2003 - Linguistics and Philosophy 26 (6):727-763.
    Why do we ask questions? Because we want tohave some information. But why this particular kind ofinformation? Because only information of this particularkind is helpful to resolve the decision problemthat the agent faces. In this paper I argue thatquestions are asked because their answers help toresolve the questioner's decision problem, and that thisassumption helps us to interpret interrogativesentences. Interrogative sentences are claimed to have asemantically underspecified meaning and thisunderspecification is resolved by means of the decisionproblem.
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  • Intentional system theory and experimental psychology.Michael H. Van Kleeck - 1988 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 11 (3):533.
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  • Who Are We?Richard Vallée - 1996 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 26 (2):211-230.
    Personal and demonstrative pronouns are notorious for challenging any theory of natural language. Singular pronouns have received much attention from linguists and philosophers alike during the last three decades. Plural pronouns, on the other hand, have been neglected, especially by philosophers. I want to fill this gap and suggest accounts of ‘we,’ the plural ‘you,’ and ‘they.'Intuitively, singular and plural personal pronouns are ‘counterparts.' Any account of personal pronouns should make sense of this intuition. However, the latter is not very (...)
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  • What is special about indexical attitudes?Matheus Valente - 2018 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 61 (7):692-712.
    In this paper, I assess whether indexical attitudes, e.g. beliefs and desires, have any special properties or present any special challenge to theories of propositional attitudes. I being by investigating the claim that allegedly problematic indexical cases are just instances of the familiar phenomenon of referential opacity. Regardless of endorsing that claim, I provide an argument to the effect that indexical attitudes do have a special property. My argument relies on the fact that one cannot account for what is it (...)
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  • Le retour du psychologisme en théorie de la signification.Richard Vallée - 1995 - Dialogue 34 (4):777-.
    Traditionnellement, une théorie de la signification doit rendre compte à la fois des conditions de vérité des phrases des langues naturelles et des relations évidentes qu'entretiennent le langage et la pensée. À ce titre, le paradigme frégéen est un modele du genre. Une phrase y est dite exprimer une pensée, laquelle lui sert de valeur cognitive et a une valeur de vérité. Différentes occurrences d'une même phrase expriment une même pensée. Si cette phrase a une occurrence dans un contexte d'attitude (...)
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  • Indexicals in Fiction.Richard Vallée - 2022 - Disputatio 14 (66):305-325.
    Both the semantics of fictional discourse and the semantics of indexicality are canonical topics in the philosophy of language, on which there exists well-known significant literature. However, the same cannot be said for the terrain where they overlap. That is, the distinctive issues raised by fictive uses of indexicals and demonstratives have not been extensively studied per se. The aim of the present essay is to shed some light on this terrain, and to advance our understanding of some of these (...)
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  • Tense, Timely Action and Self-Ascription.Stephan Torre - 2009 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 80 (1):112-132.
    I consider whether the self-ascription theory can succeed in providing a tenseless (B-theoretic) account of tensed belief and timely action. I evaluate an argument given by William Lane Craig for the conclusion that the self-ascription account of tensed belief entails a tensed theory (A-theory) of time. I claim that how one formulates the selfascription account of tensed belief depends upon whether one takes the subject of selfascription to be a momentary person-stage or an enduring person. I provide two different formulations (...)
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  • Nonconceptual content.Josefa Toribio - 2007 - Philosophy Compass 2 (3):445–460.
    Nonconceptualists maintain that there are ways of representing the world that do not reflect the concepts a creature possesses. They claim that the content of these representational states is genuine content because it is subject to correctness conditions, but it is nonconceptual because the creature to which we attribute it need not possess any of the concepts involved in the specification of that content. Appeals to nonconceptual content have seemed especially useful in attempts to capture the representational properties of perceptual (...)
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  • De Se Puzzles and Frege Puzzles.Stephan Torre & Clas Weber - 2022 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 65 (1):50-76.
    What is the relationship between Frege’s puzzle and the puzzle of the de se? An increasingly influential view claims that the de se puzzle is merely an instance of Frege’s puzzle and that the idea that de se attitudes pose a distinctive theoretical challenge rests on a myth. Here we argue that this view is misguided. There are important differences between the two puzzles. First, unlike Frege puzzle cases, de se puzzle cases involve unshareable Fregean senses. Second, unlike Frege puzzle (...)
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  • Centered assertion.Stephan Torre - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 150 (1):97-114.
    I suggest a way of extending Stalnaker’s account of assertion to allow for centered content. In formulating his account, Stalnaker takes the content of assertion to be uncentered propositions: entities that are evaluated for truth at a possible world. I argue that the content of assertion is sometimes centered: the content is evaluated for truth at something within a possible world. I consider Andy Egan’s proposal for extending Stalnaker’s account to allow for assertions with centered content. I argue that Egan’s (...)
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  • ‘Portraying’ a Proposition 1.Mark Textor - 2001 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63 (1):137-161.
    Hector‐Neri Castaüeda claimed in several papers that a proposition expressed by an indexical sentence (in a context of utterance) can be re‐expressed by means of an oratio obliqua clause (in a sentential context) that contains a quasi‐indicator. Robert M. Adams and Rogers Albritton have presented a counter‐argument that is accepted by Castaüeda himself. I will argue that the Adams/Albritton argument is not convincing: The argument uses several assumptions which could be disputed. The paper tries to develop a more direct argument (...)
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  • Does the truth-conditional theory of sense work for indexicals?Mark Textor - 2010 - Nordic Journal of Philosophical Logic 6 (2):119-137.
    The truth-conditional theory of sense holds that a theory of truth for a natural language can serve as a theory of sense: if knowledge of a theory of truth for a language L is sufficient for understanding utterance of L-sentences, the T-sentences of the theory 'show' the sense of the uttered object-language sentences. In this paper I aim to show that indexicals create a serious problem for this prima facie attractive theoretical option. The so-called 'instantiation problem' is that a truth-theory (...)
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  • Frege's Theory of Hybrid Proper Names Developed and Defended.Mark Textor - 2007 - Mind 116 (464):947-982.
    Does the English demonstrative pronoun 'that' (including complex demonstratives of the form 'that F') have sense and reference? Unlike many other philosophers of language, Frege answers with a resounding 'No'. He held that the bearer of sense and reference is a so-called 'hybrid proper name' (Künne) that contains the demonstrative pronoun and specific circumstances of utterance such as glances and acts of pointing. In this paper I provide arguments for the thesis that demonstratives are hybrid proper names. After outlining why (...)
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  • Frege’s Theory of Hybrid Proper Names Extended.Mark Textor - 2015 - Mind 124 (495):823-847.
    According to Frege, neither demonstratives nor indexicals are singular terms; only a demonstrative together with ‘circumstances accompanying its utterance’ has sense and singular reference. While this view seems defensible for demonstratives, where demonstrations serve as non-verbal signs, indexicals, especially pure indexicals like ‘I’, ‘here’, and ‘now’, seem not to be in need of completion by circumstances of utterance. In this paper I argue on the basis of independent reasons that indexicals are in fact in need of completion; I identify the (...)
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  • What really matters.Charles Taylor - 1988 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 11 (3):532.
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  • The Problem of De Se Assertion.Isidora Stojanovic - 2012 - Erkenntnis 76 (1):49-58.
    It has been long known (Perry in Philos Rev 86: 474–497, 1977 ; Noûs 13: 3–21, 1979 , Lewis in Philos Rev 88: 513–543 1981 ) that de se attitudes, such as beliefs and desires that one has about oneself , call for a special treatment in theories of attitudinal content. The aim of this paper is to raise similar concerns for theories of asserted content. The received view, inherited from Kaplan ( 1989 ), has it that if Alma says (...)
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  • On the self-locating response to the knowledge argument.Daniel Stoljar - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 155 (3):437-443.
    On the self-locating response to the knowledge argument Content Type Journal Article DOI 10.1007/s11098-010-9612-2 Authors Daniel Stoljar, Philosophy Program, Research School of Social Sciences, The Australian National University, Canberra ACT, 0200 Australia Journal Philosophical Studies Online ISSN 1573-0883 Print ISSN 0031-8116.
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  • Connectionism, Realism, and realism.Stephen P. Stich - 1988 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 11 (3):531.
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  • Indexical belief.Robert C. Stalnaker - 1981 - Synthese 49 (1):129-151.
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  • Rethinking language, mind, and meaning.Scott Soames - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (9):2529-2532.
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  • Reply to critics of the analytic tradition in philosophy vol. 1 the founding giants.Scott Soames - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (6):1681-1696.
    Reply to Beaney: the closing of the historical mindIn his comments, Michael Beaney sets himself up as the arbiter of what is genuine history and what isn’t. While celebrating the outpouring of specialized scholarship on Frege, he has no patience with the enterprise outlined in the Précis, which attempts to construct a large-scale picture of the richness of the analytic tradition. That enterprise is one in which great figures of our recent past are challenged by aspects of contemporary thought, and (...)
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  • Propositions as Cognitive Acts.Scott Soames - 2019 - Synthese 196 (4):1369-1383.
    The paper reviews the central components of the cognitive theory of propositions and explains both its empirical advantages for theories of language and mind and its foundational metaphysical and epistemological advantages over other theories. It then answers a leading objection to the theory, before closing by raising the issue of how questions, which are the contents of interrogative sentences, and directives, which are the contents of imperative sentences, are related to propositions.
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  • Lost innocence.Scott Soames - 1985 - Linguistics and Philosophy 8 (1):59--71.
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  • Direct Reference, Propositional Attitudes, and Semantic Content.Scott Soames - 1987 - Philosophical Topics 15 (1):47-87.
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  • The new theory of reference entails absolute time and space.Quentin Smith - 1991 - Philosophy of Science 58 (3):411-416.
    The New Theory of Reference (NTR) of Marcus, Kripke, Kaplan, Putnam and others is a theory in the philosophy of language and there has been much debate about whether it entails the metaphysical theory of essentialism. But there has been no discussion about whether the NTR entails another metaphysical theory, the absolutist theory of time and space. It is argued in this paper that the NTR carries this entailment; the theory of time is the main focus of the paper and (...)
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  • The multiple uses of indexicals.Quentin Smith - 1989 - Synthese 78 (2):167--191.
    you use it. These two assumptions, which I believe to be false, are based on a more fundamental assumption, that the rule governing the reference of an indexical remains constant from use to use. Contemporary theories hold that the reference of an indexical varies from use to (relevantly different) use, but that the reference-fixing rule of use is You can search..
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  • Temporal indexicals.Quentin Smith - 1990 - Erkenntnis 32 (1):5--25.
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  • Styles of computational representation.M. P. Smith - 1988 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 11 (3):530.
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  • Marcus, Kripke, and the origin of the new theory of reference.Quentin Smith - 1995 - Synthese 104 (2):179 - 189.
    In this paper, presented at an APA colloquium in Boston on December 28, 1994, it is argued that Ruth Barcan Marcus' 1961 article on Modalities and Intensional Languages originated many of the key ideas of the New Theory of Reference that have often been attributed to Saul Kripke and others. For example, Marcus argued that names are directly referential and are not equivalent to contingent descriptions, that names are rigid designators, and that identity sentences with co-referring names are necessary if (...)
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  • Indexical sense and reference.David Woodruff Smith - 1981 - Synthese 49 (1):101 - 127.
    This is a study of the epistemology of indexical reference, Or its foundation in the intentionality of the speaker's awareness of the referent. Where the referent is the object of the speaker's acquaintance on that occasion, The sense expressed is the generic content of that awareness. This, Indexical sense determines indexical reference, But indexical sense works by appeal to the context of the speaker's awareness of the referent. It is discussed how, By virtue of indexical sense, Indexical reference is rigid, (...)
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  • A Theory of Propositions.Nicholas J. J. Smith - 2016 - Logic and Logical Philosophy 25 (1):83-125.
    In this paper I present a new theory of propositions, according to which propositions are abstract mathematical objects: well-formed formulas together with models. I distinguish the theory from a number of existing views and explain some of its advantages  chief amongst which are the following. On this view, propositions are unified and intrinsically truth-bearing. They are mind- and language-independent and they are governed by logic. The theory of propositions is ontologically innocent. It makes room for an appropriate interface with (...)
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  • Why philosophers should be designers.Aaron Sloman - 1988 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 11 (3):529.
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  • Observing a superposition.Paul Skokowski - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):7107-7129.
    The bare theory is a no-collapse version of quantum mechanics which predicts certain puzzling results for the introspective beliefs of human observers of superpositions. The bare theory can be interpreted to claim that an observer can form false beliefs about the outcome of an experiment which produces a superpositional result. It is argued that, when careful consideration is given to the observer’s belief states and their evolution, the observer does not end up with the beliefs claimed. This result leads to (...)
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