A paradox can be defined as an unacceptable conclusion derived by apparently acceptable reasoning from apparently acceptable premises. Many paradoxes raise serious philosophical problems, and they are associated with crises of thought and revolutionary advances. The expanded and revised third edition of this intriguing book considers a range of knotty paradoxes including Zeno's paradoxical claim that the runner can never overtake the tortoise, a new chapter on paradoxes about morals, paradoxes about belief, and hardest of all, paradoxes about truth. The (...) discussion uses a minimum of technicality but also grapples with complicated and difficult considerations, and is accompanied by helpful questions designed to engage the reader with the arguments. The result is not only an explanation of paradoxes but also an excellent introduction to philosophical thinking. (shrink)

In this influential study of central issues in the philosophy of science, Paul Horwich elaborates on an important conception of probability, diagnosing the failure of previous attempts to resolve these issues as stemming from a too-rigid conception of belief. Adopting a Bayesian strategy, he argues for a probabilistic approach, yielding a more complete understanding of the characteristics of scientific reasoning and methodology. Presented in a fresh twenty-first-century series livery, and including a specially commissioned preface written by Colin Howson, illuminating its (...) enduring importance and relevance to philosophical enquiry, this engaging work has been revived for a new generation of readers. (shrink)

The old evidence problem affects any probabilistic confirmation measure based on comparing pr(H/E) and pr(H). The article argues for the following points: (1) measures based on likelihood ratios also suffer old evidence difficulties; (2) the less-discussed synchronic old evidence problem is, in an important sense, the most acute; (3) prominent attempts to solve or dissolve the synchronic problem fail; (4) a little-discussed variant of the standard measure avoids the problem, in an appealing way; and (5) this measure nevertheless reveals a (...) different problem for probabilistic confirmation measures, a problem that is unlikely to lend itself to formal solution. (shrink)

This dissertation proposes a new sort of explication of the relation between a hypothesis and the data which test it. Instead of deductive, explanatory, or Bayesian probability relations, qualitative confirmation is explicated in terms of causal relations--E is evidence of H if and only if E is a causal consequence of H. Evidential inferences, according to this confirmation theory, are to be restricted to those licensed by underlying ontic relations. I show how the inferential properties of the causal relation match (...) intuitions about evidential relevance and thereby avoid the paradoxes of confirmation, including the Grue and Raven Paradoxes. This approach meshes with Salmon's ontic theory of scientific explanation, thus providing a unified integration of confirmation and explanation, and revealing the source of the warrant for the "inference to the best explanation" while additionally showing how that theory is incomplete. I also criticize Bayesianism and the hypothetico-deductive method, showing how the causal view's explication of evidential relevance is superior. Applications of this "Hypothetico-CausoInferential Method" are given using several historical scientific examples, including Oldham's discovery of the internal structure of the earth, Darwin's theory of evolution, Einstein's light-quanta hypothesis, and current debate on what killed the dinosaurs. The theory is compared and contrasted with similar views found in Aristotle, Descartes and Miller. It is judged against criteria of adequacy suggested by Hempel and Glymour, and I argue that it provides the best explanation of why controlled experimentation is taken as the hallmark of the scientific method. Finally, a strong version of the theory is considered which holds that in ideal circumstances a particular hypothesis may be confirmed with practical certainty by a single experiment, as Hume suggested. This possible notion of "inductive validity" is based upon a productive necessity-and-sufficiency analysis of causation, which I defend in detail against various objections using a proposed three-place model of the causal relation. (shrink)

THE PARADOXES OF CONFIRMATION ARE CONSTITUTED BY THE CONTRADICTIONS ARISING FROM THE CONJUNCTION OF THREE PRINCIPLES OF CONFIRMATION - NICOD’S CRITERION, THE EQUIVALENCE CONDITION, AND WHAT THE PAPER CALLS THE SCIENTIFIC LAWS CONDITION. THE PAPER DISCUSSES IN DETAIL THE VARIOUS SOLUTIONS PROVIDED BY ABANDONING ONE OF THE PRINCIPLES. IN THE END IT FINDS NICOD’S CRITERION FALSE, BUT FINDS THE EXPLANATIONS GIVEN BY H.G. ALEXANDER AND OTHERS OF WHY NICOD’S CRITERION IS FALSE THEMSELVES UNSATISFACTORY. IT THEN PROVIDES A MORE ADEQUATE ACCOUNT (...) OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES IN WHICH "RA.BA" CONFIRMS "ALL R’S ARE B". (shrink)