- Robustness Analysis as Explanatory Reasoning.Jonah N. Schupbach - 2018 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 69 (1):275-300.details
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Explanationism versus Modalism in Debunking (and Theory Choice).Harjit Bhogal - 2023 - Mind 132 (528):1005-1027.details
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Is Evidential Support the Same as Increase-in-Probability?Tamaz Tokhadze - 2022 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 99 (2):135–158.details
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Bayesian representation of a prolonged archaeological debate.Efraim Wallach - 2018 - Synthese 195 (1):401-431.details
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Permission to Believe: Why Permissivism Is True and What It Tells Us About Irrelevant Influences on Belief.Miriam Schoenfield - 2014 - Noûs 48 (2):193-218.details
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Actual Control - Demodalising Free Will.David Heering - 2020 - Dissertation, University of Leedsdetails
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Should Scientific Realists Embrace Theoretical Conservatism?Finnur Dellsén - 2018 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A:30-38.details
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On Russell's principle of induction.Newton C. A. Costa & Steven French - 1991 - Synthese 86 (2):285-295.details
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A problem for the alternative difference measure of confirmation.Nevin Climenhaga - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 164 (3):643-651.details
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The Independence Condition in the Variety-of-Evidence Thesis.François Claveau - 2013 - Philosophy of Science 80 (1):94-118.details
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Is Epistemic Anxiety an Intellectual Virtue?Frank Cabrera - 2021 - Synthese (5-6):1-25.details
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The Problem of Measure Sensitivity Redux.Peter Brössel - 2013 - Philosophy of Science 80 (3):378-397.details
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Keynes’s Coefficient of Dependence Revisited.Peter Brössel - 2015 - Erkenntnis 80 (3):521-553.details
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Monty hall, doomsday and confirmation.Darren Bradley & Branden Fitelson - 2003 - Analysis 63 (1):23–31.details
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Four Problems about Self-Locating Belief.Darren Bradley - 2012 - Philosophical Review 121 (2):149-177.details
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Bayesian Networks and the Problem of Unreliable Instruments.Luc Bovens & Stephan Hartmann - 2002 - Philosophy of Science 69 (1):29-72.details
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Coincidences and the Grain of Explanation.Harjit Bhogal - 2019 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 100 (3):677-694.details
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Evil and the god of indifference.László Bernáth & Daniel Kodaj - 2020 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 88 (3):259-272.details
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Curve-Fitting for Bayesians?Gordon Belot - 2017 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 68 (3):689-702.details
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Inquiry Beyond Knowledge.Bob Beddor - forthcoming - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.details
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What Makes Something Surprising?Dan Baras & Oded Na’Aman - 2022 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 105 (1):195-215.details
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Why Do Certain States of Affairs Call Out for Explanation? A Critique of Two Horwichian Accounts.Dan Baras - 2019 - Philosophia 47 (5):1405-1419.details
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A strike against a striking principle.Dan Baras - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (6):1501-1514.details
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Accuracy and Coherence: Prospects for an Alethic Epistemology of Partial Belief.James M. Joyce - 2009 - In Franz Huber & Christoph Schmidt-Petri (eds.), Degrees of belief. London: Springer. pp. 263-297.details
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Critical review: Horwich on the ravens, projectability and induction. [REVIEW]James Woodward - 1985 - Philosophical Studies 47 (3):409 - 428.details
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Bayesianism and diverse evidence.Andrew Wayne - 1995 - Philosophy of Science 62 (1):111-121.details
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Resolving the Raven Paradox: Simple Random Sampling, Stratified Random Sampling, and Inference to Best Explanation.Barry Ward - 2022 - Philosophy of Science 89 (2):360-377.details
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Gigerenzer's normative critique of Kahneman and Tversky.Peter B. M. Vranas - 2000 - Cognition 76 (3):179-193.details
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Hempel's Raven paradox: A lacuna in the standard bayesian solution.Peter B. M. Vranas - 2004 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 55 (3):545-560.details
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Belief attribution in science: Folk psychology under theoretical stress.J. D. Trout - 1991 - Synthese 87 (June):379-400.details
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Fine-tuning, multiple universes, and the "this universe" objection.Neil A. Manson & Michael J. Thrush - 2003 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 84 (1):67–83.details
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Judging the Probability of Hypotheses Versus the Impact of Evidence: Which Form of Inductive Inference Is More Accurate and Time‐Consistent?Katya Tentori, Nick Chater & Vincenzo Crupi - 2016 - Cognitive Science 40 (3):758-778.details
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Inductive reasoning and chance discovery.Ahmed Y. Tawfik - 2004 - Minds and Machines 14 (4):441-451.details
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Evolution and the Normativity of Epistemic Reasons.Sharon Street - 2009 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 39 (S1):213-248.details
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Robustness, discordance, and relevance.Jacob Stegenga - 2009 - Philosophy of Science 76 (5):650-661.details
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Bayesianism and the Value of Diverse Evidence.Daniel Steel - 1996 - Philosophy of Science 63 (4):666-674.details
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Hypothetico‐Deductive Confirmation.Jan Sprenger - 2011 - Philosophy Compass 6 (7):497-508.details
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Probability and proximity in surprise.Tomoji Shogenji - 2020 - Synthese 198 (11):10939-10957.details
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Credibility, confirmation and explanation.William Seager - 1987 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 38 (3):301-317.details
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Genuine Coherence as Mutual Confirmation Between Content Elements.Michael Schippers & Gerhard Schurz - 2017 - Studia Logica 105 (2):299-329.details
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What is epistemically wrong with research affected by sponsorship bias? The evidential account.Alexander Reutlinger - 2020 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 10 (2):1-26.details
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Popper's severity of test as an intuitive probabilistic model of hypothesis testing.Fenna H. Poletiek - 2009 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 32 (1):99-100.details
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Irrelevant conjunction and the ratio measure or historical skepticism.J. Brian Pitts - 2013 - Synthese 190 (12):2117-2139.details
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Bayesianism, Ravens, and Evidential Relevance.Robert T. Pennock - 2004 - Annals of the Japan Association for Philosophy of Science 13 (1):1-26.details
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Varieties of Error and Varieties of Evidence in Scientific Inference.Barbara Osimani & Jürgen Landes - 2023 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 74 (1):117-170.details
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Avoiding Epistemic Hell: Levi on Pragmatism and Inconsistency.Erik J. Olsson - 2003 - Synthese 135 (1):119-140.details
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What Accuracy Could Not Be.Graham Oddie - 2019 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 70 (2):551-580.details
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The uncertain reasoner: Bayes, logic, and rationality.Mike Oaksford & Nick Chater - 2009 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 32 (1):105-120.details
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Précis of bayesian rationality: The probabilistic approach to human reasoning.Mike Oaksford & Nick Chater - 2009 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 32 (1):69-84.details
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A rational analysis of the selection task as optimal data selection.Mike Oaksford & Nick Chater - 1994 - Psychological Review 101 (4):608-631.details
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