- Accuracy and Coherence: Prospects for an Alethic Epistemology of Partial Belief.James M. Joyce - 2009 - In Franz Huber & Christoph Schmidt-Petri (eds.), Degrees of belief. London: Springer. pp. 263-297.details
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Non-additive degrees of belief.Rolf Haenni - 2009 - In Franz Huber & Christoph Schmidt-Petri (eds.), Degrees of belief. London: Springer. pp. 121--159.details
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Good Questions.Alejandro Pérez Carballo - 2018 - In Kristoffer Ahlstrom-Vij & Jeff Dunn (eds.), Epistemic Consequentialism. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 123-145.details
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Robustness Analysis as Explanatory Reasoning.Jonah N. Schupbach - 2018 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 69 (1):275-300.details
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Calling for Explanation.Dan Baras - 2022 - New York, NY: Oxford University Press.details
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Fine-tuning and multiple universes.Roger White - 2000 - Noûs 34 (2):260–276.details
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Gigerenzer's normative critique of Kahneman and Tversky.Peter B. M. Vranas - 2000 - Cognition 76 (3):179-193.details
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Hempel's Raven paradox: A lacuna in the standard bayesian solution.Peter B. M. Vranas - 2004 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 55 (3):545-560.details
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Robustness, discordance, and relevance.Jacob Stegenga - 2009 - Philosophy of Science 76 (5):650-661.details
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Probabilistic measures of coherence: from adequacy constraints towards pluralism.Michael Schippers - 2014 - Synthese 191 (16):3821-3845.details
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Philosophy of science and the replicability crisis.Felipe Romero - 2019 - Philosophy Compass 14 (11):e12633.details
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A New Bayesian Solution to the Paradox of the Ravens.Susanna Rinard - 2014 - Philosophy of Science 81 (1):81-100.details
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What is epistemically wrong with research affected by sponsorship bias? The evidential account.Alexander Reutlinger - 2020 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 10 (2):1-26.details
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A Conflict between Indexical Credal Transparency and Relevance Confirmation.Joel Pust - 2021 - Philosophy of Science 88 (3):385-397.details
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Popper's severity of test as an intuitive probabilistic model of hypothesis testing.Fenna H. Poletiek - 2009 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 32 (1):99-100.details
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Irrelevant conjunction and the ratio measure or historical skepticism.J. Brian Pitts - 2013 - Synthese 190 (12):2117-2139.details
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Corroborating testimony, probability and surprise.Erik J. Olsson - 2002 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 53 (2):273-288.details
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What Accuracy Could Not Be.Graham Oddie - 2019 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 70 (2):551-580.details
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The uncertain reasoner: Bayes, logic, and rationality.Mike Oaksford & Nick Chater - 2009 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 32 (1):105-120.details
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A rational analysis of the selection task as optimal data selection.Mike Oaksford & Nick Chater - 1994 - Psychological Review 101 (4):608-631.details
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Epistemic values and the value of learning.Wayne C. Myrvold - 2012 - Synthese 187 (2):547-568.details
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Scotching the dutch book argument.Peter Milne - 1990 - Erkenntnis 32 (1):105--26.details
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Scientists' Argumentative Reasoning.Hugo Mercier & Christophe Heintz - 2014 - Topoi 33 (2):513-524.details
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In Pursuit of Resistance: Pragmatic Recommendations for Doing Science within One’s Means. [REVIEW]Amy McLaughlin - 2011 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 1 (3):353-371.details
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Undesigned Coincidences and Coherence for an Hypothesis.Lydia McGrew - 2020 - Erkenntnis 85 (4):801-828.details
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On Not Counting the Cost: Ad Hocness and Disconfirmation.Lydia McGrew - 2014 - Acta Analytica 29 (4):491-505.details
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Severe testing as a basic concept in a neyman–pearson philosophy of induction.Deborah G. Mayo & Aris Spanos - 2006 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 57 (2):323-357.details
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Fine-Tuning, Multiple Universes, and the 'This Universe' Objection.Neil Manson - 2003 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 84 (1):67 - 83.details
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Why scientists gather evidence.Patrick Maher - 1990 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 41 (1):103-119.details
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Bayesianism and irrelevant conjunction.Patrick Maher - 2004 - Philosophy of Science 71 (4):515-520.details
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Hitchcock and Sober on Weak Predictivism.Wang-Yen Lee - 2012 - Philosophia 40 (3):553-562.details
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The context of prediction (and the paradox of confirmation).Tony Lawson - 1985 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 36 (4):393-407.details
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Variety of evidence and the elimination of hypotheses.Jürgen Landes - 2020 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 10 (2):1-17.details
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The variety of evidence thesis and its independence of degrees of independence.Jürgen Landes - 2020 - Synthese 198 (11):1-31.details
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Variation and the accuracy of predictions.Michael Kruse - 1997 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 48 (2):181-193.details
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Measurement perspective, process, and the pandemic.Vadim Keyser & Hannah Howland - 2020 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 11 (1):1-26.details
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Experimental effects and causal representations.Vadim Keyser - 2017 - Synthese:1-32.details
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In defense of modest probabilism.Mark Kaplan - 2010 - Synthese 176 (1):41 - 55.details
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Shedding Dialectical Tiers: A Social-Epistemic View. [REVIEW]Jonathan E. Adler - 2004 - Argumentation 18 (3):279-293.details
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On Ratio Measures of Confirmation: Critical Remarks on Zalabardo’s Argument for the Likelihood-Ratio Measure.Valeriano Iranzo & Ignacio Martínez de Lejarza - 2013 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 44 (1):193-200.details
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Hempel meets Wason.I. L. Humberstone - 1994 - Erkenntnis 41 (3):391-402.details
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Theories of probability.Colin Howson - 1995 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 46 (1):1-32.details
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Popper, prior probabilities, and inductive inference.Colin Howson - 1987 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 38 (2):207-224.details
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Prediction versus accommodation and the risk of overfitting.Christopher Hitchcock & Elliott Sober - 2004 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 55 (1):1-34.details
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On the predilections for predictions.David Harker - 2008 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 59 (3):429-453.details
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A surprise for Horwich (and some advocates of the fine-tuning argument (which does not include Horwich (as far as I know))).David Harker - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 161 (2):247-261.details
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Richard Swinburne, the existence of God, and exact numerical values.Jeremy Gwiazda - 2010 - Philosophia 38 (2):357-363.details
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From mere coincidences to meaningful discoveries.Thomas L. Griffiths & Joshua B. Tenenbaum - 2007 - Cognition 103 (2):180-226.details
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Justifying conditionalization: Conditionalization maximizes expected epistemic utility.Hilary Greaves & David Wallace - 2006 - Mind 115 (459):607-632.details
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Wayne, Horwich, and evidential diversity.Branden Fitelson - 1996 - Philosophy of Science 63 (4):652-660.details
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